MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 25 2017, 8:09 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Brooklyn, Indiana
Caryn N. Szyper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jeffery L. Taylor, April 25, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
84A04-1609-CR-2254
v. Appeal from the Vigo Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable John T. Roach,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
84D01-1509-F3-2179
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issue
[1] Following a jury trial, Jeffrey Taylor was convicted of battery by means of a
deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony. On appeal, Taylor raises the sole issue of
whether there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Concluding
the State presented sufficient evidence, we affirm Taylor’s conviction.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The facts most favorable to the verdict reveal that on September 5, 2015, Taylor
and his girlfriend, Aurora Garcia, began drinking malt liquor around 12:00 p.m.
After drinking all day, Taylor became angry and verbally abusive during an
argument that evening. Taylor then grabbed a knife and tried to stab Garcia,
but she blocked his attempt with her left wrist. The knife left a gash in Garcia’s
left wrist and she was “bleeding all over the place.” Transcript, Volume 1 at 8.
Garcia wanted to call an ambulance, but Taylor had taken her phone and
would not let her leave or call for help. Garcia attempted to stop the bleeding
with toilet paper and a rag, but was unsuccessful. Taylor then told Garcia they
were going to bed; she waited for him to fall asleep and ran to her neighbor’s
house to call the police. When law enforcement arrived, Garcia told them
Taylor stabbed her.
[3] The State charged Taylor with criminal confinement, a Level 3 felony; battery
by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony; and domestic battery, a Class A
misdemeanor. At trial and on cross-examination, Taylor’s attorney elicited
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testimony from Garcia concerning her physical and mental health. Garcia
testified she has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, autism, bipolar disorder,
and that she often has trouble remembering things. While at the hospital
several hours after calling the police, Garcia had a blood alcohol content of
0.161. When asked why she did not tell the 911 operator she had been stabbed
or request a paramedic, Garcia responded, “[y]ou have to understand I was
drunk that day, I could of said something, I don’t even remember what
happened from that date to now. I don’t even remember what I did yesterday
and people want me to remember what I did eight . . . months ago.” Id. at 22.
Taylor’s attorney and Garcia also engaged in colloquy that went as follows:
[Counsel]: So what you are telling this jury is that you really
don’t remember everything that happened?
[Garcia]: Yes I am.
[Counsel]: And what you’re telling the jury is, is that they can’t
believe that your testimony is one-hundred percent
accurate, right? . . .
[Garcia]: Yes.
Id. at 38. Taylor’s attorney also asked Garcia if her recollection of the events
was mistaken, and Garcia responded, “[No,] I had been stabbed.” Id. at 22. In
addition, Taylor’s attorney asked Garcia why she lied to the police, telling them
Taylor arrived at her house around 11:00 p.m. Garcia responded that her
housing situation does not permit others to live with her, so she told the police
Taylor was just visiting.
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[4] A jury found Taylor guilty of battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5
felony, and the trial court sentenced Taylor to five years in the Indiana
Department of Correction. Taylor now appeals. Additional facts will be added
as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[5] In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we neither
reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we affirm if
there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the
crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 905-06 (Ind.
2005). It is the job of the fact-finder to determine whether the evidence in a
particular case sufficiently proves each element of an offense, and we consider
conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Id. at 906.
II. Incredible Dubiosity
[6] Taylor’s sole contention on appeal is that Garcia’s testimony was incredibly
dubious and, as such, there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction.
Our supreme court has explained the incredible dubiosity rule as follows:
Appellate courts may impinge upon a jury’s function to judge the
credibility of a witness . . . by applying the “incredible dubiosity”
rule. Application of the incredible dubiosity rule is limited to
cases with very specific circumstances because we are extremely
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hesitant to invade the province of the jury. . . . [T]o warrant
application of the incredible dubiosity rule, there must be: 1) a
sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently
contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a
complete absence of circumstantial evidence.
Smith v. State, 34 N.E.3d 1211, 1221 (Ind. 2015) (citations and some internal
quotations omitted). Although not impossible, the “incredible dubiosity” test is
a difficult standard to meet and requires great ambiguity and inconsistency in
the evidence. Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015). “The testimony
must be so convoluted and/or contrary to human experience that no reasonable
person could believe it.” Id. (citation omitted).
[7] The incredible dubiosity rule does not apply to Garcia’s testimony because her
testimony was not so convoluted or contrary to human experience such that no
reasonable person could believe it. Garcia’s testimony was not inherently
contradictory, as she never wavered in her claim Taylor stabbed her. Cf. Gaddis
v. State, 253 Ind. 73, 80, 251 N.E.2d 658, 661-62 (1969) (holding “[w]here the
state’s chief prosecuting witness, by his own admission is unsure as to the
identity of the criminal, and where other evidence or lack thereof would support
such uncertainty . . . such identification, as a matter of law, is insufficient
evidence”). When the police arrived on the evening of September 5, 2015,
Garcia told them Taylor stabbed her, and her allegation remained the same all
the way through trial. As to why she was untruthful with the police regarding
when Taylor arrived to her apartment, Garcia explained her concerns about
being evicted if her landlord discovered Taylor had been living with her.
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[8] Moreover, we cannot say Garcia’s mental health diagnoses and level of
intoxication make her testimony incredibly dubious. Garcia openly discussed
her numerous diagnoses and acknowledged her high blood alcohol content and
struggles to remember all the details of the evening. The potential uncertainty
of Garcia’s testimony “was put squarely before the jury, [and] the jury had the
ability to perform its role as a trier of fact and determine the extent to which it
affected the integrity of [her] testimony.” Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 623
(Ind. 2001). Therefore, we cannot conclude Garcia’s testimony was incredibly
dubious.
Conclusion
[9] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Taylor’s conviction.
Accordingly, we affirm.
[10] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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