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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
LARON PHILMORE
Appellant No. 2758 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 4, 2005
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-51-CR-0306321-2004
BEFORE: MOULTON, RANSOM, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MAY 08, 2017
Appellant, Laron D. Philmore, appeals nunc pro tunc from the
judgment of sentence entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common
Pleas following a jury trial and his convictions for voluntary manslaughter,'
carrying a firearm without a license,2 and carrying firearms on a public
street.3 Appellant pleaded guilty to persons not to possess firearms.4
Appellant challenges the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the procedural history of this case as
follows:
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
' 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503.
2 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106.
3 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108.
4 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105.
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On April 4, 2005, [the trial court] sentenced
[Appellant] to
a total term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years of
imprisonment.
direct appeal was filed on [Appellant's] behalf. His
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judgments of sentence, therefore, became final on May 4,
2005.
On January 6, 2006, [Appellant] timely filed a pro se
[Post Conviction Relief Act] PCRA Petition. Earl Kaufmann,
Esquire, was subsequently appointed to represent
[Appellant]. Attorney Kaufmann filed a Finley[5] letter
stating that in his professional opinion, the issues raised by
[Appellant] in his pro se petition were without merit and
did not entitle [him] to relief. Having concluded that there
were no other issues that could be raised on behalf of
[Appellant], Attorney Kaufmann sought and was
subsequently granted permission to withdraw as counsel.
Thereafter, Lee Mandell, Esquire, was appointed to
represent [Appellant.] Attorney Mandell filed an amended
PCRA Petition on [Appellant's] behalf. In his Amended
Petition, [Appellant] sought PCRA relief in the form of
reinstatement of his direct appellate rights nunc pro tunc.
On August 18, 2015, [Appellant's] motion to file an
appeal nunc pro tunc was heard and granted. On
September 11, 2015, [Appellant], through his counsel,
filed a timely Notice of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc.
On February 26, 2016, this court ordered counsel for
[Appellant] to file a Concise Statement of Matters
Complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. § 1925(b).
On March 14, 2016, [Appellant] filed a Statement of
Matters Complained of on Appeal.
Trial Ct. Op., 5/25/16, at 1-2 (footnote omitted). The trial court filed a
responsive opinion.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
5 Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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1. Is [Appellant] entitled to an Arrest of Judgment on the
charge of Voluntary Manslaughter and any related charges
where the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict
and where the Commonwealth did not prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that [Appellant] had failed to act in self-
defense?
2. Is [Appellant] entitled to a new trial where, as here, the
greater weight of the evidence does not support the
verdict?
Appellant's Brief at 3.
As a prefatory matter, we consider whether Appellant has waived his
sufficiency of the evidence claim. Appellant's sufficiency argument consists
of the following, reproduced verbatim.
In ruling on a sufficiency claim, all of the evidence must be
read in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and
the Commonwealth is entitled to all reasonable inferences
arising there from. Commonwealth v. Boyle, 368 A.2d
661 (Pa. 1977). If, under the standard, the evidence is
not sufficient to sustain the charge, the [c]ourt is required
to dismiss the case and discharge the defendant.
Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 375 A.2d 384, aff'd 399
A.2d 390 (Pa. 1979).[6] Most obviously, the due process
clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged. See, In
Re: Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). While the
Commonwealth is entitled to all reasonable inferences
arising from the evidence there is no statutory authority or
case law which would provide the Commonwealth with the
benefit of unreasonable inferences.
Here, the greater weight of the evidence only places
[Appellant] on the street at the time he shot the victim.
However, the evidence does not establish, other than by
6 We note that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed this Court in
Poindexter. See id. at 391.
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what [Appellant] himself told the [c]ourt, what occurred
that lead [sic] to the shooting. [Appellant] claimed that he
shot in self-defense. The Commonwealth could not refute
that. Accordingly, the greater weight of the evidence
supports [Appellant's] claim that he shot in self-defense
and the greater weight of the evidence supports the fact
that the Commonwealth did not prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that [Appellant] had failed to act in self-
defense. Thus, [Appellant] must be awarded a new trial as
the verdict is not supported by the greater weight of the
evidence.
Appellant's Brief at 9-10.
In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915 (Pa. 2009), our
Supreme Court opined: "[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any
discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the
issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is
waived." Id. at 924 (citation omitted). The argument section of Appellant's
brief fails to mention, let alone discuss, any of the elements of the offenses
for which the evidence is insufficient. Appellant fails to provide any
discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence with citation to legal authority.
See id. Therefore, this issue is waived. See id.
Appellant's second issue, viz., that the "greater weight of the evidence
does not support the verdict" is not addressed in the argument section of his
brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating that our Appellate Rules mandate that
an appellant must develop an argument with citation to and analysis of
relevant legal authority). See also Commonwealth v. Nelson, 567 A.2d
673, 676 (Pa. Super. 1989) (stating that we must deem an issue
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abandoned, and therefore waived, where it has been identified on appeal but
not properly developed in the appellant's brief). We find this issue
abandoned and waived. See id.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
J seph D. Seletyn,
Prothonotary
Date: 5/8/2017
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