State of Maine v. Joshua T. Williamson

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 108
Docket: Ken-16-257
Submitted
On Briefs: April 27, 2017
Decided: June 1, 2017

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

v.

JOSHUA T. WILLIAMSON

ALEXANDER, J.

[¶1] This appeal involves a defendant who, while showing signs of

significant impairment, accurately predicted to police officers that he would

test at a “point 22,” nearly three times the .08 limit established by law.

See 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(A)(2) (2016). A jury found him guilty of

operating under the influence at a trial where the State had to prove either

that Williamson’s quantitative breath-alcohol level exceeded that limit or that

his mental or physical faculties were impaired however slightly, or to any

extent, by alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicants that he had consumed. See

State v. Atkins, 2015 ME 162, ¶¶ 1, 21, 129 A.3d 952. On appeal, the

defendant’s primary contention is that the State failed to comply with
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technical requirements for the admission of the Intoxilyzer test result. We

affirm the judgment.

[¶2] Joshua T. Williamson appeals from a judgment of conviction

entered by the trial court (Kennebec County, Marden, J.) after a jury found him

guilty of operating under the influence (Class D), 29-A M.R.S.

§ 2411(1-A)(B)(1) (2016), and criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S.

§ 806(1)(A) (2016). Williamson argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting the breath test result pursuant to 29-A M.R.S.

§ 2431(2) (2016) and that the State’s late disclosure that one of its witnesses

was recently investigated for accidentally shooting himself violated his due

process rights pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

I. CASE HISTORY

[¶3] “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the

jury could rationally have found the following facts beyond a reasonable

doubt.” State v. Rourke, 2017 ME 10, ¶ 2, 154 A.3d 127.

[¶4] On August 11, 2015, Williamson arrived at his Gardiner home from

work between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. and began smoking marijuana and drinking

shots of vodka. Williamson’s girlfriend arrived home at approximately

5:30 p.m. Her Ford Explorer and Jeep Grand Cherokee were parked in front of
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the apartment building in which they lived. She and Williamson had been

arguing all day, and she observed him drink vodka straight from the bottle.1

[¶5] At some point, Williamson left to visit a neighbor in the adjacent

apartment. The neighbor knocked on Williamson’s door later that evening

and asked Williamson’s girlfriend to retrieve Williamson from the neighbor’s

apartment. Williamson and his girlfriend resumed arguing. He took the keys

to her Jeep Grand Cherokee and drove her Jeep into her Ford Explorer, backed

up, and drove the Jeep into the Ford again. The neighbor, upon hearing the

crash, went outside and observed damage to the vehicles parked outside of

the apartment building. The Jeep had a flat tire, and the Ford had a broken

taillight.

[¶6] Approximately twenty minutes later, at 1:54 a.m., Williamson

called 9-1-1 to report a domestic dispute. The dispatcher determined, after

speaking with Williamson, that his speech was slurred and that he had

difficulty answering “straightforward” questions.

1 Williamson’s girlfriend provided conflicting testimony at trial regarding when she observed

Williamson drink alcohol. On direct examination, she testified that Williamson did not drink
anything after he damaged her vehicles, but, on cross-examination, she testified that he began
drinking after he damaged her vehicles. Williamson’s girlfriend also testified to a version of the
timing of events that was different from the version that she provided in her written statement to
police immediately after the incident, which statement the State used to impeach her testimony.
4

[¶7] Officers of the Gardiner Police Department arrived approximately

ten minutes after Williamson called 9-1-1. They observed that Williamson

was unsteady on his feet, stumbling over objects, slurring his speech, and

exhibiting erratic behavior. He admitted that he had been drinking alcohol

since getting home from work hours earlier, but he denied driving. The jury

also heard evidence that months later, at a Bureau of Motor Vehicles hearing

held before his trial, Williamson admitted to driving and to damaging his

girlfriend’s vehicles.

[¶8] The police arrested Williamson and transported him to the police

station, where he performed poorly on standardized field sobriety tests.

Williamson agreed to take a breath test and “guesstimated” that he would test

at a “point 22.” An officer administered the breath test on an Intoxilyzer at

3:38 a.m., and Williamson’s result was indeed 0.22 grams of alcohol per

210 liters of breath.

[¶9] In October 2015, Williamson was charged by complaint with

operating under the influence (Class D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(B)(1), and

criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A). Williamson pleaded not

guilty.
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[¶10] The court held a two-day jury trial in May 2016. The State’s

evidence consisted of testimony of the 9-1-1 dispatcher, Williamson’s

neighbor, Williamson’s girlfriend, the responding officers, and the Intoxilyzer

site coordinator for the Gardiner Police Department, and exhibits including a

recording of the 9-1-1 call, photographs of the damaged vehicles, portions of a

police body camera video, and the certified Intoxilyzer result.

[¶11] On the first day of the trial, the State informed Williamson and

the court that Williamson’s neighbor had recently been investigated for

accidentally shooting himself in the leg, but that the State did not intend to file

any charges. Williamson objected to the neighbor’s testimony. He argued:

I have a very detailed Brady discovery request that, you know, if
there [were] reports that he maybe said things or hasn’t made
credible statements to the police or prosecutors, then I should
have known about that, I mean that’s potential Brady information
. . . If he says something and his credibility is an issue, there is a
Brady violation if they have not disclosed reports to me.

The court concluded that the investigation of the accidental shooting had no

bearing on the neighbor’s credibility and overruled the objection.

[¶12] Williamson also offered to stipulate to being under the influence

when the police arrived and to the Intoxilyzer result, but the stipulation was

conditioned on the State not offering videos showing his impairment. The

State did not agree to the stipulation. After the officer who administered the
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breath test testified that the Intoxilyzer bore the stamp of approval of the

Department of Health and Human Services (the Department), the State offered

the breath test result. Williamson objected. He argued that, although the

State had satisfied paragraph H of 29-A M.R.S. § 2431(2), it had not offered

sufficient evidence to satisfy paragraph I. The court sustained the objection.

[¶13] The State then called the Intoxilyzer site coordinator, who

testified that the Intoxilyzer bore the Department’s stamp of approval and

that he performs a monthly calibration check of the solution that is used in the

operation of the Intoxilyzer, which is provided by a chemist from the

Department’s Health and Environmental Testing Laboratory. When asked if

the solution comes with a statement of the manufacturer certifying its

composition and quality, the officer testified that it does not come with a

“certificate” but that it comes directly from the Department “with [the

chemist’s] initials.”

[¶14] The State offered the result of the Intoxilyzer for a second time,

and the court admitted the Intoxilyzer result over Williamson’s objection. The

court stated that paragraph I was satisfied by testimony that the materials

“com[e] from the Department of Health and Human Services with [the

chemist’s] stamp,” which has been “the standard in the industry” in Maine.
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[¶15] After the State rested, Williamson moved for a judgment of

acquittal on the charge of operating under the influence, arguing that the State

had failed to prove that Williamson was impaired at the time of operation.

The court denied the motion. The State and Williamson offered closing

arguments. Williamson’s closing argument focused almost exclusively on the

issue of whether he was impaired at the time of operation.2 The jury found

Williamson guilty of both counts.3

[¶16] Williamson moved for a judgment of acquittal, M.R.U. Crim.

P. 29(a), which the court denied. The court sentenced Williamson to 364 days’

incarceration with all but twenty days suspended, one year of probation, a

$700 fine, and fees and surcharges.4 Williamson timely filed this appeal. See

15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2016); M.R. App. P. 2.

2 Likewise, in Williamson’s opening statement, he asked the jury “to focus like a laser” on the

“critical piece” of the State’s case which is “[Williamson’s] state at the time of driving . . . [n]ot some
time later in the evening, not some earlier time, but at the time of driving.”

3 During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court with three questions. The questions

concerned what time Williamson’s girlfriend retrieved Williamson from their neighbor’s apartment,
the amount of time between the neighbor hearing the crash and the arrival of the police, and
Williamson’s girlfriend’s written statement to police.

4 Before the start of the trial, Williamson stipulated to a prior conviction for operating under the

influence that occurred on September 18, 2007, which enhanced the minimum mandatory sentence
of incarceration. See 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(B)(1), (5)(B) (2016).
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II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Breath Test Result

[¶17] Williamson argues that that the trial court abused its discretion

and clearly erred by admitting the Intoxilyzer result when the State failed to

prove the requirements of paragraphs H and I of 29-A M.R.S. § 2431(2). “[W]e

review the admission of evidence over an objection for lack of foundation for

an abuse of discretion, but review underlying factual findings for clear error.”

State v. Gurney, 2012 ME 14, ¶ 36, 36 A.3d 893.

[¶18] Title 29-A M.R.S. § 2431 (2016) establishes evidentiary rules

governing admission of breath testing results in operating under the influence

cases. State v. Tozier, 2015 ME 57, ¶ 7, 115 A.3d 1240. A breath test result

from an Intoxilyzer may be admitted as prima facie evidence of a criminal

defendant’s alcohol level. 29-A M.R.S. § 2431(2)(G). To admit the result, the

State must either produce expert testimony or present sufficient evidence to

satisfy paragraphs H and I of the statute. Id. § 2431(2)(K); Tozier,

2015 ME 57, ¶ 14, 115 A.3d 1240. Paragraph H requires evidence that the

testing apparatus was approved by the Department, which may be proved by

demonstrating that the apparatus bore the Department’s stamp of approval.

29-A M.R.S. § 2431(2)(H). Paragraph I requires evidence that the materials
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used in operating or checking the operation of the testing apparatus were of

the composition and quality stated, which may be proved by demonstrating

that the materials “bore a statement of the manufacturer or of the

Department.” Id. § 2431(2)(I). The statute does not define “statement.” See

29-A M.R.S. § 2401 (2016).

[¶19] Here, the State met the requirements of paragraph H with the

testimony of both the Intoxilyzer operator and the site coordinator that the

apparatus bore the Department’s stamp of approval. Williamson agreed at

trial that paragraph H had been satisfied. Thus, any challenge to compliance

with paragraph H was waived.

[¶20] Regarding paragraph I, the site coordinator testified that the

solution used in the operation of the breath test apparatus was provided by

the Department’s Health and Environmental Testing Laboratory and bore the

initials of a chemist employed by the Department. As the statute does not

mandate that the statement of the Department take a particular form, the

court did not err in construing the chemist’s initials as a “statement” of the

Department. Because there is competent evidence in the record to support

the court’s findings that the State satisfied paragraphs H and I, the court did

not abuse its discretion or clearly err in admitting the test result.
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B. Late Disclosure Regarding State’s Witness

[¶21] Williamson argues that the State’s disclosure, during trial, that a

State’s witness was recently investigated for accidentally shooting himself

violated Williamson’s due process rights pursuant to Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83.5 We review the alleged due process violation de novo. State v.

Jones, 2012 ME 126, ¶ 35, 55 A.3d 432.

[¶22] “A defendant’s due process rights are violated when the

prosecution withholds evidence favorable to him.” State v. Jobin,

510 A.2d 527, 529-30 (Me. 1986) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). A Brady

violation has three elements: (1) the evidence must be favorable to the

defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) the State must

have suppressed the evidence either willfully or inadvertently, and

(3) prejudice must have ensued. State v. Twardus, 2013 ME 74, ¶ 32,

72 A.3d 523.

[¶23] We have held on numerous occasions that the State’s late

disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence is not necessarily, on its own, a

violation of due process pursuant to Brady. The context and the facts
5 Williamson also argues that his due process rights were violated based on M.R.U. Crim. P. 16

and “notions of fair play” pursuant to the state and federal constitutions. These arguments were
not raised before the trial court, and, therefore, we review only for obvious error. See M.R.U.
Crim. P. 52(b); State v. Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶ 29, 28 A.3d 1147. We conclude that there was no
obvious error.
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surrounding the late disclosure are critical to the analysis. See State v. Gagne,

2017 ME 63, ¶¶ 29-30, --- A.3d --- (concluding that the State’s production of

medical records a week before trial did not deprive the defendant of a fair

trial); State v. Gould, 2012 ME 60, ¶¶ 7, 25-26, 43 A.3d 952 (concluding that

the State’s delivery of test results to the defendant a half hour before the start

of trial was not an unreasonable delay under the circumstances); State v. Kelly,

2000 ME 107, ¶ 26 n.11, 752 A.2d 188 (concluding that there was no error

when the defendant was aware of the exculpatory evidence before trial).

[¶24] Here, the State did not conceal the evidence, which it provided to

Williamson partway through the first day of a two-day trial, soon after the

prosecutor had first learned of the investigation concerning the witness.

Williamson vaguely argues that the investigative report could contain

impeaching information, but there is nothing in the record before us that

suggests that the evidence at issue is either exculpatory or impeaching. The

investigation of the neighbor was wholly unrelated to the matter before the

trial court, and accidentally shooting oneself, without more, does not

demonstrate bias, motive to fabricate, personal interest, hostility, or any other
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factor affecting credibility.6 Therefore, because the State disclosed the

evidence to Williamson, and the information was not favorable to him

pursuant to Brady, Williamson’s right to due process was not violated.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Jeremy Pratt, Esq. and Ellen Simmons, Esq., Camden, for appellant Joshua
Williamson

Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Alisa Ross, Asst. Dist. Atty.,
Prosecutorial District IV, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2015-1241
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY

6 Williamson’s contention that the late disclosure left him with no recourse is unpersuasive

where he did not request a continuance, an in camera review, a mistrial, or any other form of relief.
See State v. Gould, 2012 ME 60, ¶ 27, 43 A.3d 952; State v. Dube, 478 A.2d 1138, 1142 (Me. 1984).