J-A11045-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: C.E.M. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: C.E.M. :
:
:
:
:
: No. 92 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree December 13, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 84887
BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 26, 2017
Appellant, C.E.M. (“Father”), files this appeal from the Decree entered
on December 13, 2016, in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas
granting the petition of J.H.W. (“Mother”) and W.R.W. (“Stepfather”) and
involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to his daughter, C.E.M.
(“Child”), born in July of 2009, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and
(b). After review, we affirm the trial court’s decree.
The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows: Mother and
Father are the biological parents of Child, and pursuant to a custody order
dated December 3, 2010, Mother was awarded primary physical custody
while Father received supervised partial physical custody of the Child. See
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Respondent’s Exhibit 1. Although Father previously saw Child regularly, he
last exercised his right to physical custody and saw Child on October 31,
2014.1 Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 12/13/16, at 6-7.
On June 16, 2016, Mother and Stepfather filed a petition to terminate
involuntarily the parental rights of Father as to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
2511(a)(1) and (b).2 The trial court conducted a hearing with regard to the
termination petition on December 13, 2016. Mother and Father both
testified on their own behalf. In addition, Father presented the testimony of
his attorney in the related custody matter and his sister, A.C.W. The court
also heard from the guardian ad litem, Susan N. Denaro, Esquire.3
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1
Mother testified to facilitating Father’s custody and transporting Child,
despite the order providing the opposite, for a period of approximately two
years prior to that time. N.T. at 7-8. Father conversely suggested that he
saw Child every day during this two-year period. Id. at 48, 65.
2
Mother and Stepfather married on September 17, 2016. Id. at 5.
3
The guardian ad litem submitted a report in favor of termination of Father’s
parental rights to Child. See Guardian Ad Litem Report, 11/14/16. At the
hearing, she testified that nothing she heard changed her opinion. N.T. at
105-06. She additionally submitted a brief in favor of this position on
appeal. See Guardian Ad Litem’s Brief. We note here that in a divided
decision our Supreme Court recently held in In re Adoption of L.B.M., ___
Pa. ____, 156 A.3d 1159 (2017) that 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a) requires a trial
court to appoint counsel for a child in contested involuntary termination of
parental rights proceedings. Justice Wecht, joined by Justices Donohue and
Dougherty, sought to hold that a trial court is required to appoint separate,
independent counsel to represent a child’s legal interests even where the
guardian ad litem is an attorney. However, Chief Justice Saylor and Justices
Baer, Todd, and Mundy disagreed in separate concurring and dissenting
opinions with that portion of the lead Opinion’s holding. In sum, while the
latter four Justices agreed that the trial court must appoint counsel to
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Following the hearing, on December 13, 2016, the trial court entered a
decree involuntarily terminating the parental rights of Father.4 On January
10, 2017, Father, through appointed counsel, filed a notice of appeal, along
with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the lower court err by terminating [Father’s] parental
rights?
2. Was the evidence presented by [Mother and Stepfather]
insufficient to support the lower court’s decision to terminate
[Father’s] parental rights?
3. Was the evidence presented insufficient to show that [Father]
by conduct continuing for a period of a least six months
immediately preceding the filing of the petition had either
shown a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to the
child or refused or failed to perform parental duties as
required by 23 Pa.C.S.A. Section 2511(a)(1), the only ground
for termination alleged by [Mother and Stepfather]?
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
represent a child in all contested involuntary termination hearings, they did
not join that portion of Justice Wecht’s Opinion that sought to hold a
guardian ad litem never may serve as the child’s counsel. Herein, Father did
not raise before the trial court any concerns which would have created a
need to appoint independent counsel to advocate for Child, nor does he
make any claims on appeal that the guardian ad litem did not properly
represent Child’s legal and best interests due to a conflict of interest.
Indeed, in this case, Attorney Denaro zealously represented Child pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).
4
This decree memorialized the decision the court placed on the record at the
conclusion of the hearing.
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4. Was the evidence insufficient for the lower court to make a
determination under 23 Pa.C.S.[] Section 2511(b)?
Father’s Brief at 1 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact
and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
supported by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., [616 Pa.
309, 325, 47 A.3d 817, 826 (2012)]. “If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision
may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The trial court’s decision,
however, should not be reversed merely because the record
would support a different result. Id. at [325-26, 47 A.3d at]
827. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial
courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties
spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [608 Pa. 9, 26-
27, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)].
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013). “The trial court
is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise
free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the
evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s
findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite
result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003)
(citation omitted).
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The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis of
the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the
parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a).
Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We
have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In
re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter
of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 550 Pa. 595, 601, 708 A.2d 88, 91
(1998)).
In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Father’s parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), as well as (b). This Court has
long held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need
only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a)
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as well as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384
(Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). We, therefore, analyze the court’s termination
order pursuant to Subsections 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).
We first examine the court’s termination of Father’s parental rights
under Section 2511(a)(1). We have explained this Court’s review of a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the involuntary
termination of a parent’s rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) as follows:
To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the
moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence of
conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing
of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to
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relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to
perform parental duties. In addition,
Section 2511 does not require that the parent
demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to perform
parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights may be
terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent
either demonstrates a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental
duties.
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform
parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of
inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her
conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between
parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of
termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to
Section 2511(b).
In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations
omitted).
As it relates to the crucial six-month period prior to the filing of the
petition, this Court has instructed:
[I]t is the six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition that is most critical to our analysis. However, the trial
court must consider the whole history of a given case and not
mechanically apply the six-month statutory provisions, but
instead consider the individual circumstances of each case.
In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa.Super. 1999) (citations omitted). This
requires the Court to “examine the individual circumstances of each case
and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination of his
or her parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of
the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination.” In re B.,
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N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 718, 872
A.2d 1200 (2005) (citation omitted).
Further, we have stated:
[T]o be legally significant, the [post-abandonment] contact must
be steady and consistent over a period of time, contribute to the
psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a
serious intent on the part of the parent to recultivate a parent-
child relationship and must also demonstrate a willingness and
capacity to undertake the parental role. The parent wishing to
reestablish his parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof
on this question.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation omitted). See
also In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1006 (Pa.Super 2008) (en
banc).
Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this Court has stated:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental
duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A
child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These
needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely
passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this
Court has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty
which requires affirmative performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association with
the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty
requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place
of importance in the child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good
faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order
to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her
ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all
available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and
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must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed
in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental
rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
others provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional
needs.
In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855 (internal citations omitted).
In the instant matter, in finding grounds for termination of Father’s
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), the trial court concluded:
Father has not seen Child since October 31, 2014. Even
before that time, he relied upon Mother to arrange visits and
transport Child to him. Father has not paid support for years,
with the exception of a $95 garnishment that the Domestic
Relations Office was able to secure sometime in late 2015.
Father has not tried to call Child and has not sent any letters,
cards, or gifts to Child. Although Mother moved in June 2015,
Father has always known her telephone number and her parents’
address. Finally, Mother testified that although she saw Father
at support conferences, Father never asked about Child.
Father did file for modification of the custody order on May
31, 2016. There was conflicting testimony about whether this
was filed before or after Father knew that Stepfather wanted to
adopt Child. Based upon [Mother and Stepfather’s] retaining
counsel in April 2016 to begin the adoption process and the
supporting testimony about the steps taken to attempt an
amicable resolution to the matter, the Court finds that Father
was aware that [Mother and Stepfather] wanted to terminate his
parental rights when he sought counsel and filed his petition for
modification.
Father testified that he suffered from a variety of medical
conditions that caused him to be bedridden both prior to and
after October 31, 2014. He was hospitalized at times. He was
too ill to work. He did not want Child to see him in such poor
condition. He testified that he was no longer bedridden as of
spring 2015 and that his condition further improved around
March or April 2016 such that he is now medically stable. He
indicated that he texted Mother to resume contact starting in
2015, but he did not attempt to obtain counsel or seek to
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enforce the custody order. He also incredibly testified that he
was seeing Child daily prior to October 31, 2014 due solely to
Mother’s driving an hour each way even though she worked until
6:30 p.m.
It is clear that Father has failed to perform his parental
duties for well more than six months, and, in fact, for two years.
He thought only of himself. The [c]ourt doubts that he ever had
the kind of contact with Child that he claims to have had, and
after October 2014 had no contact at all. His illnesses, even if as
bad as he claimed, were no excuse for losing touch with Child
and apparently, based on his own testimony, did not bar him
from resuming contact, at least as far back as spring 2015. It
seems to the [c]ourt that Father’s failing to perform parental
duties was simply a matter of convenience for him.
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 1/25/17, at 3-5.
Further, as the court stated on the record at the conclusion of the
hearing:
[Father] -- I never asked you how far you went in school,
but common sense would have dictated to me, had I been in
your position, to vigorously pursue litigation in this matter,
especially when you came to understand that this was going
nowhere, but as far as I’m concerned, immediately after you
recovered your strength sometime early 2015, and you did
nothing for most, if not all, of a year. There was [sic] so many
things you could have consulted about with your counsel, who
apparently still is your counsel, to obviate what I’m deciding
today, which is that your rights are forever terminated effective
immediately.
N.T. at 109.
Father, however, argues that the evidence offered by Mother and
Stepfather is insufficient to establish grounds for the termination of his
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). Father’s Brief at 8-9.
Further, Father suggests that the totality of the circumstances and
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explanations offered are in contravention to a finding of termination of his
parental rights. Id. at 9-11. Father points not only to his illness, but the
alleged obstructionist actions of Mother. Id. at 10-11. Moreover, Father
maintains that he took affirmative steps evidencing a desire to enforce his
parental rights to Child. Id. at 11-12. He asserts
that his filing the custody petition before the filing of the
termination petition should be sufficient in and of itself to show
that he had not evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing his
parental claim to the child. In the case of In re: Adoption of
R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502 (Pa. Super. 2006) the Court said the father
there had shown a settled purpose of relinquishing his parental
claim or failed to perform parental duties, relying heavily on the
father’s failure to take any concrete steps to modify the custody
order. In the present case, however, Father actually took the
step, despite his illness and his lack of money, to secure an
attorney and file a petition to modify custody weeks before
[Mother and Stepfather] filed the termination petition. See also
In re B.[,]N.M., supra, where the court said the six months
immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition is the
most crucial to analysis in a termination case, citing In re D.J.S.,
737 A.2d 283 (Pa. Super. 1999)[.]
Id. at 12. Father continues and summarizes as follows:
Father’s filing of his petition to modify custody within the
six months immediately prior to the filing of the termination
petition shows clearly that he did not exhibit a settled purpose of
relinquishing his parental claim, but rather that he was taking
direct action to re-establish a parental role with his daughter
within a reasonable time, taking into account the totality of the
circumstances. Father also argues that the filing of the
termination petition after he filed the petition to modify custody
was done primarily as another means Mother used to deny
Father contact with his child, and to obviate Father’s petition to
modify custody. Father believes this again fits the pattern
established by Mother of denying [Father] visitation.
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In summation, Father argues that his filing of the petition
to modify custody within the six months immediately preceding
the filing of the petition to involuntarily terminate his parental
rights showed clearly that he had not evidenced a settled
purpose of relinquishing his parental rights to the child.
Secondly, Father’s attempts to perform parental duties with his
child were basically impossible because of his on-going illness
and Mother’s pattern of thwarting his visitation. Father tried to
work things out in a civil matter without taking court action.
However, Father did file the petition to modify custody, and
Father argues that he filed the custody petition in a reasonable
time frame under the circumstances. Therefore, Father believes
the evidence was not sufficient to terminate his parental rights
under 23 Pa.C.S.A. Section 2511[(a)(1)].
Id. at 13-14.
Upon review, we find the trial court’s determinations are supported by
competent evidence in the record. The record reveals a lack of support and
contact between Father and Child since October 31, 2014. N.T. at 6, 8-9.
Father suffered from uncontrolled Type 1 diabetes, gastroparesis, and
neuropathy for which he was bedridden for six months. Id. at 50, 67-68.
During such time, he did not think it was appropriate for Child to see him.
Id. at 57-58. However, in the spring of 2015, his condition began to
improve and he was well enough to see and desired to see Child. Id. at 72,
74. Nonetheless, Father did not attempt to exercise his custodial rights
and/or enforce the custody order until a year later. Father testified to
requests at support hearings, phone calls, and text messages, which Mother
disputed. Id. at 14, 68, 74.
Mother stated that it was only after sending a letter with respect to the
voluntary termination of his parental rights that Father texted her seeking
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contact with Child. Id. at 9. Moreover, Father did not file a petition to
modify the custody order until May 31, 2016, after Mother had begun to
seek to terminate his parental rights. Id. at 15-17, 19. See Petitioner’s
Exhibit 1; Respondent’s Exhibit 2. In the meantime, Father sent no cards or
gifts to Child.5 Id. at 9, 69. Thus, as the trial court’s determinations
regarding Section 2511(a)(1) are supported by competent, clear and
convincing evidence in the record, we discern no abuse of discretion and will
not disturb them. See In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d 251, 267
(2013); In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003). As
noted above, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need
only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a)
before assessing the determination under Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W.,
843 A.2d at 384.
We next determine whether termination was proper under Section
2511(b). Our Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child
have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781,
791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M. [a/k/a E.W.C. & L.M.
____________________________________________
5
Although Mother moved during this time-period and did not provide Father
her address due to a prior Protection from Abuse order, Father had her
phone number, which remained the same, as well as her parents’ address
and phone number. Id. at 6, 12, 69.
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a/k/a L.C., Jr.], [533 Pa. 115, 123, 620 A.2d 481, 485 1993)],
this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and
welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between
the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to
discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the
parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as
discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an
easy task.
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628-29, 71 A.3d at 267. “[I]n cases where there is
no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer
that no bond exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis
necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re
Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted).
In the case sub judice, in reasoning that termination of Father’s
parental rights favors Child’s needs and welfare under Section 2511(b) of
the Adoption Act, the trial court stated:
It is also clear that termination of Father’s parental rights
is in the best interests of Child. Any bond that might have
existed between Father and Child was prior to October 2014 and
Father did nothing to maintain it. Child does not ask or talk
about Father.
Child is bonded with Stepfather. Child calls him “dad” or
“daddy.” She wants him to be home and does not like when he
goes on overnight trips. Stepfather has a good relationship with
Child – he can identify her favorite foods, he taught her how to
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ride [a] bicycle, he helps her with her homework, and they play,
fish, and hunt together. All of Child’s developmental, physical,
and emotional needs are met by Mother and Stepfather. There
is no need to disturb this environment and no need to interject
Father into it.
T.C.O. at 5.
To the contrary, Father argues that while Mother and Stepfather
offered only minimal evidence as to any bond between Child and him and
suggested Child’s emotional bond was with Stepfather, both he and his
sister, paternal aunt, testified regarding the time Father and Child spent
together and their relationship. Father’s Brief at 15. Father also challenges
the guardian ad litem’s decision not to interview Child.6 Id. at 16.
Notwithstanding Father’s claims, the record corroborates the trial
court’s termination orders pursuant to Section 2511(b). As indicated, Father
has not seen Child since October 31, 2014. In addition, the only financial
support Father had provided for Child in the recent past was a ninety-five
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6
To the extent that Father raises the guardian ad litem’s failure to interview
Child, we find this issue is waived as Father failed to raise it below in
questioning the guardian ad litem during the hearing. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)
(providing for waiver of issues not first raised in lower court); Fillmore v.
Hill, 665 A.2d 514, 515-16 (Pa.Super. 1995) (stating that “in order to
preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a timely and
specific objection at the appropriate stage of the proceedings before the trial
court. Failure to timely object to a basic and fundamental error, such as an
erroneous jury instruction, will result in waiver of that issue. On appeal, the
Superior Court will not consider a claim which was not called to the trial
court’s attention at a time when any error committed could have been
corrected.”) (citations omitted).
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dollar garnishment over a year prior to the hearing. N.T. at 8-9. Further,
when questioned about whether Child ever asks about Father, Mother
responded, “Not at all. She doesn’t mention his name. She doesn’t ask
about him. Nothing.” Id. at 10. Therefore, there is no evidence of the
existence of any current bond between Father and Child.
Moreover, and more importantly, Mother described Child’s positive,
nurturing relationship with Stepfather. Id. Specifically, Mother explained
Child has flourished since meeting Stepfather: “She -- before I introduced
her to my husband, she was very closed, wouldn’t talk to strangers at all.
Now she’s doing awesome. She’ll talk to people. She’s -- her grades have
improved dramatically in school. She’s so eager to do stuff, it’s crazy.” Id.
Mother further indicated that Child exhibits an emotional bond with
Stepfather. Id. As expressed by Mother, “She calls him daddy. She will go
to him for anything and everything. She gets upset if he goes on an
overnight hunting trip because she doesn’t want him to leave. She wants
him to stay home.” Id.
Thus, as confirmed by the record, termination of Father’s parental
rights serves Child’s needs and welfare. While Father may profess to love
Child, a parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, will not
preclude termination of parental rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. As
this Court has stated, a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope
that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of
parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the
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custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or
her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and
fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe
environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 856.
Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Father’s
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b). We, therefore,
affirm the Decree of the trial court.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/26/2017
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