NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3506-15T1
DANIEL W. BUTCHEN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE
COMMISSION,
Respondent-Respondent.
___________________________________
Submitted May 2, 2017 – Decided May 19, 2017
Before Judges Ostrer and Leone.
On appeal from the New Jersey Motor Vehicle
Commission.
Lawrence B. Sachs, attorney for appellant.
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Melissa Dutton
Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Zachary N. Klein, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Daniel W. Butchen appeals from the February 11,
2016 final decision of the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey
Motor Vehicle Commission, suspending his New Jersey driving
privileges for 730 days, effective March 11, 2016. The suspension
was based on Butchen's conviction in New York State on August 20,
2015, of driving under the influence (DUI). As a first offender
in New York, his driving privileges there were revoked for 301
days, effective January 15, 2016 (after the expiration of a
previously ordered stay). Although it was Butchen's first New
York DUI, he was previously convicted on January 26, 2012, of
driving under the influence in New Jersey.
The New York Division of Motor Vehicles sent a notice of the
New York conviction, dated November 26, 2015, to the "CDL Unit"
of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission. The New Jersey Motor
Vehicle Commission recorded the information on January 6, 2016.
The next day, the Administrator notified Butchen of the impending
suspension of his New Jersey driving privileges. The Administrator
cited his authority under N.J.S.A. 39:5D-4 (authorizing New Jersey
to give effect to out-of-state DUI convictions as if committed
here); N.J.S.A. 39:5-30 (authorizing the Commission to suspend
licenses); and N.J.A.C. 13:19-11.1 (stating that if an out-of-
state conviction constitutes a second DUI violation, "a suspension
shall be imposed under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 corresponding to the number
of the violation"). We note that N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(2) mandates
a two-year suspension for a second conviction of DUI. The
Administrator advised Butchen that the suspension would be
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effective January 31, 2016, unless he raised factual or legal
issues, in which case the effective date would be postponed until
those issues were resolved.
In response, Butchen requested a hearing on the grounds that
the New Jersey suspension should commence January 15, 2016, to
coincide with his New York suspension. He also seemed to request
that his suspension be limited to the 301-day term of his New York
suspension.
This request was rejected in the February 11, 2016 final
decision by the Administrator. The Administrator found that
Butchen's petition raised no material issues of fact. He further
found that Butchen presented no legal basis for his requests.
On appeal, Butchen renews the request for relief presented
to the Administrator, adding that he was entitled to a hearing.
As he did before the Administrator, he provides no supporting
legal authority for his arguments. We find none.
Butchen is, undisputedly, guilty of a second DUI offense in
another state. Based on the authority cited, the Administrator
was obliged to impose the suspension period reserved for second-
offenders. The Administrator acted with reasonable promptness
after receiving notice of the New York suspension and proposed to
begin the New Jersey suspension only sixteen days after the New
York suspension began. See Boyd v. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 307
3 A-3506-15T1
N.J. Super. 356, 359 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608
(1998). The additional delay in commencement of the New Jersey
suspension to March 11, 2016, was a product of Butchen's own ill-
founded request for a hearing.
In short, we find that the Director imposed the appropriate
penalty in the appropriate manner. No violation of rights
occurred. Butchen's conclusory arguments to the contrary lack
sufficient merit to warrant further comment in a written opinion.
R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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