NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 30 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TAMARA HARUTYUNYAN and LILIT Nos. 12-72200
YENGOYAN, AKA Lilit Avakyants, 12-73076
Petitioners, Agency Nos. A095-291-823
A095-291-824
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney MEMORANDUM*
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 24, 2017**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON,
Circuit Judges.
Tamara Harutyunyan, a native of Azerbaijan and a citizen of Armenia, and
Lilit Yengoyan, a native and citizen of Armenia, petition for review of the Board
of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) June 18, 2012, and September 14, 2012, orders
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
denying their motion to reopen removal proceedings. We review for abuse of
discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960,
964 (9th Cir. 2002). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petitions for review.
As to petitioners’ arguments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the
BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen where
petitioners failed to comply with the requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and any ineffective assistance was not plain on the face of
the record. See Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000) (Lozada
compliance is not dispositive where ineffective assistance is plain on the face of
the record). We lack jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ contentions that
Yengoyan was improperly sequestered because they failed to raise this to the BIA.
See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004) (petitioner must exhaust
issues or claim in administrative proceedings below).
As to petitioners’ arguments regarding changed country conditions, the BIA
did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as time
and number-barred, where it was filed more than seven years after the BIA’s final
order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish
materially changed country conditions in Armenia to qualify for the regulatory
exception to the time and number limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii),
Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence must be
2 12-73076
“qualitatively different” to warrant reopening). We reject petitioners’ contention
that the BIA discredited evidence.
PETITIONS FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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