J-S18033-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ESTEFANIA PERDOMO-CALERO IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
JACOB LEE ALTIF
Appellant No. 2273 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered June 22, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Civil Division
at No(s): C0048PF2016-000405
BEFORE: PANELLA, SOLANO, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MAY 22, 2017
Appellant, Jacob Lee Altif, appeals from the order of the Northampton
County Court of Common Pleas granting the petition for a protection from
abuse (“PFA”) order filed by Complainant, Estefania Perdomo-Calero.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for a
continuance of the PFA hearing and that the evidence was insufficient to
support the issuance of the PFA order. We remand for the preparation of a
supplemental Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
Complainant and Appellant had been in a relationship from October of
2014 to April of 2016. On May 25 and May 26, 2016, Complainant visited
Appellant’s apartment after his recent hospital stay. On May 26, 2016,
Appellant asked Complaint why she left him and then approached her to give
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S18033-17
her a hug. According to Complainant, Appellant squeezed her so hard that
she was not able to breathe correctly. When Complainant attempted to
leave, Appellant blocked the front door. Complainant grabbed Appellant’s
face and shook it. Appellant told her to leave through the backdoor.
Appellant, however, then ran to the backdoor and attempted to block the
backdoor, told Complainant that she scratched his face, and stated that he
would call the police. Complainant exited through the backdoor and went to
a neighbor’s apartment. The police responded, but took no action that
night. The following day, May 27, 2016, Appellant appeared at
Complainant’s workplace. According to Complainant, Appellant was trying to
“emotionally harass” her and then asked her for the keys to his apartment
and his motorcycle. N.T., 6/22/16, at 7.
Complainant filed a PFA petition on May 27, 2016, and an emergency
order was issued that same day.1 The trial court scheduled a hearing for
June 10, 2016, but continued the hearing to June 22, 2016, after Appellant
requested a continuance to obtain counsel.
The trial court conducted the hearing on June 22, 2016. After
Complainant testified, Appellant requested a continuance:
[Appellant]: . . . I was actually wondering if there is any
way for me to get a continuance because she
[Complainant] was coercing me and her father-figure—
1
Appellant also filed a PFA against Complainant, which the trial court
denied. Appellant’s PFA petition is not included in the certified record in this
appeal.
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***
She has a father-figure, and they were calling me on the
phone, and she called me twice yesterday. And they were
both telling me that I need to drop this, I need to let it get
done and over with, the PFA thing, or I’m going to get in
trouble and all that. I got a continuance for a lawyer, and
I didn’t bring the lawyer with me because they told me
that she wasn’t coming.
N.T. at 10-11. The trial court responded, “Well, that’s a mistake[,]” then
directed Appellant to testify. Id. Appellant testified on his own behalf and
described his and Complainant’s interactions on the day in question.
Appellant averred that Complainant assaulted him and took the keys to his
motorcycle, which he attempted to retrieve the following day.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued the instant order
granting Complainant a three-year PFA order against Appellant. Specifically,
the court determined that Complainant’s testimony was credible and
Appellant was not credible. Trial Ct. Op., 8/17/16, at 4. The court
concluded Complainant established Appellant placed her “in reasonable fear
of imminent serious bodily injury by squeezing her such that she feared that
she could not breathe and then blocking her access when she tried to leave
the apartment, both at the front door and at the back door.” Id. at 5.
Additionally, the court suggested that Appellant’s conduct “placed her in fear
that she was being falsely imprisoned.” Id. Lastly, the court noted that
Appellant “showed up unannounced, wanted to continue to discuss their
relationship, and harassed her at her office” and appeared fixated on
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Complainant. Id. Thus, the court concluded the issuance of a PFA order
was necessary to prevent “future physical contact and further threatening
and harassing conduct by Appellant.” Id.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement challenging (1) the court’s denial of his request for a continuance
of the June 22, 2016 hearing and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence. The
court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion addressing the latter claim, see
Trial Ct. Op. at 1-5, but did not address its denial of Appellant’s request for a
continuance.
Appellant presents the following questions for review:
Whether Trial Court committed reversible error denying
Appel[l]ant’s request for a continuance of the [PFA]
hearing?
Whether Trial Court committed reversible error in granting
a Final Order for [PFA] for . . . Appellee?
Appellant’s Brief at 1.
As to Appellant’s first argument regarding the denial of his request for
a continuance, we note:
Pursuant to § 6107(c), trial courts have discretion to
continue evidentiary hearings regarding final PFA orders
and enter appropriate temporary ex parte orders to cover
the intervening time. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(c) (“If a
hearing under subsection (a) [relating to evidentiary
hearing on final PFA order] is continued and no temporary
order is issued, the court may make ex parte temporary
orders under subsection (b) as it deems necessary.”).
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Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917, 926 (Pa. Super. 2013). Thus, we review
the denial of a request for a continuance for an abuse of discretion. See id.
Instantly, Appellant requested a continuance at his first opportunity to
speak at the hearing. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement contained a claim that the trial court erred in denying his request
for a continuance. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). Moreover, Appellant’s
brief sets forth an adequate argument in support of his claim. See Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a). Therefore, Appellant’s claim has been preserved for our review.
Unfortunately, the trial court did not set forth its reasons for the denial
of Appellant’s request on the record or respond to this claim in its Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion. Because this Court must review the trial court’s exercise of
discretion when granting or denying a request for a continuance, see Ferko-
Fox, 68 A.3d at 926, we are constrained to remand the record in this matter
for the preparation of a supplemental Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. The trial
court shall file a supplemental opinion addressing the denial of Appellant’s
request for a continuance within forty-five days of this memorandum.2
Record remanded with instructions. Panel jurisdiction retained.
2
In light of our disposition of Appellant’s first argument, we decline to
consider Appellant’s second argument that “[a] three year [PFA] order
should not be entered for an uncomfortable hug that lasted a bit too long,
nor should it be granted for standing in someone’s path to an exit for a few
seconds.” Appellant’s Brief at 7-8.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/22/2017
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Perdomo-Calero, E. v. Altif, J.
Combined Opinion