Case: 16-15220 Date Filed: 05/16/2017 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-15220
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:16-cv-00026-LJA-CHW
NATHANIEL HARRIS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
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(May 16, 2017)
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
Case: 16-15220 Date Filed: 05/16/2017 Page: 2 of 3
PER CURIAM:
Nathanial Harris, a Georgia prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition as impermissibly
second or successive.1 No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
We review de novo whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus is second or
successive. Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856, 858 (11th Cir. 2011). We
construe liberally pro se pleadings. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th
Cir. 2008).
Before a prisoner may file a second or successive habeas petition, he first
must obtain an order from the court of appeals authorizing the district court to
consider the petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Absent such an order, the
district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive habeas petition.
Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).
Harris was convicted of murder in 1992. Harris’s conviction and life
sentence were later affirmed by the state court. In 2010, Harris filed his first
section 2254 petition, which the district court dismissed as untimely. Harris filed a
1
In an earlier order, we denied Harris a certificate of appealability to appeal the district court’s
denial of his motions to alter the judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). To the extent that
Harris raises -- in his appellate brief -- arguments challenging the denial of his Rule 59(e)
motions, these arguments are outside the scope of this appeal and will not be considered. See
Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1998).
2
Case: 16-15220 Date Filed: 05/16/2017 Page: 3 of 3
second section 2254 petition in 2013, which the district court dismissed as second
or successive.
Then -- in 2016 -- Harris filed the section 2254 petition at issue in this
appeal. Harris’s 2016 section 2254 petition challenges the same 1992 judgment of
conviction that Harris has already challenged in his first two habeas petitions; so,
his 2016 petition is second or successive for purposes of AEDPA. See Insignares
v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[C]ourts must
look to the judgment challenged to determine whether a petition is second or
successive.”). That Harris purports to raise new claims in the instant habeas
petition is of no importance: the bar to successive applications is not claim-
specific. See id. at 1279.
Because Harris’s 2016 petition constitutes a “second or successive” habeas
petition -- and because Harris has failed to obtain leave from this Court to file such
a petition 2 -- the district court dismissed properly Harris’s petition for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Farris, 333 F.3d at 1216.
AFFIRMED.
2
Following the district court’s dismissal in this case, Harris has twice sought this Court’s leave
to file a successive habeas petition. We denied both applications after determining, in pertinent
part, that Harris failed to demonstrate that his proposed grounds for habeas relief were based
upon newly discovered evidence.
3