NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 4, 2017*
Decided May 9, 2017
Before
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
No. 17‐1059
ANTHONY DAVID ATKINSON, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellant, Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
v.
No. 14 cv 9923
SG AMERICAS SECURITIES, LLC,
Defendant‐Appellee. Sharon Johnson Coleman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Anthony Atkinson contends that his former employer, now called SG Americas
Securities (“SGAS”), did not accommodate his disability (hearing loss and deficits from
a brain injury) and discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112. The district court granted
summary judgment to SGAS on these claims. It also dismissed as legally insufficient
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 17‐1059 Page 2
five other claims, only two of which Atkinson now challenges on appeal. Because the
undisputed facts show no ADA violation and the dismissed counts do not state claims
for relief, we affirm the judgment.
We begin by describing the facts on the disability claims. The district judge
deemed SGAS’s proposed facts admitted because Atkinson did not respond to them in
accordance with the local rules. See N.D. ILL. L.R. 56.1(b)(3). District courts may
reasonably enforce compliance with these rules, even for a pro se litigant like Atkinson,
and we construe the record of those facts in the light most favorable to Atkinson.
See Flint v. City of Belvidere, 791 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2015).
In 2002 Atkinson began to work as a support analyst for SGAS, which provides
electronic software for futures trading. He answered phone calls from traders who
needed technical support. In October 2011 Atkinson was in a motorcycle accident and
lost all hearing in his left ear. His doctor released him back to work without restrictions
in December. But three months later, in March 2012, Atkinson had a brain hemorrhage
while on vacation overseas. His recovery was much more extensive this time, and he
was on medical leave until September 2012.
When he returned in September, Atkinson was unhappy with some of his work
conditions. His workspace had been dismantled while he was gone, so he picked a new
workstation close to his team members, but he had difficulty hearing people on his
left‐ear side. His passwords had also expired, and he did not have immediate access to
the systems that he thought he needed. Additionally, he had problems with his new
laptop and wanted to use his old desktop computer, which he found elsewhere in the
office. Also because Atkinson was scheduled for training on a new computer system
later than most other employees, he thought he was at a disadvantage. Finally, the
company shifted his hours to later in the day and varied his daily start times.
To discuss these work conditions, Atkinson met with his then‐manager,
Greg Stephens, and his human‐resources representative, Lisa Foster, in January 2013.
He described his hearing loss and two traumatic brain injuries as disabilities and said
that SGAS had failed to accommodate them. In response Foster offered him a new
workstation (but not his old, dismantled one), his old desktop computer, an ergonomic
keyboard, and a new, fixed start time (though not as early as he’d worked previously).
After their meeting Atkinson sent an email demanding these accommodations, and
Foster replied that they had already agreed to his requests.
No. 17‐1059 Page 3
Despite these accommodations, Atkinson still complained about his work
conditions. He renewed criticisms about his workspace, access to systems, and start
time. SGAS responded by asking that Atkinson have an independent medical
examination to determine if the accommodations he sought that were unrelated to his
hearing were medically necessary. He did not agree to the exam and instead provided
two doctors’ notes. One stated that he needed a seating placement that accommodated
his hearing loss. The other stated that he needed time for medical appointments, a
consistent work schedule, an ergonomic keyboard, and computer monitors that didn’t
flash. SGAS was already providing these accommodations, so it did nothing further.
Around the same time, SGAS became dissatisfied with Atkinson’s work. Clients
and software providers were complaining about how he handled calls. They said that
he did not provide needed information or properly escalate their complaints to a
manager. Stephens reviewed some of the calls and concluded that the complaints were
valid. As a result, Atkinson’s 2012 performance evaluation (given in January 2013) rated
him a 2—“Meets Some but Not All Expectations.”
Because of Atkinson’s performance issues, management reassigned him in
February 2013 to a project in a different group that they thought was a better fit for him.
The project involved reduced customer contact, fewer deadlines, and less stress. He
received a workspace closer to his new team, and his new manager told his coworkers
to make an effort to speak into his good ear. Atkinson did not like his new desk’s
location because he still had trouble hearing his coworkers, his desk was under a vent
blowing cold air onto him, and the desk was a folding, temporary station. (He later
received a permanent desk when one became available.) Eventually he was
permanently assigned to this new team; although his title changed, his pay remained
the same.
His employment ended a year after this reassignment. In November 2014 the
company announced a merger with another business. SGAS asked all employees to sign
an employee agreement or be deemed to have resigned. Atkinson would not sign the
agreement because he did not agree with the arbitration clause, so he “resigned”
effective January 2015. He did not receive any severance pay. Three other employees
who would not sign the agreement also resigned without severance pay.
The district court granted SGAS’s motion for summary judgment on Atkinson’s
ADA claims. On the claim for a reasonable accommodation, it ruled that SGAS had
adequately accommodated Atkinson’s hearing loss and no evidence suggested that any
No. 17‐1059 Page 4
other accommodation was medically necessary. On the disability‐discrimination claim,
it explained that Atkinson suffered no adverse action: His reassignment was not a
demotion, his resignation was not a firing, and any other perceived adverse actions
were not material. And even assuming that the actions were adverse, he had not shown
that SGAS had imposed them because of his disability. Finally, the court concluded that
Atkinson’s retaliation claim failed. Although his complaints to Foster were close in time
to some of the employment changes, timing alone was not enough.
In evaluating Atkinson’s arguments on appeal, we first address a procedural
decision that Atkinson identifies and that preceded summary judgment. Atkinson
argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting discovery extensions to
both sides. He says that the court improperly extended discovery for over 100 extra
days, allowing SGAS more time before it filed its motion for summary judgment. This is
wrong in two respects. First, the deadline to file dispositive motions was extended by
only a month, not 100 days. Second, Atkinson has not explained how the extension
prejudiced him, and without prejudice we have no reason to disturb the ruling. See Jones
v. City of Elkhart, 737 F.3d 1107, 1116 (7th Cir. 2013). Indeed, Atkinson cannot show
prejudice because the court granted the extension primarily to benefit him by giving
him time to depose two additional SGAS employees.
Atkinson briefly attacks the substance of the summary‐judgment decision itself,
but we see no error. For Atkinson’s reasonable‐accommodation claim to go forward, he
had to present evidence that SGAS failed to reasonably accommodate a known
disability. See Hooper v. Proctor Health Care Inc., 804 F.3d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 2015). He did
not. The uncontradicted evidence shows that SGAS took his accommodation requests
seriously, engaged in an “interactive process” with Atkinson to determine what
accommodations it reasonably needed to make, and made them. See Swanson v. Village of
Flossmoor, 794 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir. 2015). Although Atkinson was dissatisfied when he
did not receive every change that he demanded, the ADA requires only that he receive
reasonable accommodations of his disabilities. See id. His discrimination and retaliation
claims also fail. He presented no evidence that his disability motivated SGAS to
reassign him, change his systems access, assign him a new workstation, or ask him to
sign a new employment agreement or resign. See Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc.,
839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1115 (2017). And although he
reiterates the close timing between his complaints and these employment actions,
“suspicious timing” is generally not enough to establish causation. See id. at 564; Curtis
v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 221 (7th Cir. 2015).
No. 17‐1059 Page 5
Finally, Atkinson contends that the district court erred in dismissing five counts
of his amended complaint, but he develops an argument about only two of them. The
first count asserted the Illinois tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Atkinson alleges that SGAS committed this tort primarily by placing him in a cold and
drafty office space, which he believes aggravated his medical conditions. Unpleasant
office assignments do not suffice as “extreme and outrageous” conduct because in
employment settings the tort is limited to “truly egregious” conduct. Van Stan v. Fancy
Colours & Co., 125 F.3d 563, 567–68 (7th Cir. 1997). To commit the tort, an employer
must abuse its power “in a manner far more severe than the typical disagreements or
job‐related stress caused by the average work environment.” Naeem v. McKesson Drug
Co., 444 F.3d 593, 605 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). That did not occur here,
so the district court properly dismissed this claim.
The second dismissed count asserts that SGAS unlawfully asked Atkinson for an
independent medical examination. Atkinson alleges that the request violated 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d)(4)(A) of the ADA because it was not job‐related, just a “fishing expedition”
into his medical condition. But he admits that he asked for disability accommodations,
and the company was entitled under the ADA to request a medical exam to determine
what accommodations were medically necessary. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.
§ 1630.14(c); Kennedy v. Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 656 (6th Cir. 2000). Atkinson
thus pleaded himself out of court on this claim.
Atkinson’s remaining arguments are meritless and do not warrant discussion.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment.