RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4770-15T1
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
D.J.,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP
OF K.J., a minor.
__________________________________
Submitted May 2, 2017 – Decided May 18, 2017
Before Judges Koblitz, Rothstadt and Sumners.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County,
Docket No. FG-15-10-15.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Joseph F. Kunicki, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Melissa Dutton-
Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Daniel Pierre, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for minor (Joseph H. Ruiz,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant D.J. appeals from a June 23, 2016 Family Part order
terminating his parental rights to his son K.J., who was five
years old at the time of the guardianship trial. We affirm,
substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Therese A. Cunningham
in her thirty-one page written opinion issued with the order.
The evidence is outlined in detail in the judge's opinion.
A summary will suffice here. K.J. was born in 2011 to a mother
who was addicted to drugs and who passed away in 2015. The newborn
had withdrawal symptoms at birth, and was transferred to a
specialized children's hospital where he stayed for approximately
six weeks. D.J. initially denied paternity until a paternity test
administered when K.J. was two and one-half years old demonstrated
he was in fact the father. Defendant was incarcerated at times
during the litigation and only complied sporadically with
scheduled dates for evaluations and court hearings. He was present
for the third and final trial day only, explaining he had been
confused about the first two dates.
Defendant has a lengthy criminal and domestic violence
history. He was confrontational and hostile toward the Division
workers. He did not visit his son regularly. At the time of
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trial, defendant had only seen his son twice during the prior
year, once for the bonding evaluation. The bonding evaluator
found defendant's bond with his son was "weak." Defendant did not
have a stable home or job. The Division placed K.J. with
relatives, but the placement did not work out. At the time of
trial, K.J. was in his sixth placement, and this placement had
lasted for two years. His resource parents wished to adopt him
and the Division's expert opined that a secure bond was forming
between them and K.J. at the time of the bonding evaluation.
In her comprehensive opinion, Judge Cunningham found that the
Division had proven all four prongs of the best interests test,
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), and that termination of defendant's
parental rights was in the child's best interests. On this appeal,
our review of the trial judge's decision is limited. We defer to
her expertise as a Family Part judge, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J.
394, 412 (1998), and we are bound by her factual findings so long
as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div.
of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 269 (2007) (citing
In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div.
1993)). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial
judge's factual findings are fully supported by the record and,
in light of those facts, her legal conclusions are unassailable.
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Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in her analysis
because he never specifically harmed K.J. "directly," did not
produce positive drug tests for two years, and attended some
services. Those arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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