MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 11 2017, 7:21 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ruth Johnson Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Chandra K. Hein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Deavin Bledsoe, May 11, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1611-CR-2464
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David J. Certo,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G12-1608-CM-32550
Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1611-CR-2464 | May 11, 2017 Page 1 of 4
Statement of the Case
[1] Deavin Bledsoe appeals his sentence following his conviction for public nudity,
as a Class C misdemeanor. Bledsoe presents a single issue for our review,
namely, whether the trial court erred when it ordered him to stay away from a
certain intersection in Indianapolis when he serves the suspended portion of his
sentence. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On August 19, 2016, Bledsoe was seen urinating in public outside a
convenience store located at 10th Street and Oxford Street in Indianapolis. The
State charged Bledsoe with public nudity, as a Class C misdemeanor.
Following a bench trial on October 5, the trial court found Bledsoe guilty as
charged, entered judgment, and sentenced him to sixty days with thirty-six days
suspended. During sentencing, the trial court “order[ed]” Bledsoe “not to
return” to the intersection of 10th Street and Oxford. Tr. at 22. This appeal
ensued.1
Discussion and Decision
[3] Bledsoe’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court was not authorized to
impose a “stay-away” order as part of his sentence. Appellant’s Br. at 9.
1
We note that this sentence is consecutive to a sentence Bledsoe is currently serving in another county.
Bledsoe testified at sentencing that he would not be released until the “end of next year.” Tr. at 23-24.
Because Bledsoe has yet to serve the sentence in this matter, the issue on appeal is not moot.
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Bledsoe maintains that a trial court may only impose a stay-away order as a
condition of probation. In support of that contention, Bledsoe cites Indiana
Code Section 35-50-7-2, which provides:
The court that places a person on probation following conviction
may issue an order, reasonable in scope, under this chapter that
prohibits the person from entering the:
(1) area or property where an offense was committed by the
person; and
(2) area immediately surrounding the area or property where an
offense was committed by the person.
(Emphasis added). Bledsoe contends that, because the trial court did not order
him placed on probation, the court erred when it ordered him to stay away
from the intersection. We agree that under Indiana Code Section 35-50-7-2 a
stay-away order may only be issued when a defendant is placed on probation.
[4] The State maintains that the trial court’s comments at sentencing did not
constitute a “stay-away order” but were merely “a cautionary warning because
the trial court did not want Bledsoe to get into additional trouble based on the
neighborhood complaints and his current conviction.” Appellee’s Br. at 7. In
the alternative, the State contends that a “stay[-]away order can properly be
considered as [a] term of an informal probation.”
[5] First, nothing in the record indicates that the trial court imposed informal
probation in this case, so the State’s contention on that issue is without merit.
Second, we agree with Bledsoe that the trial court erred in its oral sentencing
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statement when it “ordered” him to stay away from the intersection of 10th
Street and Oxford Street. However, the written sentencing order does not
include a stay-away order, and, rather than remand for resentencing, we credit
the court’s written sentencing order over the oral order. See McElroy v. State,
865 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ind. 2007). The trial court’s written sentencing statement
properly omits the stay-away order. The trial court gave Bledsoe good advice
from the bench, but he is not required to stay away from the intersection of 10th
Street and Oxford Street in Indianapolis when he serves the suspended portion
of his sentence.
[6] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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