NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0516-14T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JASON ASKEW,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________
Submitted December 20, 2016 – Decided March 23, 2017
Before Judges Yannotti and Kennedy.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Passaic County, Indictment No.
13-02-0102.
Fusco & Macaluso Partners, LLC, attorneys for
appellant (Amie E. DiCola, on the brief).
Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Marc A. Festa, Senior
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Jason Askew was tried before a jury and found guilty
on two counts of second-degree leaving the scene of a motor vehicle
accident under circumstances resulting in the death of two
individuals, and other offenses. Defendant was sentenced to an
aggregate term of nineteen years of incarceration. He appeals from
the judgment of conviction dated September 2, 2014. We affirm.
I.
A Passaic County grand jury charged defendant with second-
degree leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident under
circumstances that resulted in death to Jose Fernandez-Minaya,
contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 (count one); second-degree leaving
the scene of a motor vehicle accident under circumstances that
resulted in death of Jhasleidy Benjumea-Bastidas, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
5.1 (count two); third-degree injuring a person (Fernandez-
Minaya), and leaving the scene of the injury knowing the person
is physically helpless, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a) (count three);
third-degree injuring a person (Benjumea-Bastidas), and leaving
the scene of the injury knowing the person is physically helpless,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a) (count four); third-degree hindering
apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1) (count five); and fourth-
degree tampering with evidence, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1) (count six).
Defendant was tried before a jury. The following evidence was
presented at trial. On the evening of March 16, 2012, Benjumea-
Bastidas and Fernandez-Minaya celebrated a birthday with two
friends, A.F. and E.V. They went to a club and left in a car being
2 A-0516-14T1
driven by Benjumea-Bastidas. After dropping off another person,
they became lost. Benjumea-Bastidas got into an argument with E.V.
and they exited the vehicle. A.F. and Fernandez-Minaya also exited
the car. They followed Benjumea-Bastidas and tried to get her to
return to the car. A.F. and E.V. then walked back to the car, but
Benjumea-Bastidas and Fernandez-Minaya remained at the corner of
Seventh Avenue and Route 46 East.
While A.F. was speaking to E.V. near the car, they heard a
loud noise coming from where Benjumea-Bastidas and Fernandez-
Minaya had been speaking. A.F. testified that the noise sounded
like a "crash had occurred." She turned around and did not see
Benjumea-Bastidas and Fernandez-Minaya standing on the corner.
A.F. and E.V. went to look for them and found them stretched out
on the ground. A.F. did not see any stopped car in the road, nor
did she see the car that apparently struck Benjumea-Bastidas and
Fernandez-Minaya.
At 3:57 a.m., on March 17, 2012, Officer Alex Zamora of the
Clifton Police Department (CPD) received a radio dispatch from
another officer, who indicated that two people had been found
lying on the highway. Zamora went to the scene. He observed a male
lying on the left lane and a female lying on the right lane of the
3 A-0516-14T1
highway. The bodies were about fifty feet apart. The other officer
was attending to the female.
Zamora went to assist the male. According to Zamora, the male
was unresponsive and he did not detect a pulse. When he arrived,
Zamora did not see any other vehicles on the roadway. No vehicles
returned to the scene, and Zamora did not observe a damaged vehicle
in the area.
Officer William Bais of the CPD, whose responsibilities
included the investigation of fatal motor vehicle accidents, was
informed of the accident at around 4:00 a.m. on March 17, 2012.
When he arrived at the scene, the victims' bodies had already been
removed. The police recovered forty-nine pieces of evidence from
the scene, including a piece of a clear mirror, a small piece of
gray silver plastic, and a piece of a plastic mirror.
Bais later determined that the parts were from a 2002 to 2005
black Cadillac Escalade. From the New Jersey Department of
Transportation, Bais obtained a list of 2002 to 2005 Cadillac
Escalades that were registered in New Jersey. With the help of
another officer, he began to check the residences associated with
the vehicles. They determined that defendant may be the owner of
the vehicle involved in the accident.
4 A-0516-14T1
Bais went to a residence in Paterson and spoke with the owner,
who said that defendant was his tenant and defendant's vehicle had
been involved in an accident several weeks earlier. Bais located
defendant at his place of employment and brought defendant to
police headquarters. Defendant was wearing a blue New York Yankees
jacket, with white leather sleeves.
Defendant admitted he was an owner of a Cadillac Escalade,
and the vehicle had been involved in an accident on March 17,
2012. Defendant claimed his vehicle struck a deer on Route 19
South. He said the vehicle was at an auto body shop in Newark.
Defendant also stated that on the night of the accident, he had
been at the Holiday Inn in Totowa and Six Brothers Diner. The
police obtained surveillance videos from both locations.
In the Holiday Inn video recorded on March 17, 2012, defendant
was seen in the lobby by the bar and outside the hotel. Defendant
was wearing the same jacket he was wearing when he met the police
for his interview. Defendant's vehicle also was seen in the video.
It was not damaged. The Totowa Holiday Inn is located on Route 46.
The video from Six Brothers Diner shows defendant entering
the diner at 2:59 a.m. on March 17, 2012. He is also seen leaving
the diner between 3:46 a.m. and 3:50 a.m. on that date. The diner
is located about 2.3 miles from the accident site. Testimony
5 A-0516-14T1
established that the crash site is about a three-minute drive from
the diner. As noted previously, Zamora was dispatched to the
accident scene at 3:57 a.m. on March 17, 2012.
Bais went to the auto body shop to inspect defendant's
vehicle, which was still in a damaged condition. Bais found
documents in the car, which indicated that it was a 2003 Cadillac
Escalade and defendant was its registered owner.
Bais also collected evidence from the vehicle, which included
hair on the damaged hood, hair on the headlight plug, and a broken
headlight casing with hair. Bais also recovered hair from the
vehicle's undercarriage. The hairs were sent to a laboratory for
analysis.
Bais testified that he matched the piece of the vehicle's
grill found at the scene of the accident with a piece of the grill
recovered from the auto body shop. He also matched a piece of the
lens of the light housing found at the scene with the light housing
recovered at the body shop.
Detective Timothy McConnell of the vehicular homicide unit
in the Passaic County Prosecutor's Office was assigned to
investigate the accident. He inspected the area and noted numerous
pieces of vehicle debris and personal items that apparently
belonged to the victims.
6 A-0516-14T1
McConnell said there were no defects or significant damage
that would affect the ability to drive on the road. He noted that
the speed limit in the area was thirty-five miles per hour, and
the area was primarily residential and commercial. He did not
observe any tire or skid marks. The debris covered four lanes of
travel, and was spread over 221 feet.
About sixteen days after the collision, Sergeant Michael
Bienkowski of the CPD searched the entire length of Route 19 in
the area of the accident to determine if there was any evidence
that a vehicle had struck a deer. Bienkowski found no deer remains
or pieces of a vehicle that may have been recently deposited in
the area. He also searched several streets in Clifton, and checked
to see if there were any reports of an animal on Route 19 at the
time of the accident. He found none.
A State Police DNA forensic scientist analyzed some of the
evidence collected in the investigation. A partial DNA profile was
extracted from hair recovered from the undercarriage of
defendant's vehicle. It matched Benjumea-Bastidas's DNA. The
forensic scientist said that this hair could not have come from
an animal.
Dr. Di Wang, an assistant medical examiner, performed an
autopsy on Benjumea-Bastidas. He observed multiple contusions and
7 A-0516-14T1
abrasions on her face and similar injuries on almost all parts of
her body. He found multiple internal injuries, including seven
fractured ribs and a completely severed spinal cord. He said the
rib fractures and spinal-cord injury he found are typically the
result of a very strong force, and were consistent with a
pedestrian being struck by a vehicle traveling at a high rate of
speed.
Dr. Wang also noted a number of injuries to Benjumea-
Bastidas's internal organs, including injuries to the spleen,
liver, heart, and lungs. He opined that the cause of her death was
multiple force injuries to the head, torso and extremities. He
said that, even with prompt medical intervention, Benjumea-
Bastidas would not have survived more than a minute after impact.
An autopsy also was performed upon Fernandez-Minaya. It
revealed that he suffered blunt force trauma to the head and neck,
which would have been fatal. He also sustained blunt force trauma
to the chest, resulting in multiple rib fractures, pulmonary
contusions, and other injuries. These injuries also would have
been fatal. Fernandez-Minaya had other internal injuries and
multiple fractures of his arms and legs. The autopsy found that
Fernandez-Minaya's death was due to multiple injuries, consistent
8 A-0516-14T1
with a pedestrian being struck by a vehicle traveling at a high
rate of speed.
Defendant presented one witness, a former pizzeria customer,
who claimed that she was shocked when she heard about the accident.
The jury found defendant guilty on all counts. Thereafter,
the judge sentenced defendant to five years on both counts one and
two, and three-years each on counts three, four, and five. Count
six was merged into count five. The judge ordered that all of the
sentences be served consecutively.
Defendant appeals and argues:
POINT I: THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE MR. ASKEW'S
CRIMINAL JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION BECAUSE THE
JURY'S VERIDCT IS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE AND THE STATE HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS
BURDEN OF PROOF, NAMELY THAT MR. ASKEW IS
GUILTY OF THE ALLEGED CHARGES BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT.
A. The State has failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Askew is guilty of
two counts of Leaving the Scene of a Motor
Vehicle Accident Resulting in Death, contrary
to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1, and two counts of
Leaving the Scene of a Motor Vehicle Accident
Resulting in Endangering and Injuring a
Victim, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a).
B. The State has failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Askew is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of Hindering
Apprehension, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-
3(b)(1) and Tampering with Evidence, contrary
to N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1).
9 A-0516-14T1
II.
As noted, defendant argues that the State failed to meet its
burden of proving each element of the charges under both N.J.S.A.
2C:11-5.1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a). Defendant argues that because
the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence, it should
be deemed the result of mistake, passion, prejudice, or
partiality.1
A trial court may not set aside a jury's verdict and order a
new trial "unless it clearly and convincingly appears that there
was a manifest denial of justice under the law." State v. Sims,
65 N.J. 359, 373-74 (1974). A new trial is warranted only if the
jury's verdict represents a "miscarriage of justice." Dolson v.
Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 7 (1969).
In ruling on a motion for a new trial, the trial court must
determine:
[w]hether, viewing the State's evidence in its
entirety, be that evidence direct or
circumstantial, and giving the State the
benefit of all its favorable testimony as well
as of the favorable inferences which
reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a
1
We note that defendant failed to move for a new trial on the
ground that the jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Strictly speaking, defendant is precluded from raising this
argument for the first time on appeal. R. 2:10-1; State v. Perry,
128 N.J. Super. 188, 190 (App. Div. 1973), aff'd, 65 N.J. 45
(1974). We have elected, however, to address defendant's
arguments.
10 A-0516-14T1
reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge
beyond a reasonable doubt.
[State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 459 (1967)
(citation omitted).]
We apply the same standard when reviewing a trial court's decision
on a motion for a new trial. Dolson, supra, 55 N.J. at 7.
With regard to his convictions on counts one and two, charging
violations of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1, defendant argues that the State
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that he drove
the vehicle that struck Benjumea-Bastidas and Fernandez-Minaya,
and that he then left the scene. We disagree.
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 states, in relevant part:
A motor vehicle operator who knows he [or she]
is involved in an accident and knowingly
leaves the scene of that accident under
circumstances that violate the provisions of
[N.J.S.A. 39:4-129] shall be guilty of a crime
of the second degree if the accident results
in the death of another person.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-129(a) states that:
The driver of any vehicle, knowingly involved
in an accident resulting in . . . death to any
person shall immediately stop the vehicle at
the scene of the accident or as close thereto
as possible but shall then forthwith return
to and in every event shall remain at the scene
until he has fulfilled the requirements of
subsection (c) of this section.
Subsection (c) of N.J.S.A. 39:4-129 states in pertinent part:
11 A-0516-14T1
The driver of any vehicle knowingly involved
in an accident resulting in injury or death
to any person or damage to any vehicle or
property shall give his name and address and
exhibit his operator's license and
registration certificate of his vehicle to the
person injured or whose vehicle or property
was damaged and to any police officer or
witness of the accident, and to the driver or
occupants of the vehicle collided with and
render to a person injured in the accident
reasonable assistance, including the carrying
of that person to a hospital or a physician
for medical or surgical treatment, if it is
apparent that the treatment is necessary or
is requested by the injured person.
Here, the State presented sufficient evidence to allow a jury
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of the
offenses charged under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1. As we stated
previously, the State presented testimony regarding the extensive
physical evidence recovered from the scene, which allowed the jury
to find that defendant's 2003 Cadillac Escalade was the vehicle
that struck the two victims.
The State presented evidence that the DNA in the hair obtained
from Benjumea-Bastidas matched the DNA in the hair recovered from
the undercarriage of defendant's car. The evidence also showed
that this hair was from a human being, not from a deer.
Furthermore, the State presented surveillance videos from the
night of the accident. One video showed defendant at the Holiday
Inn in Totowa and his vehicle was not damaged. The other video
12 A-0516-14T1
showed defendant leaving the Six Brothers Diner at approximately
3:49 a.m. The diner is a three-minute drive to the crash site. As
noted, the officer was dispatched to the scene at 3:57 a.m.
The State also presented testimony from A.F. and the police
officers who said that they did not see any car, including a
damaged car, stop after the accident or return to the scene.
Finally, there was no evidence supporting defendant's claim that
he hit a deer on Route 19.
Viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, and giving the
State the benefit of all favorable inferences that reasonably
could be drawn from the evidence, we conclude that the State
presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict
finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offenses
charged under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1. We reject defendant's contention
that the verdict should be deemed the result of mistake, passion,
prejudice, or partiality.
III.
Next, defendant argues that the State did not present
sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was guilty of the charges under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-
1.2(a). The statute provides that:
A person is guilty of endangering an injured
victim if he causes bodily injury to any
13 A-0516-14T1
person or solicits, aids, encourages, or
attempts or agrees to aid another, who causes
bodily injury to any person, and leaves the
scene of the injury knowing or reasonably
believing that the injured person is
physically helpless, mentally incapacitated
or otherwise unable to care for himself.
[Ibid.]
As applied here, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a) required the State to
establish that 1) defendant knowingly caused bodily injury to a
person; 2) the injured person was physically helpless, mentally
incapacitated, or otherwise unable to care for himself or herself;
and 3) defendant left the scene of the injury knowing or reasonably
believing that the injured person was in that condition. State v.
Munafo, 222 N.J. 480, 488-89 (2015). "Physically helpless" is
defined as "the condition in which a person is unconscious, unable
to flee, or physically unable to summon assistance." N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1.2(b).
Defendant argues that the State failed to establish that
after the accident, Benjumea-Bastidas and Fernandez-Minaya were
"physically helpless." In support of his argument, defendant
relies upon State v. Moon, 396 N.J. Super. 109 (App. Div. 2007),
certif. denied, 193 N.J. 586 (2008).
In Moon, the defendant put a gun to the victim's head, pulled
the trigger, and kicked the victim's body to check if he was alive.
14 A-0516-14T1
Id. at 112. We noted that the State did not present any evidence
showing that the victim "exhibited any sign of life after he was
shot or that defendant or anyone else present knew or reasonably
believed that he was alive and incapacitated, helpless or unable
[to summon assistance] after he collapsed." Id. at 115.
We therefore held that N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a) did not apply
in that case. Id. at 117. We determined that the State's evidence
was inadequate to permit the jury to find that the victim was
physically helpless or "that the defendant left [the victim] on
the street knowing or reasonably believing that he was anything
other than dead." Ibid.
Defendant's reliance upon Moon is misplaced. Here, the State
presented evidence that allowed the jury to find that after the
accident, the victims survived briefly and were physically
helpless. The State also presented evidence that allowed the jury
to find that defendant left the accident while the victims were
in that condition. The evidence also allowed the jury to find that
defendant did not stop to check on the victims, but instead left
the scene.
Viewing the evidence in its entirety, and giving the State
the benefit of all favorable inferences that reasonably could be
drawn from the evidence, we conclude the State presented sufficient
15 A-0516-14T1
evidence to support the jury's verdict on the charges under
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a).
IV.
Defendant further argues that the State did not present
sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict finding him
guilty of hindering apprehension, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-
3(b)(1), and of tampering with evidence, contrary to N.J.S.A.
2C:28-6(1). N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3 provides in pertinent part that:
(b) A person commits an offense if, with
purpose to hinder his own detention,
apprehension, investigation, prosecution,
conviction or punishment for an offense or
violation of Title 39 of the Revised Statutes
or a violation of chapter 33A of Title 17 of
the Revised Statutes, he:
(1) Suppresses, by way of concealment or
destruction, any evidence of the crime or
tampers with a document or other source of
information, regardless of its admissibility
in evidence, which might aid in his discovery
or apprehension or in the lodging of a charge
against him[.]
In addition, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1) states that a person commits
the crime of tampering with evidence:
if, believing that an official proceeding or
investigation is pending or about to be
instituted, he: (1) alters, destroys, conceals
or removes any article, object, record,
document or other thing of physical substance
with purpose to impair its verity or
availability in such proceeding or
investigation[.]
16 A-0516-14T1
Defendant contends that he did not impede or hinder his
apprehension or tamper with evidence because he took his vehicle
to a "reputable and licensed auto repair facility" after filing a
report with his insurance company, and that he was unaware of the
accident. He contends the vehicle was never hidden or destroyed.
These arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
We note, however, that the evidence established that
defendant sought to have his damaged car repaired shortly after
the accident, claiming that the car had been damaged by a collision
with a deer. The jury could reasonably find that, by doing so,
defendant was acting to hinder his own apprehension and impair the
availability of evidence relevant to the deaths of Benjumea-
Bastidas and Fernandez-Minaya.
Affirmed.
17 A-0516-14T1