J-A04038-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JEFFREY A. EDEN,
Appellant No. 1401 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 19, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0012587-2011
CP-51-CR-0012657-2011
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., SOLANO, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MAY 23, 2017
Appellant, Jeffrey A. Eden, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed on November 19, 2014, following his jury conviction, in two
consolidated cases, of two counts of corrupting a minor, and one count each
of unlawful contact with a minor, rape by forcible compulsion, involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI), statutory sexual assault, sexual assault,
and indecent assault.1 On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency and
weight of the evidence, both the legality and discretionary aspects of
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301(a)(1), 6318(a)(1), 3121(a)(1), 3123(a)(1), 3122.1,
3124.1, and 3126(a)(1), respectively.
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sentence, certain of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, and the jury charge.
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part and vacate in part.
We take the underlying facts and procedural history in this matter
from the trial court’s November 2, 2015 opinion, and our independent review
of the certified record.
Sometime between 2009 and 2010, A.S. spent a night with
[Appellant] and [Appellant’s] son in a hotel room with two beds
in Philadelphia. A.S. was between twelve and thirteen at that
time and [Appellant] was his brother-in-law. That night,
[Appellant] and A.S. shared a bed while [Appellant’s] son slept in
a separate bed in the room. During the night, A.S. awoke to
[Appellant] ripping A.S.’s underwear and caressing A.S.’s penis.
[Appellant] stopped touching A.S. once A.S. ejaculated.
Although A.S. kept his eyes closed for the entire ordeal and
pretended to be asleep, A.S. stated that he knew [Appellant]
was the one touching him by the way [Appellant’s] hands felt.
On March 2, 2011, A.S. met with his principal, Maryland
Perez, (herein “Perez”), at Madison High School in Philadelphia to
discuss his absence from school due to a wrestling injury.
During that meeting, A.S. told Perez that he was the victim of
sexual abuse. As mandated by law, Perez alerted law
enforcement to the allegations of sexual abuse against her
student. Later that day, Officer [Oswaldo] Toribio and Officer
Fuller[2] met with Perez who explained that her student A.S.,
made allegations of sexual abuse to her and that A.S. feared
speaking to the police about the allegations. Officer Torib[i]o
and Officer Fuller proceeded to A.S.’s residence in Philadelphia . .
. to investigate the claims. After initially refusing to speak with
the [o]fficers, A.S. later decided to meet with Officer Toribio
alone. He told Officer Toribio that [Appellant] touched his penis
while he was sleeping. Officer Toribio testified that A.S.’s eyes
were watery and teary as he recounted the details of the
incident. Officer Toribio completed a report for the special victim
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2
Officer Fuller’s first name is not contained within the record.
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unit and a police incident report detailing the allegations then
transported A.S. to the special victims unit.
On November 6, 2011, A.S. reported that [Appellant]
sexually abused him a second time, one to two years after the
initial incident, at [Appellant’s] house located at 5010 Bingham
St. in Philadelphia. A.S. testified that he slept at [Appellant’s]
house but was awakened by [Appellant] ripping A.S.’s boxers
and touching A.S.’s penis until A.S. ejaculated. A.S. kept his
eyes closed and pretended that nothing happened again.
A.S. later reported to [] Family Court Assistant District
Attorney [Connor Shields] about a third incident of sexual abuse
by [Appellant], which occurred at an unspecified date and time,
also at [Appellant’s] house at 5010 Bingham Street, Philadelphia.
A.S. stated that he was awaken[ed] when he felt [Appellant]
performing oral sex on him until A.S. ejaculated. Again, A.S.
pretended as if nothing happened. He testified that he felt
ashamed of the incidents and reluctantly told authorities about
only one incident of sexual abuse at first before he realized that
it was better to get it all out in the open.
On June 2, 2011, A.S.’s sister, M.O., told A.S. and then
reported to authorities that she too was a victim of sexual abuse
by [Appellant]. M.O. told authorities that when she was around
eleven years old, approximately between 1996 and 1997,
[Appellant] played hide and seek in the dark at her mother’s
house with her and other children. [Appellant] often found M.O.
by feeling her body in the dark. M.O. related that although
[Appellant] would begin touching her in different places each
time, [Appellant] always made sure he touched certain places on
her body. He would keep touching her even after she told
Defendant, “you got me.” M.O. also testified that when she
wore shorts and no shirt in the house, around age eleven,
[Appellant] once told her, “[l]ook at you all sexy with your
mosquito bites,” in reference to M.O.’s breasts. M.O. also
reported of another incident during the same timeframe where
she woke up during movie night with her underwear removed
and her private area wet. When M.O. smelled her underwear
she knew that it was not urine and was something else. She
further testified that when she was at her mother’s house,
[Appellant] propositioned her to have sexual intercourse with
him in exchange for $50[.00] and then $75[.00], which M.O.
twice refused. On August 12, 2011, police served an arrest
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warrant on [Appellant] at his home at 5010 Bingham Street[,]
Philadelphia, PA, and placed him under arrest.
(Trial Court Opinion, 11/02/15, at 2-5) (record citations omitted).
A jury trial took place in June 2014. On June 25, 2014, the jury
convicted Appellant of two counts of corrupting a minor, and one count each
of unlawful contact with a minor, rape by forcible compulsion, IDSI,
statutory sexual assault, sexual assault, and indecent assault, but acquitted
him of one count each of criminal solicitation to commit rape by forcible
compulsion and criminal solicitation to commit statutory sexual assault.
On November 19, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an
aggregate term of incarceration of not less than fifteen nor more than thirty
years. On December 1, 2014, Appellant filed post-sentence motions,3 which
were denied by operation of law on April 13, 2015. This instant, timely
appeal followed. On May 8, 2015, the trial court directed Appellant to file a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). Appellant filed timely Rule 1925(b) statements on May 21, 2015.
See id. On November 2, 2015, the trial court issued an opinion. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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3
For reasons not readily apparent from the record, although the trial court
consolidated the two cases under one case number, CP-51-CR-0012387-
2011, Appellant filed separate post-sentence motions and Rule 1925(b)
statements concerning each victim. Thus, the motions and Rule 1925(b)
statements are not identical. Therefore, we will reference them by using the
initials of the victim.
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On appeal, Appellant raises the following questions for our review:4
1. [Did] [t]he trial court err[] in [failing to] dismiss[] the
action(s) against [Appellant], as no Bills of Information
were ever filed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
identifying the charges against [Appellant] and what
charges the Commonwealth was proceeding under in these
case(s) and as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 560(A) and
resulting in prejudice to [Appellant?]
2. [Did] [t]he trial court err[] in allow[ing] an assistant
district attorney, Connor Shields[,] to testify at trial
regarding conversations which had taken place with the
[c]omplainant, A.S.[,] over [three] years prior to the trial,
in the Commonwealth’s case in chief as any statement
given by the [c]omplainant was hearsay and not proper on
direct examination and was irrelevant[?]
3. [Was] [t]he evidence [] insufficient as a matter of law
against [Appellant] to find him guilty of [i]Indecent
[a]ssault as to M.O. pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1)
as there was no evidence of touching with the intent to
cause sexual arousal and/or gratification[?]
4. [Was] [t]he evidence [] insufficient as a matter [of law]
against [Appellant] to find him guilty of corruption of the
morals of a minor as to M.O., pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. [§]
6301(a)(1), as there was no evidence that he tended to
corrupt the morals of M.O. by playing games with her[?]
5. [Was] [t]he evidence [] insufficient as a matter law to find
[Appellant] guilty of rape by [f]orcible [c]ompulsion
pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 3121(a)(1) as there was no
evidence of forcible compulsion presented at trial[?]
6. [Was] [t]he jury verdict of guilty on the charges of
corruption of the morals of a minor pursuant to 18
Pa.C.S.A. [§] 6301(a)(1) and [i]ndecent [a]ssault pursuant
to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1) [] against the weight of the
evidence presented at trial as M.O. did not reveal these
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4
For ease of disposition, we have reordered the issues in Appellant’s appeal.
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allegations for approximately [fifteen] years, there was no
evidence of the charges other than the complainant’s
testimony and [Appellant] had presented character
evidence[?]
7. [Was] [t]he jury’s finding of guilty on the charges of
unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of the morals of
a minor, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,
statutory sexual assault and sexual assault [] against the
great weight of the evidence presented at trial as A.S.
gave conflicting testimony to the police and district
attorney’s office and [Appellant] had character evidence
and there were no documents to support A.S.’s claims[?]
8. [Did t]he trial court err[] in failing to properly read the jury
charge for corruption of the morals of a minor by reading
all three [] sections of the charge rather than the two []
sections which were applicable to the case against
[Appellant] resulting in prejudice to [Appellant?]
9. [Did] [t]he trial court err[] in failing to instruct the jury,
during the trial court’s charge to the jury on the definition
of “reasonable doubt” and how that reasonable doubt
impacts the burden of proof as required by Pa.SSJI 7.01 in
[its] charge to the jury in violation of the 14th Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Pennsylvania
Constitution, Article I, Section 9, which resulted in
prejudice to [Appellant?]
10. [Did] [t]he trial court fail[] to instruct the jury on the issue
of prior inconsistent statements [Pa.]SSJI 4.08A(1)(2)
(second alternative), as requested by [Appellant’s] counsel
in the charging conference and despite being objected to
by [Appellant] and the trial court did not define to whom
the “witness” was either A.S. or M.O[?]
11. [Did] [t]he trial court improperly instruct[] the jury on the
charge of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse under 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(7) ([less than] 16 years of age and
[greater than] 4 years older than the other person), when
the Commonwealth was proceeding under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3123(a)(1) (forcible compulsion) and which was not
reflected on the verdict sheet prepared by the
Commonwealth resulting in the jury being able to
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determine the elements of the offense necessary to convict
under section [] 3123[?]
12. [Did] [t]he trial court fail[] to address whether the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and/or [Appellant] had
any objections to the jury charge following the reading of
the jury charge and prior to sending the jury out to
deliberate[?]
13. [Did] [t]he trial court err[] in permitting the jury, during
its deliberations, to review the Pennsylvania Crimes Code,
i.e., Title 18, rather than the standard jury charge(s)
which the jury had requested which resulted in prejudice
to [Appellant]?
14. [Did] [t]he trial court abuse[] its discretion in sentencing
[Appellant] outside the Pennsylvania Sentencing guidelines
and giving him the maxim[um] sentence(s) on all charges
and fail[] to articulate the reason for the sentencing
outside of the guidelines and to the statutory maximums
which was excessive and there was no rational basis for
the sentences as well as being unreasonable[?]
15. [Did the] trial court err[] in sentencing [Appellant] on the
charge of “involuntary deviate sexual intercourse” to the
mandatory minimum sentence of [not less than] ten [nor
more than] twenty [] years when the mandatory
sentencing scheme, under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718[,] was
outlawed by the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Alleyne v. United States, 1[3]3 S.Ct. 2151
(2013) and Commonwealth v. Wolfe, [] 106 A.3d 800
([Pa. Super.] 2014)[,] and proper notice was never served
upon [Appellant] of the Commonwealth’s intent to proceed
via the mandatory minimum[?]
(Appellant’s Brief, at 9-12).
Initially, we mention the following concerns. While this Court
understands the duty to be a zealous advocate,
. . . we note that it has been held that when an appellant
raises an extraordinary number of issues on appeal, as in this
case, a presumption arises that there is no merit to them. In
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United States v. Hart, 693 F.2d 286, 287 n.1 (3rd Cir. 1982),
the court had an opportunity to address this situation:
Because of the inordinate number of meritless
objections pressed on appeal, spotting the one bona
fide issue was like finding a needle in a haystack.
One of our colleagues has recently cautioned on the
danger of “loquaciousness:”
With a decade and a half of federal
appellate court experience behind me, I
can say that even when we reverse a
trial court it is rare that a brief
successfully demonstrates that the trial
court committed more than one or two
reversible errors. I have said in open
court that when I read an appellant’s
brief that contains ten or twelve points, a
presumption arises that there is no merit
to any of them. I do not say that this is
an irrebuttable presumption, but it is a
presumption nevertheless that reduces
the effectiveness of appellate advocacy.
Appellate advocacy is measured by
effectiveness, not loquaciousness.
Aldisert, The Appellate Bar: Professional Competence
and Professional Responsibility—A View From the
Jaundiced Eye of One Appellate Judge, 11
Cap.U.L.Rev. 445, 458 (1982).
Estate of Lakatosh, 656 A.2d 1378, 1380 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1995).
Further, we note it is well-settled that:
[i]f an appellant has properly preserved an issue for
appellate review, the appellant must include in his or her brief a
“statement of the case” including a “statement of place of raising
or preservation of issues.” Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c). This information
must also be referenced in the argument portion of the appellate
brief. [See] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e).
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Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 502 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2008),
appeal denied, 992 A.2d 885 (Pa. 2010). In addition, “it is not the
responsibility of this Court to scour the record to prove that an appellant has
raised an issue before the trial court, thereby preserving it for appellate
review.” Id. at 502 n.6 (citations omitted).
In this case, neither Appellant’s statement of the case nor the
argument section of his brief contains a specific “statement of place of
raising or preservation of [his] issues” and it is not this Court’s responsibility
to scour the certified record, including the lengthy trial transcript, to prove
that Appellant preserved them. Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c); see Baker, supra at
502 n.5, n.6; (Appellant’s Brief, at 13-16, 18-50). Accordingly, Appellant’s
first, and eighth through twelfth issues, are waived on this basis. See
Baker, supra at 502 n.5, n.6. Nonetheless, we will review them to the
extent it is possible to do so.
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in not
dismissing the action because the Commonwealth did not file bills of
information as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 560(a).5 (See Appellant’s Brief, at
18-19). Appellant has waived this claim.
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5
Rule 560(A) provides: “[a]fter the defendant has been held for court
following a preliminary hearing or an indictment, the attorney for the
Commonwealth shall proceed by preparing an information and filing it with
the court of common pleas.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 560(A).
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It is settled a criminal defendant must challenge defects in the
charging process by filing an omnibus pre-trial motion. See
Commonwealth v. Martin, 694 A.2d 343, 344 (Pa. Super. 1997). Failure
to do so results in waiver on the issue on appeal. See id.; see also
Commonwealth v. Richter, 676 A.2d 1232, 1236 n.2 (Pa. Super. 1996),
affirmed, 711 A.2d 464 (Pa. 1998).
Here, as the trial court discusses in its opinion, Appellant did not file
an omnibus pre-trial motion; instead, Appellant raised the issue for the first
time in his post-sentence motions, something Appellant tacitly acknowledges
in his brief. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 5-6; see also Appellant’s Post-Sentence
Motion as to Complainant A.S., 12/01/14, at 5-6; Appellant’s Post-Sentence
Motion as to Complainant M.O., 12/01/14, at 4-6; Appellant’s Brief, at 19
n.5). Thus, we find that because Appellant did not file an omnibus pre-trial
motion, he waived this claim. Therefore, the trial court did not err in not
dismissing the action on this basis. See Martin, supra at 344; Richter,
supra at 1236 n.2.
In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
admitting the testimony of Assistant District Attorney Connor Shields at trial
concerning A.S.’s prior consistent statements. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 27-
29). Specifically, Appellant claims the statements were hearsay,
inadmissible during the Commonwealth’s case in chief, and irrelevant. (See
id. at 28-29). However, Appellant waived this claim.
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This Court has held that:
With regard to evidentiary challenges, it is well established
that [t]he admissibility of evidence is at the discretion of the trial
court and only a showing of an abuse of that discretion, and
resulting prejudice, constitutes reversible error. An abuse of
discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the
overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of
judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias,
prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of
record. Furthermore, if in reaching a conclusion the trial court
overrides or misapplies the law, discretion is then abused and it
is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error.
Commonwealth v. Serrano, 61 A.3d 279, 290 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
and quotation marks omitted).
Here, Appellant claims that the trial court improperly admitted
Assistant District Attorney Shield’s testimony because it was hearsay,
irrelevant, and not admissible during the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief.
(See Appellant’s Brief, at 28-29). However, this Court has stated that,
“[w]here a specific objection is interposed, other possible grounds for the
objection are waived.” Commonwealth v. Shank, 883 A.2d 658, 672 (Pa.
Super. 2005), appeal denied, 903 A.2d 538 (Pa. 2006) (citations omitted).
Because Appellant did not object to Assistant District Attorney Shield’s
testimony on the grounds of hearsay, irrelevancy, or inadmissibility during
the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, he has waived this claim. See Shank,
supra at 672.
In his third through fifth issues, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence. Specifically he claims that the evidence was insufficient to
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sustain his conviction for: (1) indecent assault with respect to victim M.O.
(see Appellant’s Brief, at 32); (2) corruption of minors with respect to victim
M.O. (see id. at 33); and (3) rape by forcible compulsion as to victim A.S.
(see id. at 33-34). We disagree.
Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well
settled:
We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial,
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed
in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict
winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to
find every element of the crime has been established beyond a
reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.
The evidence established at trial need not preclude every
possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all,
part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within the
province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth’s
burden may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any
doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact
finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a
matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the
combined circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Tarrach, 42 A.3d 342, 345 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
Initially, we note that Appellant’s argument is undeveloped. His
argument for each of the three issues consists of less than one page.
Further, Appellant’s argument disregards our standard of review, which
requires that we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, because Appellant only discusses the
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evidence in the light most favorable to him and ignores all other evidence.
(See Appellant’s Brief, at 32-34). Appellant overlooks the fact that this
Court does not re-weigh the evidence, nor do we engage in credibility
determinations. (See id.). Moreover, Appellant fails to cite to any relevant
legal authority in support of his propositions. (See id.). Accordingly,
Appellant has waived his sufficiency of the evidence claims. See
Commonwealth v. Liston, 941 A.2d 1279, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en
banc), affirmed in part and vacated in part, 977 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2009);
Pa.R.A.P. 2101. In any event, his claims lack merit.
Specifically, in his third issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence to support his conviction for indecent assault under 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 3126, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of indecent assault if
the person has indecent contact with the complainant, causes
the complainant to have indecent contact with the person or
intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with
seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual
desire in the person or the complainant and:
(1) The person does so without the complainant’s
consent[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1). “Indecent Contact” is defined by section 3101 of
the Crimes Code as “[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of
the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in either
person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101.
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In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, see Tarrach, supra at 345, M.O. testified that during
movie nights with Appellant,6 the then eleven-year-old would fall asleep
watching the movie and wake up to find her panties pulled down or off and
her vaginal area wet with a sticky fluid that did not smell like urine. (See
N.T. Trial, 6/24/14, at 10-12, 30-31). She further stated that what woke
her was someone touching or “sticking” her. (Id. at 12; see id. at 10-12,
30-31).
We have stated that, “the uncorroborated testimony of the
complaining witness is sufficient to convict a defendant of sexual offenses.”
Commonwealth v. Castelhun, 889 A.2d 1228, 1232 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(citations omitted). Further, the testimony discussed above is sufficient to
sustain a conviction for indecent assault. See Commonwealth v. Smith,
863 A.2d 1172, 1177 (Pa. Super. 2004) (holding touching of breast and
vagina sufficient to establish indecent contact for purpose of arousing or
gratifying sexual desire); Commonwealth v. Vosburg, 574 A.2d 679, 682
(Pa. Super. 1990), appeal denied, 602 A.2d 859 (Pa. 1991) (holding minor
victim’s testimony that she felt someone pulling down her underwear while
she was in bed sufficient to prove indecent assault). Thus, Appellant’s third
claim would be meritless.
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6
While Appellant denied any sexual contact, he did admit to having movie
nights with M.O. (See N.T. Trial, 6/24/14, at 115).
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In addition, in his fourth issue, Appellant challenges his conviction for
corrupting the morals of a minor with respect to M.O. An individual commits
this crime when:
. . . Except as provided in subparagraph (ii), whoever, being of
the age of 18 years and upwards, by any act corrupts or tends to
corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18 years of age, or
who aids, abets, entices or encourages any such minor in the
commission of any crime, or who knowingly assists or
encourages such minor in violating his or her parole or any order
of court, commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(i).
This Court has explained that:
The statute requires that the knowing, intentional acts of
the perpetrator tend to have the effect of corrupting the morals
of a minor.
This court has visited the question of what constitutes
“corruption” of a minor’s morals before. In Commonwealth v.
Decker, 698 A.2d 99, 101 (Pa. Super. 1997)[, appeal denied,
705 A.2d 1304 (Pa. 1998)], we held that actions that tended to
corrupt the morals of a minor were those that “would offend the
common sense of the community and the sense of decency,
propriety and morality which most people entertain.”
Commonwealth v. DeWalt, 752 A.2d 915, 918 (Pa. Super. 2000)
(emphasis in original, one citation omitted). Further, this Court has also
stated:
[C]orruption of a minor can involve conduct towards a child in an
unlimited number of ways. The purpose of such statutes is
basically protective in nature. These statutes are designed to
cover a broad range of conduct in order to safeguard the welfare
and security of our children. Because of the diverse types of
conduct that must be proscribed, such statutes must be drawn
broadly. It would be impossible to enumerate every particular
act against which our children need to be protected.
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Commonwealth v. Barnette, 760 A.2d 1166, 1173 (Pa. Super. 2000),
appeal denied, 781 A.2d 138 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted).
Here, in addition to the above described testimony of what occurred
during movie nights, M.O. testified that, when she was age eleven or twelve,
Appellant commented about the sexiness of her breasts, would play hide and
seek and find Appellant by fondling her body, and offered her money to
engage in sexual intercourse with him. (See N.T. Trial, 6/24/14, at 9-16,
27-31). This Court utterly rejects Appellant’s unsupported contention that
this evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for corrupting the morals
of a minor. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 33). We have long held that engaging
in a pattern of sexual conduct with the minor victim is sufficient to sustain a
conviction for corrupting the morals of a minor. See Commonwealth v.
Kelly, 102 A.3d 1025, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (single instance of
grabbing minor victim’s genitals sufficient to sustain conviction for corrupting
morals of minor); Commonwealth v. Judd, 897 A.2d 1224, 1234 (Pa.
Super. 2006), appeal denied, 912 A.2d 1291 (Pa. 2006) (holding that
engaging in various sexual offenses against victim sufficient to sustain
conviction for corrupting morals of minor). Appellant’s fourth claim lacks
merit.
In his fifth issue, Appellant challenges his conviction for rape by
forcible compulsion. An individual commits the crime of rape by forcible
compulsion when he: “engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant:
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(1) (b)y forcible compulsion[; or b]y threat of forcible compulsion that would
prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3121(a)(1)-(2). The Crimes Code defines “forcible compulsion” in relevant
part as “compulsion by use of physical, intellectual, moral, emotional or
psychological force, either express or implied. . . .” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101.
Our Supreme Court has stated that forcible compulsion “includes not only
physical force or violence but also moral, psychological or intellectual force
used to compel a person to engage in sexual intercourse against that
person’s will.” Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa.
1986). The Court went on to state:
The determination of whether there is sufficient evidence
to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused
engaged in sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion (which we
have defined to include not only physical force or violence, but
also moral, psychological or intellectual force used to compel a
person to engage in sexual intercourse against that person’s
will), or by the threat of such forcible compulsion that would
prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution is, of
course, a determination that will be made in each case based
upon the totality of the circumstances that have been presented
to the fact finder. Significant factors to be weighed in that
determination would include the respective ages of the victim
and the accused, the respective mental and physical conditions
of the victim and the accused, the atmosphere and physical
setting in which the incident was alleged to have taken place,
the extent to which the accused may have been in a position of
authority, domination or custodial control over the victim, and
whether the victim was under duress. This list of possible
factors is by no means exclusive.
* * *
There is an element of forcible compulsion, or the threat of
forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of
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reasonable resolution, inherent in the situation in which an adult
who is with a child who is younger, smaller, less psychologically
and emotionally mature, and less sophisticated than the adult,
instructs the child to submit to the performance of sexual acts.
This is especially so where the child knows and trusts the adult.
In such cases, forcible compulsion or the threat of forcible
compulsion derives from the respective capacities of the child
and the adult sufficient to induce the child to submit to the
wishes of the adult (prevent resistance), without the use of
physical force or violence or the explicit threat of physical force
or violence.
Id. at 1226-27 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the evidence showed that Appellant was the victim’s brother-in-
law; he acted as a father-figure to the victim after the victim’s own father
died. (See N.T. Trial, 6/23/14, at 47-48, 65). The victim was between age
twelve and thirteen at the time of the incident. (See id. at 48). The victim
testified that he was sleeping over at Appellant’s home and awoke in the
middle of the night to Appellant engaging in oral sex with him. (See id. at
53-54).
In the instant matter, given that the incident took place at Appellant’s
home, the age difference between Appellant and the victim, and Appellant’s
role as the victim’s brother-in-law and surrogate father, we find that the
evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape by forcible
compulsion. See Rhodes, supra at 1227-28 (finding evidence sufficient to
sustain conviction for rape by forcible instruction where defendant instructed
child victim to lay down before engaging in intercourse); see also
Commonwealth v. Fears, 836 A.2d 52, 66-67 (Pa. 2003), cert. denied,
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545 U.S. 1141 (2005) (holding evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for
rape by forcible compulsion where defendant pulled down twelve-year-old
boy’s pants and had oral sex with him). Appellant’s fifth claim is meritless.
In Appellant’s sixth and seventh claims he argues that his convictions
for corrupting the morals of a minor and indecent assault as to victim M.O.
and unlawful contact with a minor, corrupting the morals of a minor, rape,
IDSI, statutory sexual assault, and sexual assault as to victim A.S. were
against the weight of the evidence. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 35-37).
Specifically, Appellant claims that the finder-of-fact should not have credited
the victims’ testimony, there was no physical or documentary evidence, and
Appellant presented character witnesses. (See id.). We disagree.
Our scope and standard of review of a weight of the evidence claim is
as follows:
The finder of fact is the exclusive judge of the weight of
the evidence as the fact finder is free to believe all, part, or none
of the evidence presented and determines the credibility of the
witnesses.
As an appellate court, we cannot substitute our judgment
for that of the finder of fact. Therefore, we will reverse a jury’s
verdict and grant a new trial only where the verdict is so
contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. A
verdict is said to be contrary to the evidence such that it shocks
one’s sense of justice when the figure of Justice totters on her
pedestal, or when the jury’s verdict, at the time of its rendition,
causes the trial judge to lose his breath, temporarily, and causes
him to almost fall from the bench, then it is truly shocking to the
judicial conscience.
Furthermore, where the trial court has ruled on the weight
claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the
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underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight
of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether
the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the
weight claim.
Commonwealth v. Boyd, 73 A.3d 1269, 1274-75 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
banc) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Thus, the trial court’s denial
of a motion for a new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is the
least assailable of its rulings.” Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873,
879-80 (Pa. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1106 (2009) (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court rejected Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim;
noting that the jury credited the victims’ testimony and the guilty verdict did
not shock its conscience. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 11-12). We agree. Fact-
finding and credibility determinations are matters for the jury. The record
reflects that the jury chose to credit the testimony of the Commonwealth’s
witnesses and chose to reject the defense witnesses. The jury, sitting as
finder of fact, was free to believe the Commonwealth’s witnesses and to
disbelieve the defense. See Commonwealth v. Griscavage, 517 A.2d
1256, 1259 (Pa. 1986). Thus, Appellant’s weight of the evidence claims are
without merit.
Appellant’s eighth through eleventh claims all concerned alleged errors
in the trial court’s charge to the jury. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 20-24, 29-
30, 37-42). The standard governing our review of a challenge to jury
instructions is as follows:
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When reviewing a challenge to part of a jury instruction,
we must review the jury charge as a whole to determine if it is
fair and complete. A trial court has wide discretion in phrasing
its jury instructions, and can choose its own words as long as the
law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury
for its consideration. The trial court commits an abuse of
discretion only when there is an inaccurate statement of the law.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 954 A.2d 1194, 1198 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal
denied, 962 A.2d 1196 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted).
In his eighth claim,7 Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
“failing to properly read the jury charge for corruption of the morals of a
minor by reading all three [] sections of the charge rather than the two []
applicable to the case. . . .” (Appellant’s Brief, at 39). Appellant waived this
claim.
The trial court charged the jury as follows:
[Appellant] has been charged with corruption of a minor.
To find [Appellant] guilty of this offense, you must find that each
of the following three elements has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
First, that [Appellant] was [eighteen] years of age or older
at the time of the incident.
Second, that the complainant[s A.S. and M.O.] were under
the age of [eighteen].
____________________________________________
7
Presumably, in an attempt to show prejudice, Appellant includes in his
argument with respect to this issue a myriad of other complaints about the
jury charge. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 41-42). However, Appellant waived
these claims because they are not included in his statement of the questions
involved. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 979 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa. Super.
2009) (holding claim waived when not included in statement of questions
involved).
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Third that [Appellant] aided, abetted, enticed, or
encouraged the minor to commit the [sic] crime or knowingly
assisted or encouraged the minor to commit the [sic] crime or
corrupted or tended to corrupt the morals of the minor following
the alleged conduct.
(N.T. Trial, 6/25/14, at 24).
Here, Appellant did not take any exception and did not object to the
instruction on corrupting the morals of a minor. (See id. at 32-33). Thus,
the claim is waived. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(B); Commonwealth v. Laird,
988 A.2d 618, 646 (Pa. 2008), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1069 (2010);
Commonwealth v. Parker, 104 A.3d 17, 30 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal
denied, 117 A.3d 296 (Pa 2015). Appellant waived his eighth claim.
In his ninth claim, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
failing to read the definition of reasonable doubt to the jury. (See
Appellant’s Brief, at 20-24). Again, Appellant failed to take an exception or
to object to the omission from the charge.8 Therefore, Appellant waived his
ninth claim. See Laird, supra at 646; Parker, supra at 30.
____________________________________________
8
In his brief, Appellant concedes that trial counsel did not object to the
omission. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 22 n.8). Appellant asks that we find
trial counsel ineffective for failing to make the objection. (See id.). We
remind counsel that with two limited exceptions, ineffective assistance of
counsel claims are deferred for review pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief
Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d
562, 563 (Pa. 2013). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are allowed on
direct appeal only where there are: (1) “extraordinary circumstances” such
that “a discrete claim (or claims) of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness is apparent
from the record and meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In his tenth claim, Appellant claims that the trial court failed to give
the requested jury instruction on prior inconsistent statements. (See
Appellant’s Brief, at 29-30). Appellant does not claim that the charge was
erroneous, but simply that it was not the requested charge. (See id.).
While Appellant did object to the charge as given on this basis, (see N.T.
Trial, 6/25/14, at 32), he has not demonstrated that he ever requested an
alternate charge. In response to Appellant’s objection, the trial court stated
that it did not recall him ever requesting that charge and reminded him that
it had asked for requested charges in advance. (See id. at 32-33). This
Court has thoroughly examined the record, and can find nothing to support
Appellant’s claim that he ever requested an alternate charge on prior
inconsistent statements.
We observe that “[i]t is an appellant’s duty to ensure that the certified
record is complete for purposes of review.” Commonwealth v. Reed, 971
A.2d 1216, 1219 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted). “[A]n appellate court cannot
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
best serves the interests of justice,” or (2) good cause and “the unitary
review . . . is preceded by the defendant’s knowing and express waiver of his
entitlement to seek PCRA review from his conviction and sentence, including
an express recognition that the waiver subjects further collateral review to
the time and serial petition restrictions of the PCRA.” Id. at 563-64. Here,
because Appellant’s ineffective assistance claim does not fall into either
exception discussed above, we dismiss his claims without prejudice to
raising them in a timely filed PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v.
Stollar, 84 A.3d 635, 652 (Pa. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1798 (2014)
(dismissing, pursuant to Holmes, appellant’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claims raised on direct appeal, without prejudice to pursue them on
collateral review).
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consider anything which is not part of the record in the case. . . . because
for purposes of appellate review, what is not of record does not exist.”
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 33 A.3d 122, 126 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2011),
appeal denied, 47 A.3d 845 (Pa. 2012) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
While Appellant claims that he raised this request during a charge
conference, there is no transcript of such and no reference to it in the
certified record. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 29-30). Again, we note “our
review is limited to those facts which are contained in the certified record[,]”
and what is not contained in the certified record “does not exist for purposes
of our review.” Commonwealth v. O'Black, 897 A.2d 1234, 1240 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (citations omitted). Here, because all discussions regarding
any proposed jury charge are dehors the record, we conclude Appellant
waived his tenth claim.9 See O’Black, supra at 1240; see also Reed,
supra at 1219 (finding waiver and declining to review appellant’s issue with
an incomplete record); Johnson, supra at 126 (declining to reach merits of
appellant’s issue where it was deemed waived.).
____________________________________________
9
We note that, “[w]here portions of a proceeding are unrecorded,
appellant’s burden to supply a record may be satisfied through the
statement in absence of transcript procedures.” Commonwealth v.
Rovinski, 704 A.2d 1068, 1073 (Pa. Super. 1997), appeal denied, 723 A.2d
1024 (Pa. 1998) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 1923). The record reflects that Appellant
made no attempt to comply with the requirements of Rule 1923.
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In his eleventh issue, Appellant claims that the trial court failed to
properly instruct the jury on the charge of involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 37-39). Specifically, Appellant claims
that the trial court instructed the jury under the incorrect section of the
statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(7), which is age-based IDSI, rather than the
section under which Appellant was charged, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(1),
which is rape by forcible compulsion. (See id.). However, Appellant waived
this claim because not only did he not object to the charge as given but
agreed to the Commonwealth’s request to alter the verdict sheet to remove
the forcible compulsion section and only have the jury deliberate on age-
based IDSI. (See N.T. Trial, 6/25/14, at 33-34). Thus, Appellant waived his
eleventh claim. See Laird, supra at 646; Parker, supra at 30.
In his twelfth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by
failing to ask the parties if they had any objections to the jury charge. (See
Appellant’s Brief, at 31). Initially, we note that Appellant has provided no
legal support for his contention that a trial court is required to ask the
parties if they have any objection to the jury charge. Moreover, the record
reflects that, immediately following the conclusion of the charge, defense
counsel sua sponte objected to the portion of the charge on prior
inconsistent statements. (See N.T. Trial, 6/25/14, at 32-33). The trial court
then asked if there were any other objections; in response, the
Commonwealth noted an omission to the verdict sheet, the trial court asked
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the Commonwealth to fix it, and defense counsel again noted an objection
(the basis of this objection is not readily apparent from the record). (See
id. at 33). Thus, it is evident from the record that defense counsel was
aware that he could object to the jury charge and did object to those
portions he found objectionable. Appellant’s twelfth claim lacks merit.
In his thirteenth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
allowing the jury to review selected portions of the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code during its deliberation. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 25-26). Again,
Appellant has waived this claim.
The issue of what materials are permitted to go back with the jury is
governed by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 646, which provides in
pertinent part:
(A) Upon retiring, the jury may take with it such exhibits as the
trial judge deems proper, except as provided in paragraph (C).
* * *
(C) During deliberations, the jury shall not be permitted to have:
(1) a transcript of any trial testimony;
(2) a copy of any written or otherwise recorded
confession by the defendant;
(3) a copy of the information or indictment; and
(4) except as provided in paragraph (B), written jury
instructions.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(A),(C). If an item does not fall within any of the
categories specifically prohibited by Rule 646(C), it falls within the discretion
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of the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Bango, 742 A.2d 1070, 1072
(Pa. 1999). In Bango, our Supreme Court stated that:
[w]e will deem a trial court to have abused its discretion only if
we determine that the trial court’s ruling exhibited manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias or such lack of
support as to render it clearly erroneous. We will not condemn a
trial court’s ruling as an abuse of discretion merely because we
might have reached a different conclusion had the decision been
ours in the first instance.
Id. (citations omitted).
Here, the jury asked to be reinstructed on almost all the definitions of
the charged crimes. (See N.T. Trial, 6/25/14, at 35-36). After a discussion
with both counsel, the Commonwealth suggested sending back the elements
of the crime, and defense counsel agreed. (See id. at 36). It is settled that
failure to raise a contemporaneous objection constitutes a waiver of the
claim. See Commonwealth v. Powell, 956 A.2d 406, 419 (Pa. 2008),
cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1131 (2009). Thus, Appellant waived his thirteenth
claim.
In his fourteenth issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects
of sentence.10 Specifically, he maintains that the trial court deviated from
the sentencing guidelines without providing sufficient reasons for its
____________________________________________
10
We note that Appellant preserved his discretionary aspects of sentence
claim by filing a timely post-sentence motion for reconsideration of
sentence. See Commonwealth v. McAfee, infra at 275.
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sentence and imposed an excessive sentence without considering mitigating
factors. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 46-50). We disagree.
The right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not
absolute. See Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super.
2004), appeal denied, 860 A.2d 122 (Pa. 2004). When an appellant
challenges the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed, he must
present “a substantial question as to the appropriateness of the sentence[.]”
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013, 1017 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(citations omitted). An appellant must, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 2119(f), articulate “a colorable argument that the
sentence violates a particular provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary
to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing scheme.”11
Commonwealth v. Kimbrough, 872 A.2d 1244, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(en banc), appeal denied, 887 A.2d 1240 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted); see
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). If an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement meets these
prerequisites, we have found that a substantial question exists. See
Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 727 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en
banc), appeal denied, 759 A.2d 920 (Pa. 2000). “Our inquiry must focus on
the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts
____________________________________________
11
Here, Appellant has included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. (See
Appellant’s Brief, at 46-47).
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underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the
merits.” Id. (emphases in original).
Here Appellant claims that the sentencing court failed to provide
sufficient reasons for sentencing him outside the guidelines. (See
Appellant’s Brief, at 46). This claim raises a substantial question. See
Commonwealth v. Rodda, 723 A.2d 212, 214 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en
banc). Appellant also claims his sentence is excessive because the trial
court did not consider mitigating factors. This Court has held that a claim of
excessiveness in conjunction with a claim that the sentencing court did not
consider mitigating factors presents a substantial question. See
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 731 (Pa. Super. 2015),
appeal denied, 125 A.3d 1198 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). We will
therefore address the merits of this claim.
Our standard of review is settled.
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of
the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an
abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law,
exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias
or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Gonzalez, supra at 731.
Appellant complains that the sentencing court sentenced him outside
the guidelines. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 46-50). We have stated that:
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When evaluating a challenge to the
discretionary aspects of sentence . . . it is important
to remember that the sentencing guidelines are
advisory in nature. If the sentencing court deems it
appropriate to sentence outside of the guidelines, it
may do so as long as it offers reasons for this
determination. [O]ur Supreme Court has indicated
that if the sentencing court proffers reasons
indicating that its decision to depart from the
guidelines is not un reasonable, we must affirm a
sentence that falls outside those guidelines.
A sentencing court, therefore, in carrying out its duty to
impose an individualized sentence, may depart from the
guidelines when it properly identifies a particular factual basis
and specific reasons which compelled [it] to deviate from the
guideline range.
Commonwealth v. Schull, 148 A.3d 820, 836 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations
and quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original).
Here, the trial court had the benefit of a Pre-Sentence Investigation
Report (PSI), a mental health report, and a lengthy sentencing
memorandum from the Commonwealth. (See N.T. Sentencing, 11/19/14, at
5). It acknowledged that Appellant had family support. (See id. at 8).
Victim M.O. testified at the sentencing hearing and the Commonwealth read
a letter from Victim A.S. (See id. at 12-16). The trial court specifically
noted how difficult trial had been for the victims. (See id. at 16). Appellant
also spoke at sentencing; he did not take responsibility for his actions and
instead complained how “heartbroken” and upset he was by the victims’
accusations and blamed them for tearing the family apart. (Id. at 17; see
id. at 18). Both parties informed the trial court about the relevant
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sentencing guidelines. (See id. at 6-9). In fact, the Commonwealth
requested a significantly longer sentence than that imposed by the trial
court. (See id. at 9). Immediately prior to imposing sentence, the trial
court explained the basis for the sentence, noting how heart breaking the
case was, the emotional difficulties suffered by the witnesses, and that the
family was torn apart. (See id. at 19).
Therefore, Appellant’s claim that the sentencing court abused its
discretion in sentencing him outside the guidelines is meritless. See
Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 966-68 (Pa. 2007) (so long as
trial court imposed individualized sentence that was reasonable there was no
abuse of discretion); Commonwealth v. Davis, 737 A.2d 792, 799 (Pa.
Super. 1999) (affirming sentence outside guidelines where trial court was
informed of PSI, heard testimony, and allowed defendant to speak before
imposing sentence); Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa.
Super. 1988) (finding statement of reasons sufficient where trial court had
PSI and was presumed to have been aware of and weighed defendant’s
history, character, and mitigating factors).
Further, we reject Appellant’s claim that the sentence was excessive
because the trial court did not consider mitigating factors. Here, as
discussed above, the trial court had the benefit of the PSI, a mental health
evaluation, and a sentencing memorandum. While acknowledging the
horrific nature of the case, the trial court still imposed a sentence well below
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that requested by the Commonwealth. Clearly, the gist of Appellant’s
argument is not that the sentencing court did not consider the relevant
sentencing factors, but rather that the court did not weigh them as much in
his favor as he wished. Our review of the record does not show that the
sentencing court abused its discretion or that it entered a manifestly
unreasonable sentence. See Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 112 A.3d 656,
662 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding sentence not manifestly unreasonable where
sentencing court considered PSI, details of crime, and explained reasons for
sentence); see also Commonwealth v. Treadway, 104 A.3d 597, 600
(Pa. Super. 2014) (holding that sentence of not less than one hundred nor
more than two hundred years not manifestly excessive in light of
defendant’s conduct of child molestation). Appellant’s claim lacks merit.
In his fifteenth and final issue, Appellant challenges the legality of his
sentence. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 43-46). Specifically, Appellant argues
that the application of the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions set
forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718 violates the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Alleyne, supra. (See id. at 43). For the reasons set forth
below, we are constrained to agree.
“Issues relating to the legality of a sentence are questions of law, as
are claims raising a court’s interpretation of a statute. Our standard of
review over such questions is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”
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Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 45 A.3d 1123, 1130 (Pa. Super. 2012),
appeal denied, 53 A.3d 756 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).
The statute at issue in the present matter is 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718,
which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Mandatory sentence.—
(1) A person convicted of the following offenses
when the victim is less than 16 years of age shall be
sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment as
follows:
* * *
18 Pa.C.S.[A] § 3123 (relating to
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse)—
not less than ten years.
* * *
(c) Proof at sentencing.—The provisions of this section shall
not be an element of the crime, and notice of the provisions of
this section to the defendant shall not be required prior to
conviction, but reasonable notice of the Commonwealth’s
intention to proceed under this section shall be provided after
conviction and before sentencing. The applicability of this
section shall be determined at sentencing. The court shall
consider any evidence presented at trial and shall afford the
Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to present any
necessary additional evidence and shall determine, by a
preponderance of the evidence, if this section is applicable.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718(a)(1), (c).
In Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court held that “facts that
increase mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury” and
must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne, supra at 2163. This
Court explained the rationale of Alleyne as follows:
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Alleyne is an extension of the Supreme Court’s line of cases
beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120
S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). In Alleyne, the Court
overruled Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct.
2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002), in which the Court had reached
the opposite conclusion, explaining that there is no constitutional
distinction between judicial fact finding which raises the
minimum sentence and that which raises the maximum
sentence.
It is impossible to dissociate the floor of a
sentencing range from the penalty affixed to the
crime. Indeed, criminal statutes have long specified
both the floor and ceiling of sentence ranges, which
is evidence that both define the legally prescribed
penalty. This historical practice allowed those who
violated the law to know, ex ante, the contours of
the penalty that the legislature affixed to the crime—
and comports with the obvious truth that the floor of
a mandatory range is as relevant to wrongdoers as
the ceiling. A fact that increases a sentencing floor,
thus, forms an essential ingredient of the offense.
Moreover, it is impossible to dispute that facts
increasing the legally prescribed floor aggravate the
punishment. Elevating the low-end of a sentencing
range heightens the loss of liberty associated with
the crime: the defendant’s expected punishment has
increased as a result of the narrowed range and the
prosecution is empowered, by invoking the
mandatory minimum, to require the judge to impose
a higher punishment than he might wish. Why else
would Congress link an increased mandatory
minimum to a particular aggravating fact other than
to heighten the consequences for that behavior?
This reality demonstrates that the core crime and the
fact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence
together constitute a new, aggravated crime, each
element of which must be submitted to the jury.
Alleyne, supra at 2160–61 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 994-95 (Pa. Super. 2014).
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In light of Alleyne, this Court has declared unconstitutional those of
Pennsylvania’s mandatory minimum sentencing statutes that permit a trial
court, rather than a jury, to make the critical factual findings for sentencing.
See Commonwealth v. Cardell, 105 A.3d 748, 751 (Pa. Super. 2014),
appeal denied, 121 A.3d 494 (Pa. 2015) (holding mandatory minimum
sentences pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508, which concern weight of
narcotics possessed by drug dealer, unconstitutional); Commonwealth v.
Valentine, 101 A.3d 801, 811-12 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9712, which concerned mandatory minimum sentencing for certain crimes
committed with firearm unconstitutional); Commonwealth v. Newman, 99
A.3d 86, 90 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 121 A.3d 496 (Pa.
2015) (holding 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712.1, which imposes mandatory minimum
sentencing for possessing firearm in close proximity to narcotics
unconstitutional).
In Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800 (Pa. Super. 2014),
appeal dismissed, 145 A.3d 727 (Pa. 2016), this Court considered the
constitutionality of Section 9718, the statute at issue in the case sub judice.
In light of Alleyne, Newman, and Valentine, we held that Section 9718
was facially unconstitutional because the elements of the “[p]roof at
sentencing” provision required a trial judge, not a jury, make the factual
findings by a preponderance of the evidence, and not beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 802; see id at 805.
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Because subsection (a)(1), which the trial court applied in the instant
matter, uses the same “[p]roof at sentencing” provision as in Wolfe, we are
constrained to conclude that its application here was unconstitutional and
the sentence illegal. Id. at 802.
Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, we vacate the November
19, 2014 judgment of sentence for Appellant’s conviction for IDSI, 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(1). Despite the trial court’s error in sentencing
Appellant, we believe a remand for resentencing is not necessary. The court
sentenced Appellant to a concurrent term of incarceration for unlawful
contact with a minor, rape, and IDSI. Under these circumstances, it is clear
that vacating a concurrent sentence would not upset the overall sentencing
scheme, so no remand is necessary. See Commonwealth v. Thur, 906
A.2d 552, 569-70 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 946 A.2d 687 (Pa.
2008) (if decision does not alter overall sentencing scheme there is no need
for remand).
Accordingly, for the reasons discuss above we affirm the judgment of
sentence in part and vacate the judgment of sentence for IDSI.
Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/23/2017
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