FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APR 24 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUVENTINO RODARTE, No. 15-17126
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:14-cv-00468-KAW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ALAMEDA COUNTY, a public entity; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Kandis A. Westmore, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 18, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: D.W. NELSON and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and BURGESS,*** Chief
District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Timothy M. Burgess, United States Chief District
Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
Juventino Rodarte (“Rodarte”) appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Appellees in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
excessive force. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.
The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees
because Rodarte failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the
Deputy Sheriffs’ use of a police canine to effectuate Rodarte’s arrest was
objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See Long v. City & Cty. of
Honolulu, 511 F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 2007).
The district court also properly granted summary judgment on the Deputy
Sheriffs’ qualified immunity defense because their conduct did not violate
Rodarte’s clearly established right to be free from the use of excessive force during
an arrest. See Green v. City & County of San Francisco, 751 F.3d 1039, 1051–52
(9th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n officer will be denied qualified immunity in a § 1983 action
only if (1) the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting
injury, show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the
right at issue was clearly established at the time of the incident such that a
reasonable officer would have understood her conduct to be unlawful in that
situation.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
AFFIRMED.
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