[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 14, 2005
No. 05-13659 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket Nos. 04-03461-CV-1-KOB & 04-03462-CV-1-K
1:04cv03461
THRESA LYNN WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ALABAMA PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT,
RAVONDA STEPHENS,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________ __
1:04cv03462
THRESA LYNN WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ALABAMA MEDICAID AGENCY,
DEBORAH POE,
WENCY MCMEANS,
Agents for Alabama Medicaid Agency,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(December 14, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
On December 17, 2004, Thresa Lynn Williams filed a pro se complaint
against the Alabama Public Health Department and Ravonda Stephens, alleging
acts of harassment during her employment as an outstation medicaid eligibility
specialist. The district court construed her complaint as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 hostile
work environment action. On May 27, 2005, the district court dismissed the
complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Williams appeals
from that order.1
To establish a hostile work environment claim, Williams must show that:
1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she has been subject to unwelcome
harassment; (3) the harassment was based on a protected characteristic of the
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Williams also submitted a separate pro se complaint against the Alabama Medicaid
Agency, Deborah Poe, and Wency McMeans. The district court treated this complaint together
with the complaint against Alabama Public Health and Stephens. Williams only appeals the
order of dismissal as to her complaint against Alabama Public Health and Stephens.
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employee; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms
and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working
environment; and (5) the employer is responsible for the environment under either
a theory of vicarious or direct liability. See Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc.,
277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002).
The district court had authority to dismiss Williams’ case if it determined
that her action was frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A case is frivolous if
the factual allegations are clearly baseless or if it is based on a “indisputably
meritless legal theory.” See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct.
1827, 1833 (1989). We review the district’s court dismissal of Williams’ claim for
frivolity only for an abuse of discretion. Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349
(11th Cir. 2001).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Williams’ case as
frivolous. Williams’ allegations are insufficient to meet the third prong of a
hostile work environment claim. She alleged that her co-workers’ conduct was
annoying and unprofessional but failed to allege that it was attributable to her
membership in a protected category. For this reason, Williams does not have a
legally cognizable hostile work environment claim under § 1983. Her claim is
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory. Accordingly, the district court did
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not abuse its discretion in dismissing Williams’ claim as frivolous.
AFFIRMED.
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