[Cite as Huntsman v. State, 2017-Ohio-2622.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES:
CYNTHIA HUNTSMAN, ET AL : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
Plaintiffs-Appellants : Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr, J.
:
-vs- :
: Case No. 2016CA00206
STATE OF OHIO, ET AL :
:
Defendants-Appellees : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 2016CV01293
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 1, 2017
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiffs-Appellants For Defendant-Appellee
JOHN JUERGENSEN LYDIA ARKO
6545 Market Avenue North 30 E. Broad Street
North Canton, OH 44721 26th Floor
Columbus, OH 43215
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 2
Gwin, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant appeals the October 13, 2016 judgment entry of the Stark County
Court of Common Pleas granting appellee’s motion to dismiss.
Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} On September 5, 2012, Ohio enacted the Dangerous Wild Animal Act
(“DWA”), R.C. Chapter 935. The law went into effect on January 1, 2014. Under the
DWA, no person may possess a dangerous wild animal after January 1, 2014 without a
permit from the Ohio Department of Agriculture (“ODA”), unless the owner falls under one
of the statute’s exceptions. R.C. 935.02; R.C. 935.05(A); R.C. 935.07(A); R.C.
935.101(A). Under R.C. 935.03(B)(10), the permit requirement does not apply to an
owner who has been issued a permit under R.C. 1533.08, provided that permit lists each
specimen of wild animal that is a dangerous wild animal or restricted snake in the owner’s
possession.
{¶3} Appellant Cynthia Huntsman (“Huntsman”) operates Stump Hill Farm, Inc.
(“Stump Hill”), which houses and cares for various animals, including dangerous wild
animals. In her complaint, Huntsman alleges that twice in 2014, appellee ODA contacted
her because she lacked a permit for these dangerous wild animals. Huntsman informed
the ODA she was exempt from the DWA because of a previously-issued permit under
R.C. 1533.08. However, the ODA told Huntsman she was not exempt based upon this
previously-issued permit as her bald-eagle permit did not cover any of the dangerous wild
animals in her possession.
{¶4} On March 3, 2016, the ODA issued a quarantine order to Huntsman
pursuant to R.C. 935.20(A), which provides if the ODA believes a person possesses a
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 3
dangerous wild animal without a permit, it may quarantine the animals on site and restrict
any movement on and off the property. The quarantine order prohibited her from
acquiring or removing dangerous wild animals from her premises without approval from
the ODA. Huntsman filed a request for a hearing with the ODA as to the quarantine order
as provided for pursuant to R.C. 935.20 and R.C. Chapter 119.
{¶5} On May 4, 2016, the ODA obtained a search warrant under R.C. 935.20 for
Huntsman’s premises from the Stark County Common Pleas Court. On the same day,
the ODA executed an administrative order to transfer the dangerous wild animals from
Huntsman’s property pursuant to R.C. 935.20, which provides the ODA may order the
immediate transfer of the animals under an administrative transfer order. The ODA
transferred five tigers, two pumas, two baboons, and one chimpanzee from Huntsman’s
property. Huntsman appealed the transfer order pursuant to R.C. 935.20(D). Her appeal
was heard at an administrative hearing held on December 8, 2016.
{¶6} In response to the transfer, Huntsman filed a motion for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction seeking to block the ODA from enforcing the
transfer order and to require the ODA to return the transferred animals to Huntsman’s
possession. In support of her motion, Huntsman argued she was exempt from R.C.
Chapter 935 and should thus not be required to obtain a permit for the animals. Huntsman
was granted a temporary restraining order against the ODA by a trial court judge, who
ordered the ODA to return the seized animals by May 19, 2016.
{¶7} On May 10, 2016, the ODA sought a writ of prohibition against the trial court
judge to prevent him from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the case in which he
granted the restraining order. The ODA argued the trial court judge improperly exercised
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 4
judicial power over the underlying action and that his exercise of that power was
unauthorized by law. Further, that he patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over
transfer orders authorized under R.C. 935.20.
{¶8} On May 18, 2016, the Ohio Supreme Court issued State ex rel. Director,
Ohio Department of Agriculture v. Forchione, 148 Ohio St.3d 105, 2016-Ohio-3049, 69
N.E.3d 636. The Supreme Court held that the trial court judge patently and
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to order the return of the dangerous wild animals
seized from Huntsman. Further, that the Director of the ODA has exclusive authority to
implement and enforce R.C. Chapter 935, including the exclusive authority to order the
removal and quarantine of dangerous wild animals being held by an owner without a
permit to do so. Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition
preventing the trial court from exercising any further jurisdiction and ordered the trial court
to vacate its previous orders in the case.
{¶9} Huntsman filed a separate complaint with the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas on June 1, 2016 against the State of Ohio and the Director of the ODA.
According to the complaint, Huntsman had a permit issued under R.C. 1533.08 as of
January 1, 2014 (“ODNR permit”) and this permit states Huntsman “may possess
mammals, a bald eagle, and other non-releasable raptors for educational purposes.” A
copy of the permit was not attached to the complaint.
{¶10} In the first count of her complaint, Huntsman sought a declaratory judgment
pursuant to R.C. 2721.03 that she is exempt from the permit requirements of the DWA
based upon her ODNR permit and thus the ODA did not have jurisdiction or authority to
issue the transfer order or the quarantine order. In the second count of her complaint,
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 5
Huntsman alleged the ODA and State of Ohio violated her Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of the U.S. Constitution because they took her personal property
without compensation and without due process due to the fact that she is exempt from
the DWA. In the third count, Huntsman similarly alleged the ODA and State of Ohio
violated her rights under the Ohio Constitution because they took her personal property
without compensation as she was exempt from the DWA.
{¶11} Huntsman requested the following relief in her complaint: a declaration she
is exempt from the provisions of Chapter 935 of the Revised Code; a declaration the ODA
and State of Ohio violated her rights protected under the United States and Ohio
Constitutions; and for a court order requiring the return of the seized animals at the State
of Ohio’s cost.
{¶12} On July 1, 2016, appellees ODA and State of Ohio filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Civil Rules 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6). They argued that, pursuant to State ex rel.
Director, Ohio Dept. of Agriculture v. Forchione, 148 Ohio St.3d 105, 2016-Ohio-3049, 69
N.E.2d 636, the ODA has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with all issues arising from the
enforcement of the DWA in the administrative process, including whether or not
Huntsman is exempt; thus, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address
whether Huntsman was exempt from the DWA. Further, that administrative orders under
the DWA are subject to administrative review and the administrative process is the proper
means by which to challenge the administrative order.
{¶13} The ODA and State of Ohio also argued a declaratory judgment cannot be
used to create or extend jurisdiction that does not otherwise exist and is not a substitute
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 6
for an administrative remedy. Also, that Huntsman failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies.
{¶14} Huntsman filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss on
July 15, 2016. Huntsman argued: Forchione is wholly inapplicable to the instant case;
this case has nothing to do with the transfer order issued by the State; the trial court had
inherent authority to determine its own jurisdiction; statutory interpretation is the function
of the judiciary; and she is not required to exhaust her administrative remedies.
{¶15} The trial court held an oral hearing on the motion to dismiss and allowed the
parties to submit supplemental briefs after the hearing. The trial court issued a judgment
entry on October 13, 2016. The trial court found the Ohio Supreme Court ruled the ODA
has the exclusive authority to implement and enforce R.C. 935 and rejected Huntsman’s
assertion that the Forchione case has no bearing on the instant case. Further, the trial
court found that because the administrative proceeding in the DWA as set forth in R.C.
935.20 is a special procedure, declaratory relief is inappropriate.
{¶16} The trial court stated Huntsman may raise the applicability of any exemption
to the DWA at her administrative hearing and, after this hearing, Huntsman has the right
to object to the hearing officer’s report, may appeal the Director’s order to the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas, and may appeal any trial court ruling to the Tenth District
Court of Appeals. Further, if Huntsman had applied for and been denied a wild animal
permit, an appeal of that administrative decision by the ODA would be heard in the Stark
County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 119.12(A). Since Huntsman failed to
apply for such a permit, there is no remedy available in the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas.
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 7
{¶17} The trial court held that under R.C. Chapter 935, the ODA has exclusive
jurisdiction over enforcement of the DWA and this jurisdiction includes reviewing the
validity of any exemption from the permit requirement. Accordingly, the trial court found
it was without subject matter jurisdiction and granted the ODA and State of Ohio’s motion
to dismiss.
{¶18} Huntsman appeals the October 13, 2016 judgment entry of the Stark County
Court of Common Pleas and assigns the following as error:
{¶19} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS’
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION.”
I.
{¶20} Huntsman challenges the trial court’s Civil Rule 12(B) dismissal of her
complaint. The motion to dismiss filed by appellees contained both Civil Rule 12(B)(1)
and (6) arguments, i.e. issues of subject matter jurisdiction, and the exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Our standard of review on a Civil Rule 12(B) motion to dismiss
is de novo. Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors Inc., 49 Ohio St.3d 228,
551 N.E.2d 981 (1990).
{¶21} A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint. State ex rel. Hanson v.
Guernsey County Bd. of Commissioners, 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 605 N.E.2d 378 (1992).
Under a de novo analysis, we must accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true
and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Byrd v.
Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56, 565 N.E.2d 584 (1991). In order to dismiss a complaint pursuant
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 8
to Civil Rule 12(B)(6), it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of the claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief. York v. Ohio State Highway
Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (1991).
{¶22} The standard of review for dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Civil Rule 12(B)(1) is whether any cause of action cognizable by the forum
has been raised in the complaint. State ex rel. Bush .v Spurlock, 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 537
N.E.2d 641 (1989). This determination involves a question of law that we review de novo.
{¶23} Huntsman contends the Stark County Common Pleas Court has jurisdiction
over the instant case as R.C. 2721.03 specifically grants such jurisdiction to the common
pleas court to determine the construction of R.C. 935.03 as it applies to Huntsman.
Further, that the trial court has jurisdiction because Huntsman sought a declaration from
the trial court that R.C. Chapter 935 does not apply to her because of the exemption
language in R.C. 935.03(B)(10).
{¶24} A declaratory judgment action is a civil action and provides a remedy in
addition to other legal and equitable remedies available. Aust v. Ohio State Dental Board,
136 Ohio App.3d 677, 737 N.E.2d 605 (10th Dist. 2000). The essential elements for
declaratory relief are: (1) a real controversy exists between the parties; (2) the controversy
is justiciable in character; and (3) speedy relief is necessary to preserve the rights of the
parties. Id. All three requirements must be met in order for declaratory relief to be proper.
Id.
{¶25} The ODA makes several arguments to why the trial court properly dismissed
the complaint. First, the ODA contends the Ohio Supreme Court has already ruled on the
issue of who has jurisdiction in State ex rel. Director, Ohio Dept. of Agriculture v.
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 9
Forchione, 148 Ohio St.3d 105, 2016-Ohio-3049, 69 N.E.2d 636. Huntsman argues the
Forchione case has no bearing on the instant case because this case has nothing to do
with the transfer order and deals only with whether she is exempt from the DWA pursuant
to R.C. 935.03(B)(10).
{¶26} In May of 2016, the ODA obtained a search warrant under R.C. 935.20 for
the Huntsman premises. The ODA then executed a transfer order for several animals on
Huntsman’s property. In response to the transfer order, Huntsman filed a motion for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction seeking to block the ODA from
enforcing the transfer order and to require the ODA to return the transferred animals to
Huntsman. In support of the motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction, Huntsman asserted she was exempt from R.C. Chapter 935 and should thus
not be required to obtain a permit for her animals. After the trial court issued an order
requiring the ODA to return the animals to Huntsman, the ODA sought a peremptory writ
of prohibition from the Ohio Supreme Court, arguing the Stark County Common Pleas
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction with regard to the administration of R.C. Chapter
935.
{¶27} The Ohio Supreme Court first noted that, pursuant to R.C. 935.20, the
owner may request a hearing to dispute either a quarantine order or transfer action, and
the administrative review includes a hearing, objections, and judicial review under R.C.
Chapter 119. Id. Further, that only after these remedies are exhausted may the director
initiate proceedings for the permanent seizure of the animals. R.C. 935.20(H). Id.
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 10
{¶28} The Ohio Supreme Court found R.C. Chapter 935 is a comprehensive
statutory scheme regarding the regulation of wild animals, which vests exclusive authority
over such matters to the direction of the ODA. Id. The Supreme Court stated:
We hold that [the trial judge] patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction
to order the return of the dangerous wild animals seized from Cynthia
Huntsman and Stump Hill Farms. Daniels, as director of the ODA, has
exclusive authority to implement and enforce R.C. Chapter 935, including
the exclusive authority to order the removal and quarantine of dangerous
wild animals being held by an owner without a permit to do so.
Id. The Supreme Court thus granted the peremptory writ of prohibition preventing the trial
court from exercising any further jurisdiction and vacated the previous orders issued in
the case. Id.
{¶29} Though Huntsman argues the instant case is not a collateral attack on the
transfer order, the plain language contained in the complaint demonstrates she is
attempting to attack the transfer order in this case. In the first count of her complaint,
Huntsman avers she is “not subject to the jurisdiction of the State with respect to the
quarantine or transfer order because of her properly issued permit” and “the State did not
have jurisdiction and/or authority to issue the quarantine order or the transfer order.”
Further, Huntsman avers the common pleas court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues
because the State’s exclusive jurisdiction over the seizure of dangerous wild animals is
not applicable to her. In her prayer for relief, Huntsman sought a declaration that she is
exempt from the permitting requirements of the DWA on the basis of her ODNR permit
and asked the court for an order requiring the return of the seized animals at the State’s
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 11
costs. If the trial court were to issue an order requiring the return of the seized animals,
it would be reversing the administrative transfer order.
{¶30} Further, while a declaratory judgment action may provide an additional
remedy which may be granted by a court, R.C. 2721.02 cannot be used to extend the
jurisdiction as to the subject matter upon which a court may act. State ex rel. Ford v.
Ruehlman, -- N.E.3d ----, 2016-Ohio-3529, citing State ex rel. Foreman v. Bellefontaine
Municipal Court, 12 Ohio St.2d 26, 231 N.E.2d 70 (1967). For this reason, a common
pleas court cannot use the declaratory judgment statute to decide matters over which it
otherwise has no jurisdiction.
{¶31} Accordingly, we find the Ohio Supreme Court case of State ex rel. Director,
Ohio Dept. of Agriculture v. Forchione, 148 Ohio St.3d 105, 2016-Ohio-3049, 69 N.E.2d
636 is dispositive of the issues in this case. As held by the Supreme Court, the ODA has
the exclusive authority to implement and enforce R.C. Chapter 935, including the review
of the validity of an exemption from the permit requirement. Id. R.C. 2721.02 cannot be
used to extend jurisdiction to the common pleas court, when the Ohio Supreme Court has
determined the common pleas court does not have jurisdiction. Thus, the trial court did
not err in concluding the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Forchione is applicable to this
case and it was without subject matter jurisdiction in the instant case.
Special Statutory Proceeding
{¶32} The ODA also contends the trial court did not err in granting its motion to
dismiss, as Huntsman failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because
declaratory judgment is improper where special statutory proceedings would be
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 12
bypassed. Huntsman argues the statutory scheme is not bypassed because she seeks
a declaration of her rights under the statutory scheme in effect.
{¶33} Pursuant to R.C. 2721.02 and R.C. 2721.03, courts of common pleas
generally have jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment regarding a question of
construction or validity arising under a statute and to declare the rights, status, or legal
relations under it. Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Commission, Dept. of Liquor
Control, 34 Ohio St.2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 261 (1973).
{¶34} However, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that a court cannot attempt to
bypass a special statutory proceeding of an agency that has exclusive jurisdiction over a
particular subject matter. State ex rel. Director, Ohio Dept. of Agriculture v. Forchione,
148 Ohio St.3d 105, 2016-Ohio-3049, 69 N.E.2d 636; State ex rel. Albright v. Court of
Common Pleas of Delaware County, 60 Ohio St.3d 40, 572 N.E.2d 1387 (1991) (holding
actions for declaratory judgment are inappropriate where special statutory proceedings
would be bypassed); State ex rel. Smith v. Frost, 74 Ohio St.3d 107, 656 N.E.2d 673
(1995) (finding where a special statutory procedure like that provided for annexation is
available, an action for declaratory judgment cannot be used to bypass the statutory
procedure); City of Galion v. Am. Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees,
Ohio Council, 71 Ohio St.2d 620, 646 N.E.2d 813 (1995) (holding since Chapter 2711
provides the exclusive statutory remedy which parties must use in appealing arbitration
awards, an action in declaratory judgment cannot be maintained).
{¶35} Further, courts of appeals have rejected declaratory judgment actions when
a special statutory proceeding is available. Autumn Health Care v. Todd, 5th Dist.
Muskingum No. CT2014-0020, 2014-Ohio-5851 (finding in R.C. Chapter 3721, the
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 13
General Assembly enacted a complete and comprehensive statutory scheme and thus
declaratory judgment was inappropriate); State ex rel. Gelesh v. State Medical Board of
Ohio, 172 Ohio App.3d 365, 2007-Ohio-3328, 874 N.E.2d 1256 (10th Dist.) (finding R.C.
Chapter 4731 governing the practice of medicine in Ohio is a special statutory proceeding
making a claim for declaratory judgment an improper attempt to bypass the special
statutory procedures governing physician discipline and finding R.C. Chapter 119
provides an appeal of the administrative proceedings to the court of common pleas);
Arbor Health Care Co. v. Jackson, 39 Ohio App.3d 183, 530 N.E.2d 928 (10th Dist. 1987)
(finding R.C. 3702 provided a special statutory proceeding to apply for a certificate of
need and since the procedure outlined in R.C. 3702 is a specialized procedure,
declaratory relief is inappropriate); Aust v. State Dental Board, 136 Ohio App.3d 677, 737
N.E.2d 605 (10th Dist. 2000) (finding the Dental Practice Act was a special statutory
proceeding and the appellant was attempting to improperly bypass the special statutory
proceeding through a declaratory judgment action).
{¶36} In this case, the General Assembly has given to the ODA the exclusive
power to regulate dangerous wild animals. As part of the special statutory proceeding,
Huntsman can assert she is exempt from the law during the administrative hearing. The
issue involved in this declaratory judgment action is the same issue that is being decided
in the administrative proceeding. Thus, this declaratory judgment action is merely a
substitute for the administrative process provided by the legislature in R.C. Chapter 935
to determine such questions. The administrative process gives Huntsman numerous
rights, including notice of the administrative hearing and the right to appear with legal
counsel before an impartial decision-maker who conducts a hearing and determines the
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 14
admissibility of evidence from both sides. The decision-maker will issue a report and
recommendation in writing, to which Huntsman may file objections. Further, R.C. Chapter
119 provides for an appeal of the administrative proceeding to the Franklin County Court
of Common Pleas by any party adversely affected by any order of the ODA. R.C.
935.20(D). Huntsman could then appeal any adverse decision to the Tenth District Court
of Appeals.
{¶37} Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in determining Huntsman’s
declaratory judgment action was an improper attempt to circumvent the special statutory
proceeding and administrative process.
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
{¶38} The ODA contends the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint
because Huntsman failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Huntsman argues
there is no mechanism for her to challenge the denial of her exemption with the ODA, so
there was no remedy to exhaust.
{¶39} In this case, Huntsman avers in the second and third counts of her
complaint that the ODA violated her constitutional rights by taking her personal property
without compensation. Such a challenge is an as-applied constitutional challenge, as it
alleges that the application of a statute in a particular context in which the party has acted,
or proposes to act, would be unconstitutional. Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 132 Ohio St.3d
167, 2012-Ohio-2187, 970 N.E.2d 898. Because an as-applied challenge depends upon
a particular set of facts, this type of a constitutional challenge must be raised before the
administrative agency to develop the factual record. Id; Hetrick v. Ohio Dept. of
Agriculture, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-944, 2017-Ohio-303.
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 15
{¶40} Huntsman’s constitutional claims must first be raised through the
administrative process outlined in R.C. 935.20(D), which provides for an administrative
hearing and appeal to the Franklin Court of Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 119.12. See
Fairview General Hospital v. Fletcher, 63 Ohio St.3d 146, 586 N.E.2d 80 (1992). In this
case, Huntsman seeks a declaration of her constitutional rights in addition to a declaration
of her statutory rights under the administrative procedure in the DWA. If Huntsman
prevails in the administrative process and obtains a ruling that she is exempt from the
DWA and thus the transfer order was improper, her constitutional claims would be
rendered moot. Further, as noted by the Tenth District Court of Appeals, where an
administrative procedure might provide relief sought without deciding a constitutional
issue, the administrative remedy should be pursued first. Arbor Health Care Co. v.
Jackson, 39 Ohio App.3d 183, 530 N.E.2d 928 (10th Dist. 1987). Further, the DWA has
already withstood constitutional challenges based on due process, takings challenges,
and free speech in Wilkins v. Daniels, 744 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2014).
{¶41} The Ohio Supreme Court has also held that an action for declaratory relief
is inappropriate when a plaintiff seeks a determination of statutory rights when she failed
to exhaust her administrative remedies. Fairview General Hospital v. Fletcher, 63 Ohio
St.3d 146, 586 N.E.2d 80 (1992). Generally, courts will not entertain proceedings for
declaratory relief when “another equally serviceable remedy has been provided for the
character of the case at hand.” Swander Ditch Landowners’ Assn v. Joint Board of Huron
& Seneca County Commissioners, 51 Ohio St.3d 131, 554 N.E.2d 1324 (1990). The
“equally serviceable remedy” in this case is the administrative process contained in R.C.
935.20(D) and further review pursuant to R.C. Chapter 119.
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 16
{¶42} In Autumn Health Care v. Todd, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2014-0020,
2014-Ohio-5851, the appellant filed a separate declaratory judgment action while an
administrative appeal was pending. This Court upheld the dismissal of the declaratory
judgment action by the trial court because the appellant failed to fully exhaust its
administrative remedies. Id. We found that “without a full venting of the administrative
remedies, there cannot be an enforceable right, as Ohio requires exhaustion of
administrative remedies.” Id. Further, that until all administrative remedies were
exhausted, the appellant did not have a justiciable claim. Id.
{¶43} We find this case analogous to Autumn Health Care. Huntsman has failed
to fully exhaust her administrative remedies and without a full venting of these
administrative remedies, Huntsman has no enforceable right. In this case, the declaratory
judgment action is merely a substitute for the administrative appeal process provided by
the legislature. Additionally, without an exhaustion of administrative remedies, the risk of
conflicting judgments or decisions exists. If, during the administrative process, the
hearing officer, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, and/or the Tenth District
Court of Appeals determines the transfer order was invalid due to an exemption and
orders the return of the animals to Huntsman, this determination could directly conflict
with a decision by the Stark County Common Pleas Court and/or the Fifth District Court
of Appeals in the instant declaratory judgment case that could determine the transfer
order was valid as an exemption does not apply.
{¶44} Though Huntsman argues her claim pre-dated the transfer order, until the
quarantine and transfer orders were issued, there was no administrative action against
Huntsman and, until the transfer of the animals on May 3, 2016, Huntsman suffered no
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 17
injury. Since there was no administrative action prior to the quarantine and transfer
orders, there was not a real controversy presenting issues ripe for judicial resolution, and
no justiciable controversy existed until that time. Lehman Bros. Holdings v. United
Petroleum Marketing, LLC, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2012 CA 00060, 2013-Ohio-233. A claim
is not ripe if the claim rests upon “future events that may not occur as anticipated, or may
not occur at all.” Id.
{¶45} Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in dismissing Huntsman’s
complaint for the failure to exhaust her administrative remedies.
Separation of Powers
{¶46} Huntsman contends the trial court’s dismissal of her complaint violates the
separation of powers doctrine. We first note that Huntsman did not make this argument
to the trial court. Thus, she has waived this argument for purposes of this appeal.
FirstMerit Bank, N.A. v. Shaheen, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2011CA00079, 2011-Ohio-6146.
{¶47} However, even if we were to consider Huntsman’s argument, we disagree
with her assertion that the trial court’s dismissal of her complaint violates the separation
of power doctrine. The Ohio Supreme Court has determined the ODA has the exclusive
authority over the regulation and enforcement of the DWA. State ex rel. Director, Ohio
Dept. of Agriculture v. Forchione, 148 Ohio St.3d 105, 2016-Ohio-3049, 69 N.E.2d 636.
Finally, as detailed above, the administrative process includes a review pursuant to
Revised Code Chapter 119, which provides the judiciary, through the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas and Tenth District Court of Appeals, an opportunity to review the
action.
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00206 18
{¶48} Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court did not err in dismissing
Huntsman’s complaint. Huntsman’s assignment of error is overruled. The October 13,
2016 judgment entry of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By Gwin, P.J.,
Baldwin, J., and
Wise, Earle, J., concur
.
Huntsman v. State
Combined Opinion