16-1483
Liu v. Sessions
BIA
Wright, IJ
A205 239 141
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
5th day of June, two thousand seventeen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Chief Judge,
DENNY CHIN,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
ZHI LIU,
Petitioner,
v. 16-1483
NAC
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General; Holly M.
Smith, Senior Litigation Counsel;
Aric A. Anderson, Trial Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner Zhi Liu, a native and citizen of the People’s
Republic of China, seeks review of an April 29, 2016, decision
of the BIA affirming a November 4, 2014, decision of an
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Liu’s application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhi Liu, No. A205 239 141 (B.I.A. Apr.
29, 2016), aff’g No. A205 239 141 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov.
4, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both
the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 325,
332 (2d Cir. 2013). We review the agency’s legal conclusions
de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. Id.
Liu has two claims for relief, one based on his pro-democracy
activities in the United States and the other based on a 2007
beating by local officials in China. The claims are addressed
in turn.
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I. Political Activities in the United States
To demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution based on
his political activities in the United States, Liu must
establish that his fear of persecution is objectively
reasonable. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d
Cir. 2004). This objective component can be satisfied either
by establishing “a reasonable possibility [that] he . . . would
be singled out individually for persecution” or by establishing
“a pattern or practice . . . of persecution of a group of persons
similarly situated to the applicant on account of . . . political
opinion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); Y.C., 741 F.3d at
332. The awareness of the Chinese government is, thus, key to
Liu’s asylum claim. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d
135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]o establish a well-founded fear
of persecution in the absence of any evidence of past
persecution, an alien must make some showing that authorities
in his country of nationality are either aware of his activities
or likely to become aware of his activities.”). Accordingly,
at a minimum, Liu was required to present credible testimony
that the Chinese government was aware or likely to become aware
of his political activities.
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The agency reasonably concluded that Liu could not meet his
burden of proof because he did not provide reasonably available
evidence corroborating his claim. First, in light of various
inconsistencies between Liu’s testimony and his other evidence,
the agency did not err in requiring corroborating evidence. In
particular, Liu failed to amend his asylum application to
reflect alleged subsequent encounters between the police and
his family in China regarding Liu’s political activity in the
United States, despite supplementing his application in other
ways. In addition, Liu testified that he did not tell anyone
in the Chinese Freedom and Democracy Party (“CFDP”) about his
suspicion that there was a Chinese government spy within the
organization, but the CFDP chairman testified that he and Liu
discussed those concerns. Liu also gave conflicting reasons
for his first trip to the United States.
The agency thus reasonably concluded that corroborating
evidence was required to support Liu’s claim. See 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). But, critically, Liu did not provide
statements from his cousin or his ex-wife regarding their
alleged encounters with the Chinese police. While Liu’s
explanations that his cousin was afraid of retaliation and that
he is estranged from his ex-wife are plausible, they do not
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compel a finding that their statements were unavailable. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).
Liu also testified that the Chinese authorities were likely
aware of his activism because his articles and photographs of
his attendance at CFDP protests were online. The agency did
not err in finding this evidence insufficient to show official
awareness. See Y.C., 741 F.3d at 333-34, 336-37. The agency
also reasonably determined that Liu did not demonstrate a
“pattern or practice” of persecution of similarly situated
pro-democracy activists. Id. at 334-35.
For the foregoing reasons, the agency reasonably
determined that Liu did not demonstrate an objectively
reasonable fear of persecution. This finding is dispositive
of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief to the extent
the claims are based on Liu’s activities in the United States.
Id. at 335; Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir.
2006).
II. 2007 Beating
To the extent Liu argues that he is eligible for asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief based on his 2007
beating, we find no error in the agency’s conclusion that he
is not.
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To be eligible for asylum and withholding of removal on this
basis, Liu must show that the beating was on account of a
protected ground. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1231(b)(3)(A). He
did not. He testified that, in 2007, city administration
officials beat him outside his store for refusing to pay
extortion money and that all vendors were targeted for
extortion. This does not show that a protected ground was a
central reason for the extortion or beating. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Matter of C-T-L, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 346-50
(B.I.A. 2010) (holding that the “one central reason” standard
also applies to withholding of removal). Liu argued to the BIA
that he was targeted because of his family ties or imputed
political opinion, but the BIA properly rejected this argument
because Liu did not present testimony or evidence to support
it.
The agency also reasonably concluded that Liu did not meet
his burden for CAT relief. To obtain CAT relief, an applicant
must establish that he would more likely than not be tortured
in the future. Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 184-85; see 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(2), (3). “Torture is an extreme form of cruel and
inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment . . . .” 8 C.F.R.
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§ 1208.18(a)(2). As discussed above, Liu’s failure to show an
objectively reasonable fear of harm stemming from his political
activities in the United States is dispositive of that ground
for CAT relief. Moreover, although Liu testified to a 2007
beating, he provided no evidence of a likelihood of being
subject to future harm on that basis. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(2),(3).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion
for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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