In Re: M.S., a minor, Appeal of: M.S.

J-S28014-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: M.S., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: M.S., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1792 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order October 28, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): TPR No. CP-02-AP-000109-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, MOULTON, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MAY 10, 2017

M.S., Jr. (“Father”) appeals from the order entered on October 28,

2016, granting the petition filed by the Allegheny County Office of Children

and Youth and Families (“OCYF” or the “Agency”), and involuntarily

terminating Father’s parental rights to his male child, M.S., III, born in

November 2011 (“Child”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).1 Father’s counsel (“Counsel”), has filed with

this Court a petition for leave to withdraw as counsel and a brief pursuant to
____________________________________________

*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
In a termination order entered on October 28, 2016, the trial court also
terminated the parental rights of Child’s mother, F.L.S. (“Mother”), and any
unknown father. Neither Mother nor any unknown father has filed an
appeal, nor is Mother or any such individual a party to the present appeal.
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Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).2 We affirm, and grant

Counsel’s petition to withdraw.

In its opinion to this Court, the trial court adeptly set forth the factual

background of this appeal. As the trial court explained:

[On May 23, 2016, OCYF filed a petition seeking to
involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Father. The
trial court held an evidentiary hearing on October 28, 2016.
Father was incarcerated at the time of the hearing, but he
participated via telephone. During the hearing,] Sarah
Deak ([“Ms. Deak”)], a caseworker for OCYF, testified that
Child first came to the attention of OCYF in July [] 2011
because OCYF was concerned with Mother’s “housing and
stability.” Mother reported that she was “overwhelmed with
parenting two kids while being pregnant with a third child.”
There were also allegations of domestic violence between
Mother and Father. In September [] 2011, Mother moved
outside of Allegheny County and the case was closed.

On November 20, 2012, a referral was made to OCYF
because there were concerns with inadequate physical care
of the children. OCYF accepted the case for service and the
case remained open[] with OCYF until it closed on March 8,
2013, because the family lived outside of Allegheny County.

In May 2014, OCYF [was] requested by Washington County
to assess the safety of Child’s [] sibling, C.C., a dependent
child in Washington County. OCYF of Allegheny County
accepted the case for service and the case remained open.
From May 22, 2014[] until October 13, 2014, OCYF
provided 353 [] in-home services through Project Star. For
____________________________________________

2
In In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992), this Court extended
the Anders principles to appeals involving the termination of parental rights.
We stated that counsel appointed to represent an indigent parent on a first
appeal from a decree involuntarily terminating parental rights may, after a
conscientious and thorough review of the record, petition this Court for leave
to withdraw representation and must submit an Anders brief. Id. at 1275.

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a portion of this time, Father was not incarcerated and lived
in the home and was able to participate in the services
provided. OCYF worked with Mother using the Teaming and
Conferencing model, however, Father chose not to
participate in the family conference with OCYF in July []
2014. Additionally, Father was aware of the caseworkers in
the home but did not communicate with OCYF. The in-
home services continued to work with the family.

On October 31, 2014, OCYF filed an Emergency Custody
Authorization [(“ECA”)] because there were concerns that
Mother “left [Child’s sibling, N.C.,] in the care of a maternal
cousin for several days and was not willing to pick him up.”
Additionally, there were concerns that Mother was leaving
Child with paternal grandfather “while there was an active
Child Line for allegations that he had sexually maltreated
[N.C.].” Child was not removed [from the house;] however,
N.C. was removed at that time. OCYF did not execute the
ECA for Child because Mother stated that she would not
place Child in the care of paternal [grandfather] any longer.

On January 28, 2015, OCYF requested an ECA[,] which was
approved[,] and a shelter hearing was conducted [] on that
date. At that time, Child was removed because Mother
“was sharing a home with someone who had drug and
alcohol issues,” and there were concerns with Mother’s
housing and stability. Child was placed in foster care
through Auberle. Child has remained in care since January
28, 2015.

On March 11, 2015, Child was adjudicated dependent
pursuant to 42 [Pa.C.S.A. §] 6302. . . .

[OCYF began providing services to the family in May 2014.
Despite Father’s presence in the home at that time,] Father
did not cooperate or participate [with OCYF]. Father was
incarcerated on or about October 31, 2014, and has
remained incarcerated throughout the entirety of Child’s
removal, subsequent placement, and determination of
dependency. Child has not returned to Father’s care. In
October 2015, Father contacted OCYF when he was
incarcerated in Westmoreland County. Ms. Deak testified
that Father continued to send letters to OCYF “about once a

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month” and requested information regarding the case and
visitation with Child.

On September 3, 2015, a permanency review hearing was
held and Father was granted visitation with Child at the
prison. Father was initially incarcerated in Westmoreland
County Jail. OCYF eventually learned that Father was
moved to SCI Camp Hill and then subsequently transferred
to Quehanna [B]oot [C]amp. As of October 28, 2016,
Father was [incarcerated] at SCI Houtzdale. Ms. Deak
testified that it was a “complex process” to facilitate
visitation because Father continued to transfer to different
prisons while OCYF attempted to arrange visitation in
compliance with the policies of the respective prisons.
Consequently, visitation did not occur at any of these
locations.

On March 16, 2016, [the trial court] ordered that Father
was permitted to have weekly phone calls with [Child],
supervised by his mobile therapist to assist [Child] with
processing these calls. If phone calls go well for a period of
one [] month, [Child] may visit his father at Quehanna Boot
Camp, upon agreement of all parties. Ms. Deak explained
that Child’s mobile therapist was “not comfortable”
supervising the phone calls. Eventually[,] Child’s Foster
Mother agreed to facilitate the phone calls but did not want
to use her personal phone number. OCYF was ordered to
provide Foster Mother with a TRAC phone. On June 22,
2016, [the trial court] acknowledged that Father had been
unable to have phone calls with Child up to that date “due
to various obstacles.” However, Father testified that he
eventually had phone calls with Child while incarcerated.
Their last phone call was October 10, 2016.

Father’s goals include drug and alcohol and domestic
violence [counseling]. Father reported to Ms. Deak that he
completed a violence prevention and drug and alcohol
[program] at boot camp. However, the boot camp was
unable to confirm what specific programs he successfully
completed. Father testified that he sent Ms. Deak
certificates of his completion of the programs. At the time
of the October 28, 2016[] hearing, Ms. Deak did not receive
that documentation.

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Father has an extensive criminal record. Father admitted to
having led a criminal lifestyle after being incarcerated as a
juvenile. Father estimates that he has been incarcerated
for about eight years since the age of [15]. His previous
charges include drug charges, gun charges, receiving stolen
property, and other misdemeanor offenses. Father is
currently incarcerated at SCI Houtzdale for [] possession of
heroin and crack cocaine with intent to deliver. Father had
a potential release date of September [] 2016[;] however[,]
Father testified in a permanency review hearing on
September 14, 2016, that his release date was extended
because he took a cookie he was not permitted to take.
Father was removed from boot camp and now has to serve
his minimum sentence. Additionally, Father explained that
he forged documents to help another inmate get released[.
Father testified]:

For me to get removed, an inmate, you have to send
home your home plan and get it signed by the guardian
that is willing to take you in to get released. . . . So,
[my fellow inmate’s] home plan [was] rejected. So, he
had tried again. And I had written in my handwriting a
different name for him that he had wanted to get. So, it
was just basically my handwriting. And they found out
about it. That it was basically like something bogus.
And I got questioned about it. I didn’t tell the truth
about it and I got removed.

Father’s violation extended his minimum release date to
December [] 2017.

On October 28, 2016, [the trial court] granted OCYF’s
petition to terminate Father’s parental rights.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/17, at 3-7 (internal citations and some internal

footnotes, capitalization, and quotations omitted).

Father filed a timely notice of appeal and a concise statement pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). Counsel filed a petition for leave to

withdraw as counsel for Father and an Anders brief on February 12, 2017.

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In the Anders brief, Father raises two issues challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination of his parental rights

to Child. See Anders Brief at 1-7; Father’s Concise Statement at 1.3 Those

issues are as follows:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights under Section
2511(a)(2), (5) and (8) when Father contends that he
completed the goals set out for him by the agency and is
capable of parenting his son?

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by
determining that termination of Father’s parental rights
would meet the needs and welfare of the child under
Section 2511(b)?

Anders Brief at 1.

To withdraw under Anders, court-appointed counsel must satisfy

certain technical requirements. First, counsel must “petition the court for

leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious examination of

the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous.”

Commonwealth v. Miller, 715 A.2d 1203, 1207 (Pa. Super. 1998).

Second, counsel must file an Anders brief, in which counsel:

(1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and
facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to anything in
the record that counsel believes arguably supports the
appeal; (3) set[s] forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal
____________________________________________

3
In the concise statement that accompanied the notice of appeal, Father
stated his issues somewhat differently from his Anders brief, but we find
that Father adequately preserved his issues for our review.

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is frivolous; and (4) state[s] counsel’s reasons for
concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should
articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law,
and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that
the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).

Finally, counsel must furnish a copy of the Anders brief to her client

and advise the client “of [the client’s] right to retain new counsel, proceed

pro se or raise any additional points worthy of this Court’s attention.”

Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa. Super. 2007).

If counsel meets all of the above obligations, “it then becomes the

responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the

proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the

appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 n.5. It is only

when all of the procedural and substantive requirements are satisfied that

counsel will be permitted to withdraw.

Here, in her motion for leave to withdraw, Counsel complied with each

of the requirements of Anders. Counsel indicates that she conscientiously

examined the record and determined that an appeal would be frivolous.

Further, Counsel’s Anders brief comports with the requirements set forth by

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Santiago. Finally, attached to her

motion for leave to withdraw is a copy of her letter to Father, dated February

11, 2017. In compliance with Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748,

752 (Pa. Super. 2005) the letter advised Father of his right to proceed pro

se or retain alternate counsel and file additional claims, and stated Counsel’s

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intention to seek permission to withdraw. Accordingly, Counsel has

complied with the procedural requirements for withdrawing from

representation, and we will proceed with our review.

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we

adhere to the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
petition for termination of parental rights. As in
dependency cases, our standard of review requires an
appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
record. In re: R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the
factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to
determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused
its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011)
(plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of
discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
court might have reached a different conclusion. Samuel
Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa.
2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003).
Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of
discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

As [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] discussed in R.J.T.,
there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion
standard of review in these cases. [The Supreme Court]
observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties
during the relevant hearing and often presiding over
numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents.
R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts
could support an opposite result, as is often the case in
dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must
resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose
its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead
[appellate courts] must defer to the trial judges so long as

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the factual findings are supported by the record and the
court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law
or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650
A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. 309, 325-26, 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (2012).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Moreover, we have explained:

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined
as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise
facts in issue.”

Id.

In the Anders brief, Father contends that the trial court abused its

discretion and erred as a matter of law in concluding that the evidence was

sufficient to support the involuntary termination of his parental rights under

section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). Specifically, Father suggests that the

trial court erred in determining that he was not able to parent Child because

of his incarceration, and that the termination of his parental rights would

meet the needs and welfare of Child.

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section

2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en

banc). Here, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights under section

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2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b). We will analyze the trial court’s decision to

terminate Father’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(2) and (b). These

sections provide:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:

...

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied
by the parent.

...

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of
the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

We have stated:

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must
be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,

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neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal has caused the child to be without essential parental
care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or
mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal

citations omitted).

Our Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under section 2511(a)(2) as

follows.

§ 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds for termination of
parental rights where it is demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has
caused the child to be without essential parental care,
control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by
the parent.”

A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made
lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can
seldom be more difficult than when termination is based
upon parental incapacity. The legislature, however, in
enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a parent
who is incapable of performing parental duties is just as
parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827 (internal citations and some

internal quotations omitted).

Moreover, our Supreme Court instructed:

[I]ncarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a
determinative factor, in a court’s conclusion that grounds
for termination exist under § 2511(a)(2) where the
repeated and continued incapacity of a parent due to
incarceration has caused the child to be without essential

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parental care, control or subsistence and [] the causes of
the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 828.

After re-visiting its decision in In re: R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567 (Pa. 2011),

regarding incarcerated parents, the Supreme Court stated:

[W]e now definitively hold that incarceration, while not a
litmus test for termination, can be determinative of the
question of whether a parent is incapable of providing
“essential parental care, control or subsistence” and the
length of the remaining confinement can be considered as
highly relevant to whether “the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent,” sufficient to provide grounds for
termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). See e.g.
Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d at 891 (“[A] parent who is
incapable of performing parental duties is just as parentally
unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties.”); [In re:]
E.A.P., [944 A.2d 79, 85 (Pa. Super. 2008)] (holding
termination under § 2511(a)(2) supported by mother’s
repeated incarcerations and failure to be present for child,
which caused child to be without essential care and
subsistence for most of her life and which cannot be
remedied despite mother’s compliance with various prison
programs). If a court finds grounds for termination under
subsection (a)(2), a court must determine whether
termination is in the best interests of the child, considering
the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare of the child pursuant to § 2511(b). In this regard,
trial courts must carefully review the individual
circumstances for every child to determine, inter alia, how a
parent’s incarceration will factor into an assessment of the
child’s best interest.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 830-31.

Within the trial court’s opinion, the trial court explained that Father’s

incarceration has “unequivocally” caused Father to be unable to provide

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“essential parental care, control or subsistence” to Child – and for Child to be

without essential parental care. As the trial court explained:

Here, the facts unequivocally establish that Father’s
incarceration has caused Child to go without essential
parental care. At the time of Child’s birth [in November]
2011, Father was incarcerated. Father remained
incarcerated until May [] 2014. Upon his release, Father
lived with Child for six months. During that time, Father did
not attempt to contact or cooperate with OCYF, or to
remedy the cause of Child’s dependency. On October 31,
2014, Father was again incarcerated and has remained so
since that time. Outside of the limited six month timeframe
in which Father lived with Child, Father has been unable to
parent Child due to his continued incarceration. Father has
an extensive criminal history prior to Child’s birth and has
continued to lead that lifestyle. Child has been in the care
of OCYF since January 28, 2015, and Father will be unable
to assume a role in which he is able to provide essential
parental care for Child until December [] 2017[,] at a
minimum.

Father asserts that he has sent letters to the Foster Parent
while incarcerated and has had phone calls with Child.
Father testified that he “just want[s] to remain in [Child’s]
life no matter what the outcome is. . . . I’m doing
everything that I can . . . [t]hat I’m able to from
incarceration.” However, [the trial court] does not credit
Father’s testimony that he would “do anything” to remain in
[Child’s] life when, by Father’s own admission, he chose to
forge documents for a fellow inmate[, and thereby] violate
the [boot camp’s] policy which extended his release date.
Accordingly, [the trial court] is not persuaded that Father
has corrected his criminal tendencies and that his repeated
criminal activity demonstrates his incapacity to parent Child.

Even if Father completed programs while incarcerated that
are consistent with meeting his FSP goals, the completion of
these programs does not remedy his inability to parent.
FSP compliance and remedy or removal of condition[s] is
not determinative of the capacity to parent. Furthermore,
“when a child is adjudicated dependent, the child’s proper
placement turns on what is in the child’s best interest, not

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on what the parent wants or which goals the parent has
achieved.” In re K.C., 903 A.2d 12, 15 (Pa. Super. 2006).
With the facts concerning Father’s inability to provide care
for [] Child considered, [the trial court] found OCYF met the
statutory ground of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2411(a)(2).

Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/17, at 8-9 (some internal citations and

capitalization omitted).

This Court has stated that a parent is required to make diligent efforts

towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.

In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s vow to

cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity

or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or

disingenuous. Id. at 340. The evidence demonstrated that Father’s

continued incapacity, neglect, and refusal to parent could not or would not

be remedied, despite OCYF’s offering reasonable efforts to assist in his

reunification with Child.

A parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, will not

preclude termination of parental rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121

(Pa. Super. 2010). We stated in In re Z.P., a child’s life “simply cannot be

put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the

responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic

constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon

the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have

proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent,

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healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super.

2004).

After our careful review of the record in this matter, we find that the

trial court’s credibility and weight determinations are supported by

competent evidence in the record. In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. at 325-

326, 47 A.3d at 826-827. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s

determinations regarding section 2511(a)(2) are supported by sufficient,

competent evidence in the record and that Father’s claim of error in this

regard is frivolous.

After having determined that the requirements of section 2511(a)

were satisfied, we proceed to review whether the requirements of subsection

(b) were satisfied. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa.

Super. 2008) (en banc). This Court has stated that the focus in terminating

parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child

pursuant to section 2511(b). Id. at 1008.

In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section

2511(b), our Supreme Court declared:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are
met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of
the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and
welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to
include “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012).
In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993), the
Supreme] Court held that the determination of the child’s
“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional

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bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost
attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the
child of permanently severing the parental bond. In re
K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.
In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

As the trial court explained, termination of Father’s parental rights was

in the best interests of Child:

Here, [the trial court] evaluated the bond between Father
and Child and determined that there was no indication that
an emotional bond exists to the extent that the termination
of parental rights of Father would cause Child to suffer
extreme emotional consequences. . . . It is without
question that Father has been incarcerated for the majority
of Child’s life. Father was merely present in the same home
as Child for a total of six months. When Father was first
released from incarceration, Child was only two [] years of
age. Father was incarcerated again before [] Child’s third
birthday. Any detriment that Child would have suffered
from termination has already been endured because of
Father’s incarceration and absence from Child’s life. . . .

[Further,] Child has been in a stable foster home for the
duration of his placement. On October 20, 2016, Child was
placed in an adoptive foster home with [his sibling, N.C.,]
where they will remain permanently. Ms. Deak testified
that it is important that Child and N.C. be adopted together
and the adoptive Foster Parent really wants to adopt the
kids. She was actually one of the [previous] foster mother’s
cousin[s] . . . [s]o, she was really interested in having both
of the kids live with her. [The trial court] carefully
considered the fact that Child will have to adjust to a new
foster home[;] however, th[e trial court] determined that an
adoptive placement with N.C. would provide the stability
and permanence Child needs.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/17, at 10-11 (some internal quotations omitted).

The evidence in the record thoroughly supports the trial court’s

credibility and weight assessments regarding Child’s needs and welfare, and

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the absence of any bond with Father. We thus conclude that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion as to section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of

S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. Father’s claim to the contrary is frivolous. In

addition, after an independent review of the entire record, we see nothing

that might arguably support this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, wholly

frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order and grant Counsel’s

petition to withdraw appearance.

Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/10/2017

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