16‐917
Pryor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
3 the City of New York, on the 8th day of May, two thousand seventeen.
4
5 PRESENT:
6 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
7 GERARD E. LYNCH,
8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
9 Circuit Judges.
10 _____________________________________
11
12 RONALD J. PRYOR,
13
14 Plaintiff‐Appellant,
15
16 v. No. 16‐917
17
18 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
19 SECURITY,
20
21 Defendant‐Appellee.
22 _____________________________________
1
2
3 FOR APPELLANT: RONALD J. PRYOR, pro se, New York, NY.
4
5 FOR APPELLEE: CANDACE SCOTT APPLETON (Varuni Nelson,
6 Arthur Swerdloff, on the brief), Assistant United
7 States Attorneys, for Bridget M. Rohde, Acting
8 United States Attorney, Eastern District of New
9 York, Brooklyn, NY.
10
11 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
12 District of New York (Margo K. Brodie, Judge).
13 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
14 DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
15 Ronald J. Pryor, proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment of the District
16 Court (Brodie, J.) in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security. Pryor seeks
17 review of the Commissioner’s determination that Pryor made $15,922.54 in
18 unreported earnings in 2008. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts
19 and record of the prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to
20 explain our decision to affirm.
21 We review de novo the District Court’s judgment on the pleadings, and
22 examine the entire administrative record to determine whether substantial
2
1 evidence supports the Commissioner’s determination and whether the
2 Commissioner applied the correct legal standard. Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402,
3 408 (2d Cir. 2010). For substantially the reasons stated by the District Court, we
4 conclude that the Commissioner’s determination was supported by substantial
5 evidence. In a hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Pryor
6 failed to credibly rebut the evidence offered by the Commissioner that
7 documented his employment and earnings in 2008. The new evidence Pryor
8 submitted to the Appeals Council “does not contradict the ALJ’s finding.” Perez
9 v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1996). And the evidence submitted for the first
10 time to the District Court and to this Court is either not material or duplicative of
11 evidence already in the record. Remand is therefore not warranted. See 42
12 U.S.C. § 405(g); Pollard v. Halter, 377 F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir. 2004). Because a
13 reasonable factfinder could find that Pryor earned $15,922.54 in wages in 2008
14 and would not “have to conclude otherwise,” we accept the Commissioner’s
15 determination. Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012)
16 (quotation marks omitted).
17
3
1 We have considered Pryor’s remaining arguments and conclude that they
2 are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court
3 is AFFIRMED.
4 FOR THE COURT:
5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
4