NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARMANDO ANTONIO MARROQUIN, No. 15-16515
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:11-cv-04535-SBA
v.
MEMORANDUM*
R. BOWMAN, M.D.; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Saundra B. Armstrong, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2017**
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Former California state prisoner Armando Antonio Marroquin appeals pro se
from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
claims relating to his medical treatment and subsequent transfer to an Arizona
correctional facility. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
novo. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) (failure to exhaust
administrative remedies); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004)
(summary judgment). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Marroquin’s
deliberate indifference claims stemming from his transfer to an Arizona
correctional facility because Marroquin did not properly exhaust all steps of the
grievance process, and he did not show that administrative remedies were
effectively unavailable to him. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006)
(“Proper exhaustion [of administrative remedies] demands compliance with an
agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules[.]”); Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623
F.3d 813, 823-24, 826-27 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing limited circumstances where
improper screening renders administrative remedies unavailable or where
exhaustion might otherwise be excused).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Marroquin’s
medical deliberate indifference claims because those claims are barred by the
statute of limitations. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and tolling laws
apply to § 1983 actions and California’s relevant statute of limitations is two
years).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Marroquin’s Federal
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Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion for reconsideration because Marroquin failed
to demonstrate any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v.
ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review
and grounds for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Marroquin’s motion
for leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper
when amendment would be futile).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Marroquin’s motion
to appoint counsel because Marroquin did not demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (setting
forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
We reject as meritless Marroquin’s contentions regarding the district court’s
failure to provide him with notice as required under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d
952, 959-60 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and failure to sua sponte transfer his claims
to Arizona district court.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
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Marroquin’s request for judicial notice, set forth in his opening brief, is
denied.
AFFIRMED.
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