NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 6 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL ALEXANDRUK; TEREZA No. 13-73609
ALEXANDRUK,
Agency Nos. A088-537-682
Petitioners, A088-537-683
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 18, 2017**
Seattle, Washington
Before: GOULD and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and LEMELLE,*** Senior District
Judge.
Daniel Alexandruk (Alexandruk) and his wife, Tereza Alexandruk, petition
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Ivan L.R. Lemelle, Senior United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming an
Immigration Judge’s denial of their joint application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Because
Tereza Alexandruk’s claim is derivative of her husband’s, we focus on his
eligibility. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.21(a). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(1), and we deny the petition for review.
(1) The BIA’s denial of asylum is free from legal error. Despite
Alexandruk’s protestations to the contrary, the BIA did not require him to show
continuing injury from his alleged past persecution and did consider the cumulative
effects of his mistreatment, the fact that he was a child when much of the alleged
mistreatment occurred, his psychological harm, and other evidence in the record.
(2) The BIA’s denial of asylum is supported by substantial evidence. See
Ling Huang v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2014). Alexandruk did not
establish that he suffered past persecution on account of his religion or perceived
ethnicity. “Persecution is an extreme concept that means something considerably
more than discrimination or harassment.” Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206,
1213 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although there is
evidence that Alexandruk was bullied by other children, a teacher, and coworkers,
even considering all of the incidents cumulatively and taking his youth into
consideration, the record does not compel a conclusion that his mistreatment rose
2
to the level of persecution. See id.; cf. Halim v. Holder, 590 F.3d 971, 975–76 (9th
Cir. 2009); Nagoulko v. I.N.S., 333 F.3d 1012, 1014–16 (9th Cir. 2003).
Because Alexandruk did not suffer past persecution, he must show a well-
founded fear of future persecution. See Halim, 590 F.3d at 976. The behavior
Alexandruk fears—that he may experience difficulty gaining a job or be assigned
less-desirable tasks because of his religion or perceived nationality—does not rise
to the level of persecution. Because Alexandruk did not suffer past persecution
and did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, he is not entitled to
asylum. See Hanna v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2007).
(3) Because Alexandruk is not eligible for asylum, he is also not eligible for
withholding of removal. See Halaim v. I.N.S., 358 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“[F]ailure to satisfy the lower standard of proof required to establish eligibility for
asylum . . . necessarily results in a failure to demonstrate eligibility for withholding
of deportation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
(4) Alexandruk did not present his claim for humanitarian asylum to the
BIA. That claim is therefore not exhausted and we do not have jurisdiction to
consider it. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004).
(5) The BIA’s denial of CAT relief is supported by substantial evidence.
“Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not include
lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment . . . .” 8
3
C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(2). Alexandruk did not present evidence that it is more likely
than not that he would be tortured if returned to the Czech Republic. See Tamang
v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010).
DENIED.
4