NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0476-15T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RICKEY H. WILLIFORD, a/k/a
RICKEY H. WILLIFORD, JR.,
a/k/a RICKY H. WILLIFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________
Submitted April 4, 2017 – Decided April 20, 2017
Before Judges Fisher and Ostrer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County,
Indictment No. 14-12-0973.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Frank J. Pugliese, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the
brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Jennifer E. Kmieciak,
Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the
brief).
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Rickey H. Williford appeals from his conviction,
after a jury trial, of unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-5(b), and doing so as a certain person not to have weapons,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b) — both second-degree crimes. His sole point
on appeal is that a 2013 gun amnesty statute made his conduct
lawful. He contends:
POINT I
MR. WILLIFORD WAS CONVICTED OF CONDUCT THAT
DID NOT CONSTITUTE A CRIME AT THE TIME, THUS
HIS CONVICTION IS ILLEGAL AND SHOULD BE
VACATED.
A) The Plain Language of the Amnesty Law
Establishes that Defendant Committed No
Crime on December 17, 2013.
B) Mr. Williford was Precluded from
Complying with the Terms of the Amnesty
Law Following his Unlawful Arrest on
December 17, 2013.
Defendant's argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant
extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We
add the following brief comments.
The statute upon which defendant relies states:
Any person who has in his possession a handgun
in violation of subsection b. of [N.J.S.A.]
2C:39-5 . . . on the effective date of this
act [August 8, 2013] may retain possession of
that handgun . . . for a period of not more
than 180 days after the effective date of this
act. During that time period, the possessor
of the handgun . . . shall:
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(1) transfer that firearm to any person
lawfully entitled to own or possess it; or
(2) voluntarily surrender that firearm
pursuant to the provisions of [N.J.S.A.]
2C:39-12.
[L. 2013, c. 117, § 1.]
Under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-12, a person will not be held criminally
liable for possessing a firearm "if after giving written notice
of his intention to do so . . . he voluntarily surrendered the
weapon[.]"
Defendant had the burden to prove the amnesty law applied to
him, as it was in his interest to do so, and the amnesty law did
not create an element of the offenses charged. See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-
13(d) (stating that the burden of proof for a finding of fact,
which is not an element of the offense, rests on the party whose
interests will be furthered if the finding were made). He failed
to do so.
According to the statute's plain language, see In re Kollman,
210 N.J. 557, 568 (2012) (stating if the statute's plain language
is clear, the court's interpretative task is complete), the amnesty
law applies only to persons in possession of a weapon on the
effective date. See State ex rel. C.L.H.'s Weapons, 443 N.J.
Super. 48, 56 (App. Div. 2015). Here, defendant was charged and
convicted of possessing a semi—automatic handgun on December 17,
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2013. Defendant presented no evidence that he possessed the
firearm on August 8, 2013. Additionally, defendant did not provide
written notice to authorities, nor did he voluntarily surrender
his handgun. We have noted that the statute was not intended to
shield from prosecution a person who "voluntarily surrender[s]" a
weapon only "after it has already been seized" by authorities.
Id. at 56-57. In sum, the amnesty law provides defendant no
refuge.
Affirmed.
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