IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1932
Filed May 17, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JODY LYNN HUGHLETTE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Richard G. Blane II,
Judge.
A defendant appeals her conviction. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Vaitheswaran, JJ. Blane,
S.J. takes no part.
2
VOGEL, Judge.
Jody Hughlette appeals her conviction for possessing a taxable substance
without affixing a tax stamp, in violation of Iowa Code section 453B.1, .3, and .12
(2014). Specifically, Hughlette claims the State was required to prove she knew
the weight of the methamphetamine she possessed was seven grams or more.
Because we conclude the statute does not contain such a requirement, we affirm
her conviction.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On the evening of September 5, 2014, an officer with the Des Moines
Police Department (DMPD) was dispatched to East 14th Street and Dean
Avenue on reports of a fight involving a weapon. The officer encountered a
group of people, which included Hughlette, in a parking lot approximately one
block away. After talking with the group, the officer decided to arrest some of the
individuals, including Hughlette, for disorderly conduct. The officer then
requested a female officer be sent to the scene to assist in searching the
individuals for contraband. When the female officer arrived and searched
Hughlette, she discovered a clear plastic bag containing methamphetamine
tucked into her bra. The bag contained 23.78 grams of methamphetamine,1 and
it did not have a tax stamp on it.
1
At trial, a DMPD officer with experience in narcotics explained that approximately
twenty-eight grams equals one ounce and that an average dose of methamphetamine
was approximately 0.1–0.2 grams; thus, this package contained approximately 100
doses. He also testified one gram of methamphetamine sold for approximately $100–
$120.
3
On October 10, 2014, the State charged Hughlette with one count of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, in violation of Iowa
Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) and one count of possessing a taxable substance
without affixing a tax stamp, in violation of Iowa Code section 453B.1, .3, and .12.
At trial, Hughlette argued the State was required to prove she knew the weight of
methamphetamine she possessed was seven or more grams. The district court
determined the statute did not contain such a requirement and rejected
Hughlette’s argument. On September 2, 2015, the jury found Hughlette guilty of
possession of a controlled substance—a lesser-included offense of possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver—and guilty of possessing a
taxable substance without affixing a tax stamp. Hughlette appeals the tax-stamp
conviction.
II. Standard of Review
As the question raised on appeal is one of statutory interpretation, we
review it for correction of errors at law. See State v. Hagen, 840 N.W.2d 140,
144 (Iowa 2013) (“Questions of statutory interpretation . . . are reviewed for
correction of errors at law.”).
III. Statutory Requirements
Hughlette argues the tax-stamp statute contains a knowledge element that
applies to the weight of the taxable substance as well as the nature of the
substance itself. The State responds that the knowledge requirement only
applies to the nature of the substance and there is no such requirement attached
to the weight of the substance.
4
Iowa Code section 453B.3 provides: “A dealer shall not possess,
distribute, or offer to sell a taxable substance unless the tax imposed under this
chapter has been paid as evidenced by a stamp, label, or other official indicia
permanently affixed to the taxable substance.” Section 453B.1 defines a dealer
as:
any person who ships, transports, or imports into this state or
acquires, purchases, possesses, manufactures, or produces in this
state any of the following:
(1) Seven or more grams of a taxable substance other than
marijuana, but including a taxable substance that is a mixture of
marijuana and other taxable substances.
In interpreting this statute, our supreme court has identified “[t]he essential
elements of the drug tax stamp charge” as “(1) . . . a dealer who knowingly
possessed a taxable substance, (2) without a stamp, label or other official indicia
evidencing that the tax imposed by chapter 421A has been paid. The definition
of a dealer includes a person who possesses a certain quantity of a controlled
substance.” State v. Butler, 505 N.W.2d 806, 808 (Iowa 1993). In Butler, the
court construed the “knowingly” requirement as applying exclusively to the nature
of the substance, rather than the weight. Id. While addressing an elemental
challenge to a drug-tax-stamp conviction in State v. White, 545 N.W.2d 552
(Iowa 1993), the court again refused to attach the “knowingly” requirement to the
weight of the taxable substance. See id. at 555 (describing the elements as “(1)
the defendant is a dealer, (2) who unlawfully possesses, distributes or offers to
sell, (3) a taxable substance, (4) without affixing a stamp, label, or other official
indicia evidencing the tax imposed by chapter 453B has been paid”).
5
Based on our review of the statutory scheme and the relevant precedent
from our supreme court, we conclude the knowledge requirement in the statute
does not apply to the weight of the substance. The State was not required to
prove Hughlette knew the weight of the methamphetamine she possessed was
seven or more grams. Accordingly, we discern no error in the district court’s
rejection of Hughlette’s argument and affirm Hughlette’s conviction.
IV. Conclusion
Because we conclude Iowa Code section 453B.1 and .3 did not require
proof Hughlette knew the methamphetamine she possessed weighed seven or
more grams, we affirm Hughlette’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.