UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-1234
In re: DAREN KAREEM GADSDEN, a/k/a D,
Petitioner.
On Petition for Writ of Prohibition. (1:11-cr-00302-CCB-3; 1:15-cv-01965-CCB)
Submitted: May 23, 2017 Decided: May 25, 2017
Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Daren Kareem Gadsden, Petitioner Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Daren Kareem Gadsden, who was convicted of several bank fraud and identity
theft offenses, has filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with this court. In his petition,
Gadsden asks that this court dismiss the criminal indictment against him because he
asserts that the Government’s evidence was insufficient to support his bank fraud
convictions and, thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction over his criminal case.
Gadsden nonetheless readily admits that he has unsuccessfully raised this claim in
“several forms” before this court and in the district court.
“[A] writ of prohibition is a drastic and extraordinary remedy which should be
granted only when the petitioner has shown his right to the writ to be clear and
indisputable and that the actions of the court were a clear abuse of discretion.” In re
Vargas, 723 F.2d 1461, 1468 (10th Cir. 1983). In fact, a writ of prohibition should not
issue unless it “clearly appears that the inferior court is about to exceed its jurisdiction.”
Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 176 (1886). Because it is a drastic remedy, a writ of
prohibition should only be granted when the petitioner’s right to the requested relief is
clear and indisputable, see Vargas, 723 F.2d at 1468; see also In re Missouri, 664 F.2d
178, 180 (8th Cir. 1981), and there are no other adequate means of relief, In re Bankers
Trust Co., 775 F.2d 545, 547 (3d Cir. 1985).
Gadsden has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to the relief he seeks.
Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the petition
for a writ of prohibition. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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