Guihai Liang v. Sessions

15-3311 Liang v. Sessions BIA Balasquide, IJ A205 232 374 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 4th day of May, two thousand seventeen. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 PIERRE N. LEVAL, 8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 9 GERARD E. LYNCH, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 GUIHAI LIANG, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 15-3311 17 NAC 18 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, 19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Wei Gu, Whitestone, N.Y. 24 25 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal 26 Deputy Assistant Attorney General; 27 John W. Blakeley, Assistant 28 Director, Patricia E. Bruckner, 29 Trial Attorney, Sarai M. Aldana, 30 Law Clerk, Office of Immigration 31 Litigation, United States 32 Department of Justice, Washington, 33 D.C. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 4 is DENIED. 5 Petitioner Guihai Liang, a native and citizen of the 6 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an October 2, 7 2015, decision of the BIA, affirming a September 4, 2014, 8 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Liang’s 9 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 10 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Guihai 11 Liang, No. A205 232 374 (B.I.A. Oct. 2, 2015), aff’g No. 12 A205 232 374 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 4, 2014). We 13 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts 14 and procedural history in this case. 15 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 16 both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of 17 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 18 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of 19 review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); 20 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). 21 For asylum applications like Liang’s, governed by the 22 REAL ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of 23 the circumstances,” base a credibility finding on 2 1 inconsistencies between an applicant’s testimony and 2 evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 3 F.3d at 163-64, 166 n.3. “We defer . . . to an IJ’s 4 credibility determination unless, from the totality of the 5 circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder 6 could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia 7 Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Where the record contains 8 inconsistencies, “[a] petitioner must do more than offer a 9 plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to 10 secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact- 11 finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” Majidi 12 v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Zhou 13 Yun Zhang v. U.S. INS, 386 F.3d 77, 76 (2d Cir. 2004)). As 14 discussed below, the adverse credibility determination rests 15 on inconsistencies which called into question the basis of 16 Liang’s claim that he ran a restaurant and lived in a 17 building that the government demolished. 18 The agency reasonably relied on an inconsistency 19 concerning Liang’s place of residence. 8 U.S.C. 20 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). First, Liang testified that the 21 property he purchased in 2005 (which was allegedly 22 demolished by the Chinese government) served both as his 23 restaurant and residence, but his 2007 Household Register 3 1 listed his father’s address as his residence. The agency 2 was not compelled to credit Liang’s shifting explanations 3 for this inconsistency. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. He 4 proffered both that the Chinese government automatically 5 renews the Household Register without changing information, 6 but when confronted with a different change that had been 7 made, Liang’s explanation was not responsive: he stated that 8 he did not expect his property to be demolished and that his 9 father did not want Liang to leave the father’s house. The 10 agency was not compelled to accept these competing and non- 11 responsive explanations. Id. 12 Second, Liang’s testimony was also inconsistent with 13 the 2007 Register with respect to his occupation. The 14 Register listed his occupation as grain farmer, not 15 restaurant operator or chef. The agency reasonably declined 16 to credit Liang’s explanation that, to the Chinese 17 government, “once you’re a farmer you’re always a farmer,” 18 because he provided no evidence of that policy. Id. 19 The agency also reasonably found Liang’s credibility 20 further undermined by his lack of proof of ownership of the 21 demolished property. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate 22 his . . . testimony may bear on credibility, because the 23 absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant 4 1 unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been 2 called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 3 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Liang’s explanation that all proof of 4 property ownership was destroyed in the demolition was not 5 compelling because it failed to account for the absence of 6 photographs of the property, bank records, advertisements, 7 or letters from family members or employees; and it was 8 inconsistent with a tax record he produced that was issued 9 prior to the demolition. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80; see 10 also 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(4) (“No court shall reverse a 11 determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the 12 availability of corroborating evidence . . . [unless] a 13 reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such 14 corroborating evidence is unavailable.”); Siewe v. Gonzales, 15 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] single false document 16 or a single instance of false testimony may (if attributable 17 to petitioner) infect the balance of the alien’s 18 uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence.”). 19 Given the multiple inconsistencies calling into 20 question whether Liang owned a restaurant and residence that 21 was demolished, as well as Liang’s failure to produce 22 sufficient corroborating evidence, it cannot be said “that 23 no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse 5 1 credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The 2 adverse credibility ruling is dispositive of asylum, 3 withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three 4 forms of relief are based on the same factual predicate. 5 Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 6 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 7 DENIED. 8 FOR THE COURT: 9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 10 11 6