FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 30 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIA ANTONIA PERALES, No. 15-16097
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01160-SAB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Stanley A. Boone, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 18, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: BERZON and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and MCCALLA,*** District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Jon P. McCalla, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
Maria Perales appeals the district court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Perales’ application for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) concluded that Perales
had the severe impairments of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, polyarthralgias,
and mild cervical degenerative disc disease. The ALJ then determined that Perales
retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work. Finally,
the ALJ found that Perales had past relevant work as a produce sorter—and also,
separately, as a packer—within the previous fifteen years, and that she could
perform her past work as a sorter.
On appeal, Perales challenges only the ALJ’s characterization of her past
relevant work as a “sorter.” She contends, instead, that her past relevant work
consisted of sorting and packing, and she therefore performed a composite job.
We review the district court’s order upholding the ALJ’s denial of
supplemental security income benefits de novo. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d
1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s decision may be reversed only if it is not
supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Id.
The only question here is whether Perales performed a composite job of
“sorter/packer,” as she contends, or whether she worked as a “sorter” and,
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separately, as a “pakcer,” as the ALJ found. If Perales actually worked as a
“sorter/packer,” then she performed a composite job involving both light work
(sorter duties) and medium work (packer duties), and she cannot continue
performing the “sorter/packer” job given that her RFC is limited to light work.
“Every occupation consists of a myriad of tasks, each involving different degrees
of physical exertion. To classify an applicant’s ‘past relevant work’ according to
the least demanding function of the claimant’s past occupations is contrary to the
letter and spirit of the Social Security Act.” Valencia v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 1082,
1086 (9th Cir. 1985).
There is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s conclusion that
Perales worked as a “sorter.” For instance, a medical report dated February 13,
2007 described Perales’ job duties as follows: “As a sorter, the patient is required
to stand at a work station sorting carrots which are on a conveyor belt. Her physical
duties consist of constant standing with repetitive use of her hands.” Moreover,
between October 2006 and August 2008, Perales’ treating sources consistently
described her job as “carrot sorter” or “sorter.” The only evidence Perales points to
in support of her argument are two medical reports describing her position as a
“carrot sorter and packer” or “sorter/packer.” These reports simply list Perales’
position, but do not elaborate on her actual job duties.
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Given the state of this record, the ALJ’s conclusion that Perales worked as a
“sorter” is supported by substantial evidence. Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1159
(9th Cir. 2012) (holding that substantial evidence consists of “more than a mere
scintilla” and is of such reliability that “a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion”) (citation omitted). The only contrary evidence
Perales has cited to support her claim that she worked as a “sorter/packer” are two
stray labels on medical reports without any detail about Perales’ actual duties.
Therefore, the ALJ did not err in concluding that Perales could perform past
relevant work as a “sorter.”
AFFIRMED.
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