FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUN 08 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TRESA FLOYD, a single woman, No. 16-15450
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02617-NVW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF MARICOPA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 5, 2017
Pasadena, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, and KORMAN,**
District Judge.
Tresa Floyd appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Maricopa County on her claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Because the parties are
familiar with the history and facts of this case, we need not recount them here.
I
The district court did not err by granting summary judgment to the County
on Floyd’s FMLA claim. Under the FMLA, a covered employee may take up to
twelve weeks of leave for her own serious illnesses or to care for family members.
Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a), 1614(a)(1)). The FMLA guarantees the employee
reinstatement after exercising her leave rights. Id. In addition to these substantive
rights, the FMLA provides protection in the event an employer discriminates
against an employee for exercising those rights. Id. at 1122–24. There are two
types of claims under the FMLA: interference claims, in which employers
“interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right
provided” by the FMLA; and retaliation claims, in which employers discriminate
against employees “for instituting or participating in FMLA proceedings or
inquiries.” Id. at 1122, 1124 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)). Floyd brings only
an interference claim in this case. To prevail on her claim, Floyd must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that her taking of FMLA-protected leave constituted
a negative factor in the decision to demote her. Id. at 1125. “She can prove this
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claim, as one might any ordinary statutory claim, by using either direct or
circumstantial evidence, or both.” Id.
Floyd did not tender sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material
fact as to causation. At best, Floyd shows that she subjectively believed that her
supervisor was unhappy with her FMLA leave, but this is not sufficient to, by
itself, demonstrate causation. Absent stray remarks by her supervisor, there is no
record evidence showing a causal link between her availment of FMLA benefits
and her demotion. Moreover, the County has met its burden of establishing it had
legitimate reasons to demote Floyd for a number of reasons, several of which
Floyd conceded. Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate on this claim.
II
The district court likewise did not err by granting summary judgment to the
County on Floyd’s ADA claim. To state a prima facie case under the ADA, Floyd
must show that: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is a
qualified individual, meaning she can perform the essential functions of her job;
and (3) the County terminated her because of her disability. Nunes v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that “[t]he ADA prohibits
an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). Discrimination claims
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under the ADA are subject to the burden-shifting framework outlined in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). Curley v. City
of N. Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2014).
Floyd cannot make a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA
because she cannot establish that the County terminated her because of her
disability. Floyd did not establish that the person responsible for her demotion
decision was aware of Floyd’s disability. Even assuming that Floyd stated a prima
facie case, the County met its burden to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for Floyd’s demotion. Moreover, Floyd has failed to produce evidence,
aside from stray remarks from her supervisor, that the reasons given for her
demotion were a “pretext for discrimination.” See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing,
530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).
AFFIRMED.
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