MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 24 2017, 9:12 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William T. Myers Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Grant County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Marion, Indiana
Monika Prekopa Talbot
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Mitchell Carroll, May 24, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
27A02-1606-CR-1536
v. Appeal from the Grant Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Dana J.
Appellee-Plaintiff Kenworthy, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
27D02-1507-F2-6
Crone, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Following a jury trial, Mitchell Carroll was convicted of numerous felonies and
misdemeanors. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his
objection to the State’s use of peremptory challenges to remove “the only two
African-American” prospective jurors from the jury venire in violation of Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Appellant’s Br. at 7. Finding no Batson
violation regarding prospective juror R.J., and concluding that Carroll has
waived his claim regarding the alleged peremptory strike of a second African-
American prospective juror, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The relevant facts most favorable to the verdicts indicate that prior to July 2015,
Carroll and A.N. were in a romantic relationship and shared a residence. A.N.
and her son, P.C., moved out of the residence at some point but returned on
July 2, 2015, to retrieve P.C.’s video gaming system. When they arrived at the
residence, Carroll exited the house “acting crazy” and yelling at A.N. Tr. at
557. He reached into her vehicle, turned off the ignition, and made her enter
the house. P.C. ran away and called 911.
[3] Neighbors heard a scream and a gunshot and witnessed Carroll carrying a gun
while dragging A.N. by her hair. Carroll looked angry and A.N. looked scared.
Three neighbors called 911. One of those neighbors then saw A.N. and Carroll
in a car, with A.N. driving. That same night, A.N.’s mother called police to
report that she believed her daughter had been kidnapped and that A.N. was
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driving with Carroll in a silver Lexus. A.N.’s mother reported that Carroll was
armed with a rifle and that he had wanted to take her as well but that she
refused to go. A.N.’s mother reported that Carroll told her that he was going to
kill both women.
[4] Police subsequently located A.N. driving a silver Lexus with Carroll “slumping
down” in the passenger seat. Id. at 333-34. After an officer began following the
Lexus in a marked police cruiser, Carroll pointed the rifle at the officer. The
officer called for backup. A.N. subsequently stopped the vehicle and Carroll
exited the vehicle with his hands in the air. A.N. stayed in the vehicle, and
when officers approached her, she was crying, trembling, gasping, and saying,
“He was going to kill me. He was going to kill me.” Id. at 337. Officers found
Carroll’s rifle in the vehicle. Three shell casings found outside Carroll’s
residence, which appeared to have been recently fired, matched the rifle found
in the vehicle.
[5] The State charged Carroll with fourteen criminal counts including level 2 felony
kidnapping while hijacking a vehicle, level 2 felony criminal confinement while
hijacking a vehicle, two counts of level 5 felony intimidation with a deadly
weapon, level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon, level 6 felony
pointing a loaded firearm, level 6 felony criminal recklessness with a deadly
weapon, class A misdemeanor domestic battery, class A misdemeanor theft,
class A misdemeanor intimidation, and four counts of class A misdemeanor
invasion of privacy. The trial court later dismissed the level 5 felony battery
charge and the class A misdemeanor theft charge. Jury selection began on May
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10, 2016, and trial on the twelve remaining counts was held on May 11, 2016.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Carroll guilty as charged. The trial
court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of thirty years. This appeal
ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Carroll’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his
Batson objection to the State’s use of peremptory strikes to remove African-
American prospective juror R.J., as well as a second African-American
prospective juror, from the jury pool. “Purposeful racial discrimination in
selection of the venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection because it
denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.” Batson, 476
U.S. at 86. “The exclusion of even a sole prospective juror based on race,
ethnicity, or gender violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.” Addison v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
[7] Our supreme court has explained that pursuant to Batson and its progeny, a
defendant’s claim that a peremptory challenge was based on race is evaluated
using a three-step process:
First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a
peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race;
second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must
offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question; and
third, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must
determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful
discrimination. A step two explanation is considered race-
neutral if, on its face, it is based on something other than race.
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Although the burden of persuasion on a Batson challenge rests
with the party opposing the strike … the third step—
determination of discrimination—is the duty of the trial judge.
The trial court evaluates the persuasiveness of the step two
justification at the third step. It is then that implausible or
fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be
pretexts for purposeful discrimination. Also, at the third stage,
the defendant may offer additional evidence to demonstrate that
the proffered justification was pretextual.
Cartwright v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1217, 1220-21 (Ind. 2012) (citations and
quotation marks omitted). “Upon appellate review, a trial court’s decision
concerning whether a peremptory challenge is discriminatory is given great
deference, and will be set aside only if found to be clearly erroneous.” Id. at
1221.
[8] Regarding prospective juror R.J., we will assume for the sake of argument that
Carroll made a prima facie showing of discrimination based upon race.
Accordingly, the burden shifted to the State to offer a race-neutral basis for
striking R.J. We note that “[a] neutral explanation means ‘an explanation
based on something other than the race of the juror.’” McCormick v. State, 803
N.E.2d 1108, 1111 (Ind. 2004) (citation omitted). “Unless a discriminatory
intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be
deemed race neutral. Although the race-neutral reason must be more than a
mere denial of improper motive, the reason need not be particularly ‘persuasive,
or even plausible.’” Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1208-09 (citation omitted). The
record indicates that in response to Carroll’s Batson objection to the State’s
peremptory challenge of R.J., the State explained that it was striking R.J. based
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upon her statement during voir dire that she was “psychic.” 1 Tr. at 148. This
was a race-neutral reason for the State’s peremptory challenge of R.J.
[9] As for the third step of the Batson analysis, the trial court found the State’s race-
neutral reason credible and persuasive. Indeed, the trial court echoed the
State’s concern that R.J. had stated that she was “psychic,” and the trial court
was similarly concerned with “the vibe” of her statement. Id. at 148-49.
Carroll made no argument that the proffered race-neutral justification was
pretextual. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court clearly
erred in determining that the State’s peremptory challenge of prospective juror
R.J. was not discriminatory. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying
Carroll’s Batson objection to the removal of prospective juror R.J.
[10] Regarding Carroll’s claim that the trial court also erred in denying his objection
to the State’s alleged peremptory challenge of a second African-American
prospective juror, he has provided us an inadequate record to review this claim.
It has long been recognized that it is the appellant’s burden to provide us an
adequate record to permit meaningful appellate review. Wilhoite v. State, 7
N.E.3d 350, 354-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). While the record does indicate that
there may have been “two black jurors” in the venire and that Carroll
1
Although much of the State’s race-neutral explanation for its peremptory challenge of prospective juror R.J.
was inaudible to the transcriber, the record clearly indicates, and Carroll concedes, that the State’s
peremptory challenge was based upon R.J.’s “psychic” statement. Specifically, during voir dire, when she
was asked about the high evidentiary standard of reasonable doubt, R.J. stated that she was “like a very, kind
of psychic person, so I can feel a lot of things. Not everything, but some things, so I would have to feel the
peace within me and all the evidence also and the person.” Tr. at 107.
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challenged the State’s removal of both R.J. and a second prospective African-
American juror, see Tr. at 148, Carroll concedes that the voir dire transcript “is
unclear, due to inaudible conversation, whether or not defense counsel or the
prosecutor responded to the Batson challenge of the other African-American
venireperson.” Appellant’s Br. at 10.
[11] We note that if Carroll received what he believed to be an inadequate record of
proceedings due to the inaudible portions of the transcript, Indiana Appellate
Rule 31 provides, in part, that “[i]f no Transcript of all or part of the evidence is
available, a party or the party’s attorney may prepare a verified statement of the
evidence from the best available sources, which may include the party’s or the
attorney’s recollection.” Carroll failed to do so.2 Carroll has failed to meet his
burden to present us with an adequate record for review and has therefore
waived his Batson claim regarding the second African-American venireperson.
See Weekly v. State, 496 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ind. 1986) (defendant waived Batson
challenge on appeal by failing to present adequate record). We affirm Carroll’s
convictions.
[12] Affirmed.
Barnes, J., and Robb, J., concur.
2
While it appears that a court reporter was, in fact, present during the proceedings here, as trial courts trend
away from using live court reporter’s, we note that the audibility of tape recorded proceedings and the
resulting inadequacy of the transcripts is going to become an increasing problem. Parties and their trial
attorneys must be cognizant of this fact and more often avail themselves of Appellate Rule 31.
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Mitchell Carroll v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion