[Cite as Strahm v. Kagy, 2017-Ohio-4220.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
LINDA J. STRAHM, ET AL.,
CASE NO. 1-17-08
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
v.
LEE ANN KAGY, ET AL., OPINION
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CV 2016 0694
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: June 12, 2017
APPEARANCES:
Thomas P. Kemp and James F. Blair for Appellants
Ryan W. Goellner for Appellees, Lee Ann Kagy and Leslie M. Barnes
Matthew C. Huffman for Appellee, A to Z Control Meats, Inc.
Case No. 1-17-08
WILLAMOWKSI, J.
{¶1} Although originally placed on our accelerated calendar, we have
elected pursuant to Loc.R. 12(5) to issue a full opinion in lieu of a summary
judgment entry. Plaintiffs-appellants Linda J. Strahm (“Strahm”) and Lois J.
Bender (“Bender”) appeal the judgment of the Allen County Court of Common
Pleas for granting the motion to dismiss of the defendants-appellees, Lee Ann Kagy
(“Kagy”) and Leslie M. Barnes (“Barnes”). For the reasons set forth below, the
judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} Ownership of A to Z Portion Control Meats, Inc. (“A to Z”) is equally
divided among four shareholders: Strahm, Bender, Kagy, and Barnes. Doc. 1, 12.
Thus, each of these shareholders owns one-fourth of A to Z’s stock. Id. The board
of directors of this corporation is composed of three people who are elected to serve
one-year terms. Doc. 1. The officers of A to Z are presently Kagy, who serves as
president and treasurer, and Barnes, who serves as secretary. Id. Currently, three
people—Kagy, Barnes, and Terry Strahm, who is Strahm’s husband—serve on the
board of directors. These board members were elected by the shareholders on
January 8, 2015, to commence their one-year terms. Id. Bender and Strahm
received their ownership interest in A to Z on May 26, 2015, and were, thus, not
shareholders at the time that the current board of directors was elected. Id.
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{¶3} On July 21, 2015, the shareholders held a special meeting during
which Strahm and Bender moved to expand the positions on the board of directors
from three to five. Id. Bender and Strahm voted in favor of this motion while Kagy
and Barnes voted against this motion. Id. Thus, this motion failed to receive a
majority vote of the shareholders and was defeated. Id. On January 4, 2016, the
shareholders convened for their annual meeting during which elections were held
for the board of directors. Id. At this meeting, the names of Strahm, Terry Strahm,
Bender, Barnes, and Kagy were placed into nomination for positions on the board
of directors. Id. When the time came to vote, Terry Strahm, Bender, Barnes, and
Kagy each received one vote. Id. Kagy, as president of the company, announced
that the vote was deadlocked and that the current board of directors, which had been
elected the previous January, would remain in office pursuant to the company’s code
of regulations. Id.
{¶4} Since that time, the shareholders have remained deadlocked on the
issue of who should be on the board of directors and have not been able to come to
an agreement, leaving the board of directors elected on January 8, 2015 in their
positions after their one-year term expired. Id. On December 15, 2016, appellants
Strahm and Bender filed a verified complaint for judicial dissolution of A to Z
pursuant to R.C. 1701.91. Id. In the complaint, appellants allege that
various controversies and differences have existed, and still exist,
among them, which are of such a dramatic and competing nature,
kind, and character, as to impede the efficient and effective
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business plan, management of A to Z, and the relationship
between the shareholders has been irretrievably broken.
Id. On December 20, 2016, the appellees submitted a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to
dismiss. Id. In this motion, appellees argued that the trial court should dismiss this
action because the appellants did not represent the required level of shareholder
ownership to bring an action for judicial dissolution under R.C. 1701.91 and,
therefore, lacked standing to bring this claim. Id.
{¶5} On January 27, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on appellees’
motion and dismissed this action. Doc. 26 at 40. On February 27, 2017, appellants
filed a joint notice of appeal. In this appeal, appellants raise the following
assignment of error:
The trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion to dismiss
based on a flawed interpretation of Ohio Revised Code
1701.91(A)(4).
On the basis of their arguments, appellants request that we reverse the decision of
the trial court that granted appellees’ 12(B)(6) motion.
Legal Standard
{¶6} “A [Civ.R. 12(B)(6)] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted is procedural and tests whether the complaint is
sufficient.” Pearsall v. Guernsey, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-16-25, 2017-Ohio-681,
¶ 8, quoting Bd. of Health of Defiance Cty. v. McCalla, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4–
12–07, 2012–Ohio–4107, ¶ 33. Civ.R. 12(B)(6) reads, in relevant part, as follows:
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Case No. 1-17-08
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading,
* * * shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is
required, except that the following defenses may at the option of
the pleader be made by motion: * * * (6) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted * * *.
Civ.R. 12(B)(6). For a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal to be proper, “it must appear
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that
would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Arnett v. Precision Strip, Inc., 2012-Ohio-2693,
972 N.E.2d 168, ¶ 5, quoting LeRoy v. Allen, Yurasek, & Merklin, 114 Ohio St.3d
323, 2007-Ohio-3608, 872 N.E.2d 254, ¶ 14.
{¶7} “A complaint may be dismissed under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failing to
comply with the applicable statute of limitations when the complaint on its face
conclusively indicates that the action is time-barred.” Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp.
v. McKinley, 130 Ohio St.3d 156, 2011–Ohio–4432, ¶ 13; Doe v. Archdiocese of
Cincinnati, 109 Ohio St.3d 491, 2006-Ohio-2625, 849 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 11; Dibert v.
Watson, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-09-02, 2009-Ohio-2098, ¶ 10. On review, “[t]he
allegations of the complaint must be taken as true, and those allegations and any
reasonable inferences drawn from them must be construed in the nonmoving party’s
favor.” McKinley at ¶ 12. An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision to
grant a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion de novo. Ballreich Bros., Inc. v. Criblez, 3d Dist.
Hancock No. 5-09-36, 2010-Ohio-3263, ¶ 9.
{¶8} R.C. 1701.91(A)(4) governs the judicial dissolution process and
reads, in relevant part, as follows:
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(A) A corporation may be dissolved judicially and its affairs
wound up:
***
(4) By an order of the court of common pleas of the county in this
state in which the corporation has its principal office, in an action
brought by one-half of the directors when there is an even number
of directors or by the holders of shares entitling them to exercise at
least two-thirds of the voting power, when it is established that the
corporation has an even number of directors who are deadlocked
in the management of the corporate affairs and the shareholders
are unable to break the deadlock, or when it is established that
the corporation has an uneven number of directors and that the
shareholders are deadlocked in voting power and unable to agree
upon or vote for the election of directors as successors to directors
whose terms normally would expire upon the election of their
successors.
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 1701.91(A)(4).1
Legal Analysis
{¶9} In this case, the primary dispute is over whether R.C. 1701.91(A)(4)
confers standing on the appellants. Under our plain reading of this statute, it is clear
that the appellants do not have standing to bring this action. R.C. 1701.91(A)(4)
first identifies the parties who are able to bring an action for judicial dissolution and
then identifies the circumstances in which these specified parties have standing to
bring an action for judicial dissolution. This statute confers standing on two classes
1
Prior to revision in 2012, R.C. 1701.94(A)(4) permitted judicial dissolution, subject to other specified
circumstances, “in an action brought by one-half of the directors when there is an even number of directors
or by the holders of shares entitling them to exercise one-half of the voting power* * *.” R.C. 1701.91(A)(4).
Thus, before the amendments, shareholders exercising one-half of the voting power could have standing
under the right circumstances to bring a judicial dissolution action. With the 2012 amendments, however,
the General Assembly raised the required level of shareholder voting power necessary to bring a judicial
dissolution action from one-half to two-thirds.
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of people: either one-half of the board of directors or shareholders with two-thirds
of voting power can bring an action for judicial dissolution. We need not consider
the circumstances under which these specified parties can bring an action for
judicial dissolution because it is apparent, from the face of the complaint, that the
appellants represent neither one-half of the board of directors nor two-thirds of
shareholder voting power. Thus, the appellants do not have standing to bring this
claim, and the question of whether the shareholders are deadlocked in a dispute over
the election of a new board of directors need not be considered. For these reasons,
Appellants’ sole assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶10} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellants in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgment of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
PRESTON, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.
/hls
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