Wilhelm Construction, Inc. and J.C. Riberger Construction Corporation v. Secura Insurance, a Mutual Company and Davenport Masoney, Inc. (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 24 2017, 8:32 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John W. Mervilde SECURA INSURANCE
Rick D. Meils Kyle A. Lansberry
Neil A. Davis Lewis S. Wooton
Meils Thompson Dietz & Berish Michael R. Giordano
Indianapolis, Indiana Lewis Wagner, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
DAVENPORT MASONRY
Mark D. Gerth
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Wilhelm Construction, Inc. and May 24, 2017
J.C. Ripberger Construction Court of Appeals Case No.
Corporation, 49A02-1604-CT-811
Appellants/Defendants/Third-Party Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
Plaintiffs, The Honorable David J. Dreyer,
Judge
v.
Trial Court Cause No.
49D10-1212-CT-46372
Secura Insurance, a Mutual
Company and Davenport
Masonry, Inc.,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1604-CT-811 | May 24, 2017 Page 1 of 29
 Appellees/Third-Party Defendants.

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary
[1] In June of 2012, Mark Rhone was injured while completing certain masonry

work in connection to a construction project on the University of Indianapolis’s

campus. Rhone initially filed suit against the construction project’s general

contractor. In this suit, Rhone sought damages for the injuries he suffered

while working on the construction project. Rhone subsequently amended his

complaint to include the construction project’s subcontractor which had been

responsible for the completion of certain concrete and masonry work. This

subcontractor had subsequently entered into a sub-subcontract with Rhone’s

employer for the completion of certain masonry work.

[2] In filing suit against the general contractor and the subcontractor, Rhone

argued that both had breached their nondelegable duty to provide all

individuals working on the construction project with a safe work environment.

The general contractor and the subcontractor sought indemnification from the

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 sub-subcontractor, i.e., Rhone’s employer, and the sub-subcontractor’s

insurance carrier. All parties eventually sought summary judgment. The trial

court conducted a hearing on the parties’ competing summary judgment

motions, after which it found that (1) the general contractor and the

subcontractor had assumed a nondelegable duty to provide Rhone with a safe

work environment; (2) there had been a breach of this duty, resulting in injury

to Rhone; and (3) the general contractor and the subcontractor were not entitled

to indemnification by the sub-subcontractor or the sub-subcontractor’s

insurance carrier because the indemnification provision at issue violated

Indiana’s Anti-Indemnity Statute and, as such, was void.

[3] On appeal, the general contractor and the subcontractor do not dispute the

breach of duty, instead arguing that the trial court erred in determining that (1)

the indemnification provision at issue was void and (2) they were not entitled to

indemnification by the sub-subcontractor or the sub-subcontractor’s insurance

carrier. Our review of the facts and circumstances of this particular case

considered with the relevant statutory authority and case law leads us to the

conclusion that the trial court properly found that the indemnification provision

at issue violated Indiana’s Anti-Indemnity Statute. As such, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

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 A. The Project
[4] In September of 2011, the University of Indianapolis hired

Appellant/Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Wilhelm Construction, Inc.

(“Wilhelm”) to serve as the construction manager for the construction of

Roberts Hall, a dormitory (“the Project”). Wilhelm subcontracted the concrete

and masonry work to Appellant/Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff J.C.

Ripberger Construction Corp. (“Ripberger”). Ripberger then subcontracted

certain masonry work to Appellee/Third-Party Defendant Davenport Masonry,

Inc. (“Davenport”), whose liability carrier is Appellee/Third-Party Defendant

Secura Insurance, a Mutual Company (“Secura”).

B. The Relevant Contracts
[5] Four separate contracts govern the parties’ relationships: the contract between

the University of Indianapolis and Wilhelm (“the Prime Contract”), the

subcontract between Wilhelm and Ripberger (“the Wilhelm-Ripberger

Contract”), the sub-subcontract between Ripberger and Davenport (“the

Ripberger-Davenport Contract”), and the insurance policy issued to Davenport

by Secura (“the Secura Policy”).

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 1. The Prime Contract

[6] On September 12, 2011, Wilhelm entered into a contract with the University of

Indianapolis which provided that Wilhelm would serve as the construction

manager for the Project.1

2. The Wilhelm-Ripberger Contract

[7] After securing the Prime Contract, Wilhelm contracted with Ripberger to

complete concrete and masonry work on the Project. The Wilhelm-Ripberger

Contract contained the following language with regard to jobsite safety,

insurance, and indemnification:

9. Subcontractor shall take the proper precautions in the
performance of its Work to protect all persons and property from
being injured by the Work or by the condition of the site, shall
comply with any safety measures initiated by Contractor or set
forth in the Subcontract Documents, and shall comply with
OSHA and any other applicable Federal, State or local safety
laws, rules, orders or regulations.
****
14. Prior to the start of its Work, Subcontractor shall procure
and maintain in force, for at least the duration of its Work,
insurance as is called for by the attached Project Insurance
Requirements, plus any additional insurance that is required of
Contractor under the Prime Contract. Contractor, Owner, Prime
Contractor, Construction Manager and Architect shall be named
as additional insured on each of the required policies, except for
worker’s compensation. Subcontractor shall furnish insurance

1
None of the provisions in the Prime Contract are at issue in the instant appeal. As such, for the sake of
brevity and clarity for the reader, none of the specific provisions of this contract are included in this
memorandum decision.

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 certificates to Contractor verifying the required insurance prior to
beginning its Work, but no later than ten (10) days from the date
of this Subcontract Agreement. If any of the foregoing insurance
coverages are required to remain in force after final payment, an
additional certificate evidencing continuation of such coverage
shall be submitted with Subcontractor’s final application for
payment. This insurance coverage provided by Subcontractor
shall be primary and non-contributory to any other insurance.
****
17. To the fullest extent permitted by law, Subcontractor shall
indemnify, hold harmless, and defend at its own expenses
Contractor, Owner, Prime Contractor, Construction Manager,
Architect, and their respective agents, employees and assigns
(herein collectively referred to as “Indemnitees”) from and
against any claims, causes of action, damages, losses and
expenses (including litigation costs and attorney’s fees) of any
nature whatsoever, including but not limited to claims for or
relating to injury, sickness or disease to any persons (including
death), damages to property (including the lost use thereof and
consequential damages therefrom), economic loss, liens or
Project delays, which arise out of or are alleged to arise out of a)
the performance of Subcontractor’s Work; b) the Subcontractor’s
breach of this Subcontract Agreement; and/or c) any act or
omission of Subcontractor, its subcontractors or material
supplies, any directly or indirectly employed by them or anyone
for whose acts they may be liable; regardless of whether or not
such claim, cause of action, damage, loss or expense is
contributed to or caused by the negligence, breach of contract or
warranty, strict liability, or any other breach of duty to any
Indemnitee; provided, however, that subcontractor shall not be
obligated to indemnify an Indemnitee for its sole negligence or
willful misconduct where such indemnification ins contrary to
law, but otherwise it is the intent of the parties that Subcontractor
shall indemnify the Indemnitees to the fullest extent permitted by
law.

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 Appellants’ App. Vol. IV, p. 103.

[8] The Wilhelm-Ripberger Contract provided that Ripberger would obtain

specified minimum levels of insurance for the Project. It also required that

“The following shall be named as Additional Insured(s) on Subcontractor’s

[insurance] policies: F.A. Wilhelm Construction Co., Inc. AND Wilhelm

Construction, Inc. and their respective affiliates, subsidiaries, officers, directors,

employees and representatives AND University of Indianapolis.” Appellants’

App. Vol. IV, p. 105 (bold in original). The Wilhelm-Ripberger Contract

further provided that “[t]he insurance coverage provided by Subcontractor

under this Subcontract Agreement shall be primary and non-contributory to any

other insurance.” Appellants’ App. Vol. IV, p. 106.

3. The Ripberger-Davenport Contract

[9] At some point, Ripberger entered into a contract with Davenport for the

completion of certain masonry work on the Project. The Ripberger-Davenport

Contract provided that Ripberger had entered into a contract with the

University of Indianapolis to provide all concrete and masonry work on the

Project, referring to Ripberger’s agreement with the University of Indianapolis

as the “General Contract.”2 Appellants’ App. Vol. IV, p. 107.

2
We note that Ripberger did not actually enter into an agreement with the University of Indianapolis.
Rather, Ripberger entered into an agreement with Wilhelm, who had entered into a contract with the
University of Indianapolis for completion of the Project. It is unclear from the record before the court on
appeal whether Ripberger intended the phrase “General Contract” to refer to the Prime Contract entered into

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[10] In relation to insurance and indemnity, the Ripberger-Davenport Contract

provided as follows:

12. INSURANCE (a) the Subcontractor shall purchase
and maintain throughout its performance of this contract the
minimum insurance coverages and limits as set forth below,[ 3]
unless otherwise stated in the General Contract. All required
insurance shall be procured from insurance companies
authorized to do business in the State of Indiana and having
A.M. Best Rating of A- (or better) or S&P AA- (or better). Prior
to commencing performance under this contract, the
Subcontractor shall furnish to Contractor a Certificate or
Certificates as issued by the insurer(s) evidencing that the
required coverages and limits are in effect and that the policies
may not be cancelled or lapse without thirty (30) days prior
written notice to the Contractor. J.C. Ripberger Construction
Corp. shall be added as an additional insured to the
Subcontractor’s general liability, auto and umbrella policies, and
the coverage’s [sic] granted by the additional insured provision of
these polices will be primary and on a noncontributory basis.
Subcontractor shall furnish Contractor complete and certified
copies of all required polices if so requested by Contractor.
****
13. INDEMNIFICATION To the fullest extent permitted
by law, Subcontractor hereby agrees to indemnify, save and hold
harmless, and defend at its own expense Contractor, its officers,
employees, agents and servants, the Owner, and the Architect or
Engineer, and any other person or entity for whom any of them

between Wilhelm and the University or Indianapolis or the Wilhelm-Ripberger Contract entered into
between Wilhelm and Ripberger.
3
The Ripberger-Davenport Contract provides the specific types of insurance which much be provided by
Davenport, but does not clearly outline the minimum amount of each type of coverage that is required. The
specifics relating to the coverage requirements contained within the Ripberger-Davenport Contract are not
material to the resolution of this appeal and, as such, are not quoted herein.

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 may be legally responsible (herein collectively called
“Indemnitees”) from and against all claims, loses, damages,
suits, costs and expenses, including but not limited to attorneys’
fees and costs of litigation, arbitration and mediation or actions
of any nature whatsoever, which arise out of or result from, or
[are] alleged to arise out of or result from, the work to be
performed by the Subcontractor, including without limiting the
generality of the foregoing all liability for claims for debt or
damage to any property, including the loss of use thereof and
consequential damages therefrom, economic loss, damage or
injury to any Indemnitee, whether such claim or damage is based
upon, or alleged to be based upon statutory, contractual, tort or
other liability of any Indemnitee and even though cause, or
alleged to be caused by the joint, several and comparative
negligence, breach of contract, breach of warranty, strict liability,
or other breach of duty by any Indemnitee. It is the intent of this
Subcontract that Subcontractor defend, indemnify and hold
harmless Indemnitees and any such other persons or entities as
the contract documents may require even if it is alleged that
Indemnitees, or such other persons or entities, individually or
collectively contributed to the alleged wrongdoing, were
individually or collectively, actively or passively negligent or
individually or collectively liable because of a non-delegable
duty. Subcontractor is not obligated to defend, indemnify or
hold harmless Indemnitees, or such other persons, for their sole
negligence or willful misconduct if such indemnification is
contrary to law.

Also, the Subcontractor shall defend, indemnify, and hold the
Owner and its officers, agents, and employees harmless from all
claims, demands, and causes of action brought against them or
any of them as a result of Subcontractor’s non-compliance with
any non-discrimination requirements imposed by Indiana Code
§§ 22-9-1-10, 36-1-12-15, and 5-16-6-1 (or any successor or
claimed statutory obligations).

If any part of this provision is adjudged to be contrary to law, the

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 remaining part of the provision shall in all other respects be and
remain legally effective and binding. Moreover, this provision
shall not be construed to eliminate or in any way reduce any
other indemnifications or rights which the Contractor,
Construction Manager, Owner, Architect or Engineer has by
law.

Appellants’ App. Vol. IV, pp. 110-11.

4. The Secura Policy

[11] Relevant portions of the Secura Policy provide as follows:

SECTION I – COVERAGES

COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY
DAMAGE LIABILITY

1. Insuring Agreement

a. We will pay those sums that the Insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or
“property damage” to which this insurance applies. We will
have the right and duty to defend the Insured against any “suit”
seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to
defend the Insured against any “suit” seeking damages for
“bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance
does not apply. We may, at our discretion, investigate any
“occurrence” and settle any claim or “suit” that may result.…

b. This insurance applies to “bodily injury” and “property
damage” only if:
(1) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” is
caused by an “occurrence” that takes place in the
“coverage territory”;

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 (2) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” occurs
during the policy period; and
(3) Prior to the policy period, no Insured … and no
“employee” authorized by [the Insured] to give or
receive notice of an “occurrence” or claim, knew that
the “bodily injury” or “property damage” had
occurred, in whole or in part.…
d. “Bodily injury” or “property damage” will be deemed to have
been known to have occurred at the earliest time when any
Insured … or any “employee” authorized by [the Insured] to give
or receive notice of an “occurrence” or claim:
(1) Reports all, or any part, of the “bodily injury” or
“property damage” to us or any other insurer;
(2) Receives a written or verbal demand or claim for
damages because of the “bodily injury” or “property
damage”; or
(3) Becomes aware by any other means that “bodily
injury” or “property damage” has occurred or has
begun to occur.
****
2. Exclusions

This insurances does not apply to:

****

e. Employer’s Liability

“Bodily injury” to:

(1) An “employee” of the Insured arising out of and
in the course of:
(a) Employment by the Insured; or
(b) Performing duties related to the
conduct of the Insured’s business; or

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 (2) The Spouse, child, parent, brother or sister of that
“employee” as a consequence of Paragraph (1)
above.

This exclusion applies:

(1) Whether the Insured may be liable as an
employer or in any other capacity; and
(2) To any obligation to share damages with or repay
someone else who must pay damages because of the
injury.

This exclusion does not apply to liability as assumed by the
Insured under an “Insured contract”.

****
SECTION II – WHO IS AN INSURED

1. If you are designated in the Declarations as:
****
d. An organization other than a partnership, joint venture or
limited liability company, you are an Insured. Your “executive
officers” and directors are Insureds, but only with respect to their
duties as your officers or directors. Your stock-holders are also
Insureds, but only with respect to their liability as stockholders.
****
2. Each of the following is also an Insured:

a. Your “volunteer workers” only while performing duties
related to the conduct of your business, or your “employees”,
other than either your “executive officers” … but only for acts
within the scope of their employment by you or while performing
duties related to the conduct of your business. However, none of
these “employees” or “volunteer workers” are Insureds for:
(1) “Bodily injury” or “personal and advertising
injury”:

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 (a) To you, to your partners or
members … to a co-“employee” while
in the course of his or her employment
or performing duties related to the
conduct of your business, or to your
other “volunteer workers” while
performing duties related to the conduct
of your business;
(b) To the spouse, child, parent, brother
or sister of that co-“employee” or
“volunteer worker” as a consequence of
Paragraph (1)(a) above;
(c) For which there is any obligation to
share damages with or repay someone
else who must pay damages because of
the injury described in Paragraphs (1)(a)
or (b) above; or
(d) Arising out of his or her providing
or failing to provide professional health
care services.
****
SECTION IV – COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABLITY
CONDITIONS
****
2. Duties in the event of Occurrence, Offense, Claim or Suit

a. You must see to it that [the Insurer is] notified as soon as
practicable of an “occurrence” or an offense which may result in
a claim. To the extent possible, notice should include:
(1) How, when and where the “occurrence” or
offense took place;
(2) The names and addresses of any injured persons
and witnesses; and
(3) The nature and location of any injury or damage
arising out of the “occurrence” or offense.
b. If a claim is made or “suit” is brought against any Insured,
you must:
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 (1) Immediately record the specifics of the claim or
“suit” and the date received; and
(2) Notify us as soon as practicable.
You must see to it that we receive written notice of the claim or
“suit” as soon as practicable.
c. You and any other involved Insured must:
(1) Immediately send us copies of any demands,
notices, summonses or legal papers received in
connection with the claim or “suit”;
(2) Authorize us to obtain records and other
information;
(3) Cooperate with us in the investigation or
settlement of the claim or defense against the “suit”;
and
(4) Assist us, upon our request, in the enforcement of
any right against any person or organization which
may be liable to the Insured because of injury or
damage to which this insurance may also apply.
d. No Insured will, except at that Insured’s own cost, voluntarily
make a payment, assume any obligation, or incur any expense,
other than for first aid, without our consent.

3. Legal Action Against Us

No person or organization has a right under this Coverage Part:
a. To join us as a party or otherwise bring us into a
“suit” asking for damages from an Insured; or
b. To sue us on this Coverage Part unless all of its
terms have been fully complied with.

Appellants’ App. Vol. VII, pp. 20-21, 28-30 (bold in original).

[12] The Secura Policy defines the term “bodily injury” as follows: “Bodily injury”

means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, including death

resulting from any of these at any time.” Appellants’ App. Vol. VII, p. 32. It

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 defines the term “occurrence” as follows: “Occurrence” means an accident,

including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general

harmful conditions.” Appellants’ App. Vol. VII, p. 33. The Secura Policy

further defines the term “suit” as follows:

“Suit” means a civil proceeding in which damages because of
“bodily injury”, “property damage” or “personal and advertising
injury” to which this insurance applies are alleged. “Suit”
includes:
a. An arbitration proceeding in which such damages are claimed
and to which the Insured must submit or does submit with [the
Insurer’s] consent; or
b. Any other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in which
such damages are claimed and to which the Insured submits with
our consent.

Appellants’ App. Vol. VII, p. 34.

[13] The “Additional Insured WRAP”, an endorsement incorporated into the

Secura Policy, provides as follows:

A. Additional Insured When Required By Written
Construction Contract

1. Operations Performed for An Additional Insured

WHO IS AN INSURED is amended to include as an additional
insured any person or organization for whom you are performing
operations when you and such person or organization have
agreed in a written contract or written agreement prior to a loss,
that such person or organization be added as an additional
Insured on your policy. Such person or organization is an
additional Insured only with respect to liability for “bodily

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 injury”, “property damage” or “personal and advertising injury”
caused, in whole or in part, by:
a. Your acts or omissions or
b. The acts or omissions of those acting on your
behalf;

In the performance of your ongoing operations for the additional
Insured.

A person’s or organization’s status as an additional Insured
under this provision ends at the earlier of when your operations
for that additional Insured are completed; or the end of the policy
period.
****

F. Additional Condition

The following condition is added:

Additional Insured Duty to Notify

The additional Insured described in A … must give written
notice of loss, including a demand for defense and indemnity, to
any other insurer having coverage for the loss under its policies.
Such notice must demand full coverage available and the
additional Insured shall not waive or limit such other available
coverage.

This additional condition does not apply to the insurance
available to the additional Insured which covers that person or
organization as a named insured.

Appellants’ App. Vol. VII, pp. 67-69 (bold in original).

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 C. The Incident
[14] On June 5, 2012, Mark Rhone, an employee of Davenport, and Davenport

foreman Gary Smalley were disassembling scaffolding. Smalley was operating

a piece of equipment known as a lull, which was used to lift the scaffolding.

While Rhone was standing next to a section of the scaffolding, Smalley lifted

the section of the scaffolding up with the lull. The section of the scaffolding

toppled over onto Rhone.4 Rhone was injured when he was crushed by a

section of the scaffolding.

D. Procedural History Leading to this Appeal
[15] On December 4, 2012, Rhone and his wife (collectively, “the Rhones”) filed the

underlying lawsuit against Wilhelm, seeking damages for the injuries Rhone

allegedly suffered as a result of the incident. After being sued, Wilhelm

requested defense and indemnity from Ripberger based on the indemnity

provisions of the Wilhelm-Ripberger Contract. On July 30, 2013, Ripberger’s

insurer, Amerisure, sent a letter to Davenport and Secura demanding that they

defend and indemnify Ripberger and Wilhelm. Secura denied Americure’s

demand, noting that Wilhelm is not insured under the Secura policy and that

no lawsuit had been filed against Ripberger.5

4
At all times relevant to this appeal, Rhone alleged that Smalley’s negligent operation of the lull caused the
scaffolding to topple over onto him.
5
On August 2, 2013, Secura filed a Motion to Intervene in the underlying suit so to protect its worker’s
compensation lien. The trial court granted this motion on August 13, 2013.

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[16] Wilhelm sought leave to file a third-party complaint against Secura and

Davenport on December 19, 2013. The trial court subsequently granted this

motion. Secura filed its answer to this third-party complaint on March 17,

2014.

[17] On May 1, 2014, the Rhones amended their complaint, adding Ripberger as a

defendant. In this amended complaint, the Rhones alleged that the Appellants

were liable for breaching the nondelegable duty of care that they assumed by

contract. Counsel for Secura was not served with this amended complaint. Six

months later, Wilhelm and Ripberger filed a third-party complaint against

Secura. Ripberger did not request that Secura defend or indemnify it for the

suit at any time between May 1, 2014 and November 14, 2014, when it sued

Secura for an alleged breach of contract.

[18] Between April and August of 2015, each party filed a motion for summary

judgment. The Rhones sought partial summary judgment on the issues of

whether Appellants (1) owed a nondelegable duty of job site safety and (2) were

vicariously liable for their subcontractors. Wilhelm and Ripberger (collectively,

“Appellants”) moved for summary judgment against Davenport and Secura

(collectively, “Appellees”), arguing that Secura was obligated to defend and

indemnify Appellants or, alternatively, that Davenport had breached its

obligation to provide insurance that would provide for Appellants’ defense and

indemnification. Appellees opposed Appellants’ motions and filed cross-

motions for summary judgment. The trial court held a hearing on all of the

summary judgment motions on December 3, 2015.

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[19] On January 12, 2016, the trial court issued an order granting the Rhones’

motion for partial summary judgment, finding that “as a matter of law”

Appellants “assumed a contractual nondelegable duty for the safety of all

employees on the subject construction project, including the employees of

[their] subcontractors.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 8, p. 54. The trial court also

found that “in addition to liability for their own negligence, [Appellants] are

vicariously liable for the negligence of their subcontractors including

DAVENPORT.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 8, p. 54. Appellants do not challenge

these findings on appeal.

[20] Also on January 12, 2016, the trial court issued an order denying Appellants’

motion for summary judgment and granting Secura’s motion for summary

judgment. On March 30, 2016, the trial court amended its order to also grant

Davenport’s motion for summary judgment. This appeal follows.

Discussion and Decision
[21] On appeal, the Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting the

Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. In making this contention, the

Appellants argue that the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law,

they were not entitled to indemnification by Secura. The Appellants further

contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary

judgment. We disagree with both contentions.

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 I. Standard of Review
[22] Summary judgment is appropriate only where no genuine issues
of material fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Settles v.
Leslie, 701 N.E.2d 849, 852 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Genuine issues
of material fact exist where facts concerning an issue which
would dispose of the litigation are in dispute. Settles, 701 N.E.2d
at 852. The moving party has the initial burden of
demonstrating, prima facie, the absence of genuine issues of
material fact. Id. If the moving party does so, the burden then
falls upon the non-moving party to identify a factual dispute
which would preclude summary judgment. Id. Upon appeal of a
grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the
trial court, resolving any factual disputes or conflicting inferences
in favor of the non-moving party. Id. We consider only those
portions of the record specifically designated to the trial court.
Id. Upon appeal, the non-moving party bears the burden of
persuasion and must specifically point to the disputed material
facts and the designated evidence pertaining thereto. Id. We will
liberally construe the designated evidence in favor of the non-
movant, so that he is not improperly denied his day in court. Id.

Meisenhelder v. Zipp Exp., Inc., 788 N.E.2d 924, 926-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

II. Analysis
A. Appellants’ Nondelegable Duties
[23] The Indiana Supreme Court recently handed down an opinion in which the

Court discussed the duties that contractors owe to subcontractors in cases

stemming from accidents occurring on construction sites. See Ryan v. TCI

Architects/Engineers/Contractors, Inc. et al, --- N.E.3d ---, 2017 WL 1488853 (Ind.

April 26, 2017), the Indiana Supreme Court explained as follows:
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 As to the duty owed by a general contractor, the long-standing
rule in Indiana is that “a principal will not be held liable for the
negligence of an independent contractor.” Bagley v. Insight
Commc’ns Co., L.P., 658 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ind. 1995) (citing Prest-
O-Lite Co. v. Skeel, 182 Ind. 593, 597, 106 N.E. 365, 367 (1914);
also citing City of Logansport v. Dick, 70 Ind. 65, 78 (1880)).
Therefore, a general contractor, such as TCI, will ordinarily owe
no outright duty of care to a subcontractor’s employees, much
less so to employees of a sub-subcontractor. This means that
when a subcontractor fails to provide a reasonably safe
workspace, the general contractor will not incur liability for
employee injury, even when such injury is proximately caused by
the subcontractor negligence. The rationale behind this rule is
that a general contractor has little to no control over the means
and manner a subcontractor employs to complete the work.
Stumpf v. Hagerman Const. Corp., 863 N.E.2d 871, 876 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007).

However, five exceptions to our general rule exist. One such
exception allows for the existence of a duty of care where a
contractual obligation imposes a “specific duty” on the general
contractor.6 Bagley, 658 N.E.2d at 586. “If a contract
affirmatively evinces an intent to assume a duty of care,
actionable negligence may be predicated on the contractual
duty.” Stumpf, 863 N.E.2d at 876. In other words, a contract
that is found to demonstrate the general contractor’s intent to
assume a duty of care exposes the general contractor to potential
liability for a negligence claim where no such liability would
have otherwise existed. A duty imposed by contract, once
formed, is non-delegable and is thought to encourage the general

6
The other exceptions recognized by Indiana law apply when: (1) the contract requires the performance of
intrinsically dangerous work; (2) the act will create a nuisance; (3) the act to be performed will probably cause
injury to others unless due precaution is taken; and (4) the act to be performed is illegal. Bagley, 658 N.E.2d
at 586.

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 contractor to minimize the risk of resulting injuries. Bagley, 658
N.E.2d at 588.

Ryan, --- N.E.3d ----, 2017 WL 1488853 *3 (footnote in original).

[24] In the instant matter, the trial court found that, as a matter of law, Appellants

had each assumed a nondelegable duty for the safety of all employees working

on the Project, including the employees of their subcontractors. The trial court

further found that given this nondelegable duty, in addition to liability for their

own negligence, Appellants were vicariously liable for the negligence of their

subcontractors, including Davenport. Appellants do not challenge the trial

court’s findings that they (1) had assumed a nondelegable duty for the safety of

all employees working on the Project or (2) were vicariously liability for the

negligence of their subcontractors.

B. Indiana’s Anti-Indemnity Statute
[25] Appellants, who assumed a non-delegable duty for the safety of their worksite,

seek indemnification from Davenport for damages suffered by Rhone after he

was injured when scaffolding fell on him as he was working on Appellants’

worksite. As such, the question presented on appeal is not of duty, but rather of

indemnification.

[26] Again, the Ripberger-Davenport contract included a section titled

“Indemnification.” As is stated above, the Ripberger-Davenport Contract

expressly provides that the indemnification provision contained therein applies

“even if it is alleged that Indemnitees … were individually or collectively,

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 actively or passively negligent or individually or collectively liable because of a

non-delegable duty.” Appellants’ App. Vol. IV, p. 111 (emphasis added). The

trial court found that this provision was void because it violated Indiana’s Anti-

Indemnity Statute.

[27] Appellants challenge the trial court’s determination that the “Indemnification”

section of the Ripberger-Davenport Contract violates Indiana’s Anti-Indemnity

Statute and is therefore void. Indiana’s Anti-Indemnity Statute, which is

codified at Indiana Code section 26-2-5-1, provides as follows:

All provisions, clauses, covenants, or agreements contained in,
collateral to, or affecting any construction or design contract
except those pertaining to highway contracts, which purport to
indemnify the promisee against liability for:
(1) death or bodily injury to persons;
(2) injury to property;
(3) design defects; or
(4) any other loss, damage or expense arising under
either (1), (2) or (3);
from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee or
the promisee’s agents, servants or independent contractors who
are directly responsible to the promisee, are against public policy
and are void and unenforceable.

Ind. Code § 26-2-5-1.7

7
The vast majority of states have adopted some form of a general anti-indemnity statute relating to
construction contracts. See Alaska Stat. § 45.45.900; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 34-226; Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2782,
2782.05; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-50.5-102; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572K; Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2704; Fla. Stat.
§ 725.06; Ga. Code Ann. § 13-8-2; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 431:10-222; Idaho Code § 29-114; 740 Ill. Comp. Stat.
35/1; Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-401; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 29C; Mich. Comp. Laws

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[28] We have previously explained that the purpose of the Anti-Indemnity Statute is

to increase safety at construction sites. See generally Fort Wayne Cablevision v.

Ind. & Mich. Electric Co., 443 N.E.2d 863, 869-71 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)

(discussing the purpose and scope of the Anti-Indemnity Statute). The Seventh

Circuit further expanded the rationale for the Anti-Indemnity Statute, stating

the following:

Before it was passed general contractors would negotiate with
their subcontractors for a promise to indemnify the general
contractor if he was sued for a personal injury to a worker
employed by a subcontractor at the construction site. The
legislature believed that this type of agreement resulted in more
accidents on the job. This is possible, certainly. If the general
contractor can shift the financial burden of liability he may have
less incentive to take measures to make the construction site safe.
Of course he will have to compensate the subcontractors for
imposing a greater risk of liability on them, and thus will pay a
price for his carelessness. But in just the same way, a person who
becomes more careless because he has liability insurance may in
the end have to pay for his greater carelessness in the form of a
higher premium for insurance, yet the buffering of liability by the
insurance company may result in some additional carelessness.
This would not matter if tort compensation were always full
compensation. For then the victims of this extra carelessness
would be no worse off, while the insured and insurer (or

§691.991; Minn. Stat. §337.02; Miss. Code Ann. §31-5-41; Mo. Rev. Stat. §434.100; Mont. Code Ann. §28-2-
2111; Neb. Rev. Stat. §25-21, 187; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:40A-1; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 56-7-1; N.Y. Gen. Oblig. §
5-322.1; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-1; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2305.31; Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.140; R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-
344; S.C. Code Ann. §32-2-10; S.D. Codified Laws §56-3-18; Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-6-123; Utah Code Ann.
§ 13-8-1; Va. Code Ann. § 11-4.1; Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.115; W. Va. Code § 55-8-14; Wis. Stat. § 895.447.
In addition, Louisiana, North Dakota, and Texas have adopted statutes limiting indemnity in certain specific
situations. See La. Stat. Ann. § 38:2216(G); N.D. Cent. Code § 9-08-02.1; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 130.002.
For instance, North Dakota and Texas limit indemnity when an injury was caused by defects in planning or
design. See N.D. Cent. Code § 9-08-02.1; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 130.002.

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 indemnitee and indemnitor—in fact liability insurance is just a
special form of indemnity) would be better off; otherwise they
would not have made the contract. See Shavell, On Liability and
Insurance, 13 Bell J. Econ. 120 (1982). But tort compensation is
not always full compensation, and when it is not the victims may
be worse off.

McMunn v. Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., 791 F.2d 88, 92 (7th Cir. 1986). The

Seventh Circuit further noted that “in sum, it is possible to understand how the

Indiana legislature might have believed that banning indemnity agreements

might make construction workers safer” and “[t]he statute is directed at a

particular problem, construction safety[.]” Id. at 93.

[29] The trial court noted below that Secura only had an obligation under the Secura

Contract to indemnify Appellants if the indemnity provision in the Ripberger-

Davenport Contract was enforceable. However, the trial court determined that

the indemnity provision in the Ripberger-Davenport Contract was void and

unenforceable under Indiana’s Anti-Indemnity Statute. In making this

determination, the trial court noted that both Wilhelm and Ripberger are

directly responsible for Davenport and, in effect, are “asking to be indemnified

for their sole fault and the fault of ‘independent contractors who are directly

responsible to [them].” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 20 (brackets in original).

The trial court further stated that:

If this Court allowed Wilhelm and Ripberger to recover
indemnification from Davenport in this case, Wilhelm’s and
Ripberger’s non-delegable duty would be transformed into a
delegable duty and, as an inevitable consequence, the purpose of

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 the Anti-Indemnity State would be thwarted because Wilhelm
and Ripberger would have absolutely no incentive to make their
construction sites safe. This result is unacceptable. Therefore,
the indemnity provision in the Ripberger/Davenport contract is
void and unenforceable as a matter of law.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 20.

[30] In arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the indemnification clause in

the Ripberger-Davenport Contract was rendered void by Indiana’s Anti-

Indemnity Statute, Appellants cite to this court’s prior opinion in Moore Heating

& Plumbing, Inc. v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols, 583 N.E.2d 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).8

In Moore, the general contractor, Huber, sought indemnification from Moore

after Dirk Peterson,9 an employee of Moore, was injured on Huber’s

construction worksite. 583 N.E.2d at 144. The trial court granted summary

judgment in favor of Huber. Id. On appeal, this court affirmed, stating the

following:

We agree that the legislature has declared one form of
construction contract indemnity clause, in which the promisee
seeks indemnification for its own negligence, to be void and
unenforceable. That form is the indemnity clause which seeks to
indemnify the promisee against liability from its sole negligence,

8
Appellants also cite to a number of other cases. However, we only discuss Moore because either the
resolution of the other cases rely completely on Moore’s reasoning or are not applicable to the question of
whether Indiana’s Anti-Indemnity Statute apply to the facts of the instant matter.
9
Peterson was injured when a scissor lift, upon which he was working, “tipped and fell” while being
operated by another worker. Moore, 583 N.E.2d at 144.

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 that is, in a situation where the promisee and no one else has
been negligent.

Id. at 148. Because Peterson’s injury did not result solely from Huber’s

negligence, this court determined that the indemnity statute in question was not

rendered void by Indiana’s Anti-Indemnity Statute.10 Id. Importantly,

however, unlike the instant matter, nothing in the court’s opinion in Moore

indicates that Huber, the general contractor, had assumed a non-delegable duty

for the safety of all employees working on the construction project.

[31] While we acknowledge this court’s prior conclusion in Moore, we must note

that the court’s conclusion in Moore seems to have a more narrowing effect on

Indiana’s Anti-Indemnity Statute than what we believe was intended by the

General Assembly. A plain reading of the Anti-Indemnity Statute reveals that

immediately following the language which would seem to limit application of

the statute to the sole negligence of the promisee, the General Assembly

inserted the much broader, arguably nearly all-encompassing, language which

extends application of the statute to not only the sole negligence of the

promisee, but also the sole negligence of promisee’s agents, servants, and

independent contractors who are directly responsible to the promisee. See Ind.

10
We must note that the court’s conclusion in Moore seems to have a more narrowing effect on the statute
than what we believe was intended by the General Assembly. We base this opinion on the fact that
immediately after inserting the language which would seem to limit application of the statute to the sole
negligence of the promisee, the General Assembly inserted the much broader, arguably nearly all-
encompassing, language which extends application of the statute to not only the sole negligence of not only
the promisee, but also the sole negligence of promisee’s agents, servants, or independent contractors who are
directly responsible to the promisee.

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 Code § 26-2-5-1. Therefore, we believe that the question of “sole negligence” is

not merely limited to Appellants, but also includes the “sole negligence” of any

independent contractors who are directly responsible to Appellants. Like the

trial court, we conclude that Davenport falls into this category.

[32] As a subcontractor working on the Project, Davenport and its employees were

directly responsible to the Appellants, who had assumed a non-delegable duty

to ensure the safety of all of the individuals working on the Project. Given the

fact that Davenport was directly responsible to Appellants coupled with

Appellants’ assumption of the non-delegable duty and the trial court’s

unchallenged finding that Appellants are vicariously liable for the negligence of

their subcontractors, including Davenport, we conclude that it is as if any

negligence committed by Appellants’ subcontractors qualifies as the negligence

of Appellants. As such, one can reasonably find that Rhone’s injuries were

caused by negligence attributable solely to Appellants. To conclude otherwise

would, in effect, allow Appellants to dodge their duty to provide a safe worksite

for all employees working on the Project. We further conclude that under the

specific undisputed facts and circumstances of this case, the indemnification

provision at issue is rendered void by Indiana’s Anti-Indemnity Statute.

Conclusion
[33] Because we conclude that the indemnity provision contained in the Ripberger-

Davenport Contract is rendered void by Indiana’s Anti-Indemnity Statute, we

affirm the judgment of the trial court. Further, because we affirm the trial court

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 on the question of application of Indiana’s Anti-Indemnity Statute, we need not

consider the parties’ additional arguments for and against the trial court’s award

of summary judgment to Secura and Davenport.

[34] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Najam, J., and Bailey, J., concur.

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