NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 11 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
INDIGO GROUP USA, INC., a California No. 14-56429
corporation,
D.C. No.
Plaintiff-Appellant, 2:14-cv-04657-MWF-CW
v.
MEMORANDUM *
RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 9, 2017**
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK,***
District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
Indigo Group USA, Inc. (“Indigo”) developed “cut-and-sew” patterns for
denim garments it manufactured for Ralph Lauren Corporation (“Ralph Lauren”).
Indigo filed a complaint requesting a declaration of co-ownership in the copyrights
to these patterns and an accounting of any profits derived from them. The case
went to trial. A jury found that Indigo and Ralph Lauren were co-owners of
copyrights in “certain” patterns. Indigo then argued that the jury’s finding
encompassed every pattern it had created for Ralph Lauren, and Ralph Lauren
argued that the case must be limited to the patterns identified in the operative
complaint. The district court limited the accounting to the patterns identified in the
operative complaint plus a number of additional patterns that had been produced in
discovery or discussed at trial.
While the accounting was ongoing, Indigo filed a second complaint against
Ralph Lauren. Indigo made the same claims of co-ownership, again requested an
accounting, and identified the patterns the district court had excluded from the first
case. The district court dismissed Indigo’s second complaint without leave to
amend under the rule against claim splitting, and Indigo appealed. We review the
district court’s order for an abuse of discretion, see Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health
Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007), overruled in part on other grounds by
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008), and we affirm.
2
“Plaintiffs generally have ‘no right to maintain two separate actions
involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against
the same defendant.’” Id. (quoting Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir.
1977) (en banc)). A district court thus has discretion to dismiss a later-filed action
if “the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or privies to the
action, are the same.” Id. at 689. The “most important” criterion in this
comparison is “whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of
facts.” Id. (quoting Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201–02
(9th Cir. 1982)).
The claims here all arise from the same transactional nucleus of facts:
Indigo’s development of cut-and-sew patterns for Ralph Lauren denim garments.
Indigo could have litigated its entire dispute with Ralph Lauren in a single case—
indeed, it has repeatedly asserted that it was doing just that. The district court’s
orders in the first case may also be challenged on direct appeal in that case, and
this order is without prejudice to Indigo’s doing so. But the district court was well
within its discretion to dismiss the second action.
AFFIRMED.
3