NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LORRAINE PATTERSON, No. 15-17308
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-00321-NVW
v. MEMORANDUM*
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF
ECONOMIC SECURITY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2017**
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Lorraine Patterson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that more than a dozen defendants
violated her constitutional rights in connection with the removal of Patterson’s
daughter from her custody. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004). We
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The district court properly dismissed Patterson’s claims against the Arizona
Department of Economic Security as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See
Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (under the Eleventh
Amendment neither state nor state agency may be sued in federal court without its
consent).
The district court properly dismissed Patterson’s claims against Maricopa
County, the City of Mesa and the Mesa Police Department because Patterson failed
to allege facts sufficient to show a policy or custom of any of these entities
resulting in a constitutional violation. See AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of
Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (pleading requirements for a liability
claim against a municipality under Monell v. Department of Social Services of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
The district court properly dismissed Patterson’s claims against defendant
Hansen as barred by prosecutorial immunity. See Meyers v. Contra Costa Cty.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987) (absolute immunity
extends to quasi-prosecutorial functions connected with the initiation and pursuit
of child dependency proceedings).
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The district court properly dismissed Patterson’s claims against defendants
Milstead, McKay, Rodriguez and Stiles because Patterson failed to allege facts
sufficient to show that any of these defendants were the cause of Patterson’s
claimed deprivation of constitutional rights. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
142 (1979) (“[A] public official is liable under § 1983 only if he causes the
plaintiff to be subjected to deprivation of his constitutional rights.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The district court’s dismissal of defendants Miller, Nelson-McCall, Romero,
Mathlin and Youngman was improper. The district court concluded that these
defendants were entitled to absolute immunity as child services workers
performing quasi-judicial functions. However, Patterson alleged that they made
false statements and fabricated evidence in connection with the dependency
proceeding that terminated Patterson’s custody over her daughter, and we have
held that social workers are not immune from such claims. See Beltran v. Santa
Clara County, 514 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (social workers are “not
entitled to absolute immunity from claims that they fabricated evidence during an
investigation or made false statements in a dependency petition affidavit that they
signed under penalty of perjury . . . .”); see also Hardwick v. County of Orange,
844 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2017) (social workers are not entitled to absolute
immunity from claims alleging that they submitted false statements and fabricated
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evidence in dependency proceedings). Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of
these defendants only, and remand for further proceedings.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Patterson leave to
file a fourth amended complaint because Patterson failed to establish good cause
for her undue delay in seeking to amend. See Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d
992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and factors relevant to a
motion to amend).
We reject as unsupported by the record Patterson’s contentions regarding
judicial bias and fraud upon the court.
Patterson’s motion to file a substitute reply brief (Docket Entry No. 74) is
granted. The Clerk shall file the reply brief submitted as Docket Entry No. 75. To
the extent that Patterson seeks any other relief, this motion (Docket Entry No. 74)
is denied.
Patterson’s other pending motions (Docket Entry Nos. 18, 23, 36, 52, 53, 56,
70, 76 and 79) are denied.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
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