[Cite as State ex rel Ames. v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2017-Ohio-4237.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PORTAGE COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO ex rel. : OPINION
BRIAN M. AMES,
:
Relator-Appellant, CASE NO. 2016-P-0057
:
- vs -
:
PORTAGE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, et al., :
Respondents-Appellees. :
Civil Appeal from the Portage County Court of Common Pleas.
Case No. 2015 CV 00958.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Brian M. Ames, pro se, 2632 Ranfield Road, Mogadore, OH 44260 (Relator-
Appellant).
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Denise L. Smith, Chief Assistant
Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Respondents-
Appellees).
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J.
{¶1} Relator-appellant, State of Ohio ex rel. Brian M. Ames (“Mr. Ames”),
appeals from a decision rendered by the Portage County Court of Common Pleas
granting summary judgment in favor of respondents-appellees, the Portage County
Board of Commissioners and its three commissioners: Maureen T. Frederick, Kathleen
Chandler, and Vickie A. Kline (collectively, “the Board”). For the reasons that follow, the
trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} This case originated in November 2015. On February 2, 2016, upon order
of the trial court, Mr. Ames filed a pro se “Amended Verified Complaint in Mandamus,
Injunction and Declaratory Judgment” against the Board, alleging six counts in violation
of R.C. 121.22, Ohio’s Open Meetings Act. The essence of Mr. Ames’ complaint is that
the Board held four separate meetings on November 4, 2015; the Board called one of
those meetings as an “emergency meeting” when there was no emergency; the Board
did not give proper notice of one of those meetings; the Board discussed matters not
disclosed in the notices that were given; and the Board failed to keep full and accurate
minutes of each meeting. Mr. Ames attached copies of four public notices that had
been published in the Ravenna Record Courier. The authenticity and content of these
notices are not disputed. They are summarized as follows:
On October 23, 2015, the Board published notice of cancelling
its regularly scheduled meetings for November and December
2015.
Also on October 23, 2015, the Board published notice of a
Special Meeting on November 4, 2015, at 11:00 a.m. The
noticed purpose of the Special Meeting was “to meet in an
Executive Session to discuss details relative to the security
arrangements and emergency response protocols for a public
body or a public office.
On October 25, 2015, the Board published notice of Special
Meetings “to review the Fiscal Year 2016 budgets with Elected
Officials and Department Heads” on three separate days:
November 2, from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.; November 3, from
1:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.; and November 4, from 10:00 a.m. to
10:30 a.m.
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On November 4, 2015, the Board published notice of a Special
Emergency Meeting on November 4, 2015, beginning at 9:30
a.m. The stated purpose of this Special Emergency Meeting
was “to meet with the Portage Park District to discuss the Hiram
Hike and Bike Trail and to conduct Budget meetings as
previously advertised.”
{¶3} The Board filed an answer, denying it had violated any provisions of R.C.
121.22.
{¶4} Mr. Ames filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting no genuine
issue as to any material fact alleged in his complaint remained to be litigated. He stated
only one set of minutes exist for November 4, 2015, but four separate meetings were
held that day. He attached a copy of the minutes to his motion. The “material facts” he
says cannot be disputed are as follows:
{¶5} The first meeting was the Special Emergency Meeting at 9:30 a.m., for
which notice was published in the Record Courier that same day. Because there was
no actual emergency, it should not have been called as an emergency meeting; notice
was therefore required to be given more than 24 hours in advance. The Board also
held an improper executive session because it was not related to the purpose of the
Special Emergency Meeting.
{¶6} The second meeting was the Special Meeting from 10:00 to 10:30 a.m.,
for which notice was published on October 25, 2015. The purpose of this meeting was
to discuss the 2016 budget.
{¶7} The third meeting was the Special Meeting at 11:00 a.m., for which notice
was published on October 23, 2015. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss
security and emergency protocols.
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{¶8} The fourth meeting commenced at 1:16 p.m. Mr. Ames stated the minutes
do not reflect a proper closing of any of the three earlier meetings; the recess occurred
at the end of the third meeting, the purpose of which was to discuss security; the fourth
meeting exceeded the scope and purpose of the third meeting; thus, a reasonable
person would have concluded that the fourth meeting was a new meeting, not a
continuation. Notice was not published for this fourth meeting.
{¶9} The Board responded in opposition and filed its own motion for summary
judgment. The Board asserted no genuine issue existed as to the following material
facts: only one meeting was held on November 4, 2015; three separate notices were
issued regarding the time, place, and purposes for that one meeting; and the minutes of
that one meeting accurately reflect that those purposes were discussed. The Board
further asserted there was no issue of law regarding the propriety of its emergency
meeting.
{¶10} Attached to the Board’s motion was an affidavit of Amy Hutchinson, the
Board’s Clerk, who averred the following, in relevant part:
7. In November 2015, two (2) of the three (3) members of the Board
of Portage County Commissioners were unavailable for meetings.
8. One (1) commissioner was unavailable or available on a limited
basis for medical reasons from November 9, 2015 through
November 23, 2015.
9. One (1) commissioner was out of the Country from November
10, 2015 through December 1, 2015.
10. * * *
11. The next scheduled Board meeting after October 30, 2015, was
Tuesday, November 3, 2015.
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12. At the request of the Board of Commissioners, on November 3,
2015, I sent an email transmission to the Ravenna Record Courier
and other news media outlets with notification of a meeting of the
Board set for November 4, 2015 for the purpose of a discussion
with the Portage Park District regarding the Hiram Hike and Bike
Trail and budget discussions.
13. A true and accurate copy of the minutes of the Portage County
Board of Commissioners’ November 4, 2015 meeting is attached
hereto as Exhibit D.
{¶11} The minutes from November 4, 2015, indicate the following, as
summarized:
9:38 a.m.: A meeting commenced, at which time the Board met
with Director Chris Craycroft to discuss Phase II of the Hiram
Hike and Bike Trail. The Board agreed to ask the county
engineer to send correspondence withdrawing sponsorship for
Phase II.
9:52 a.m.: The Board moved into executive session, pursuant to
R.C. 121.22(G)(1), “to consider the appointment, employment,
dismissal, discipline, promotion, demotion, or compensation of a
public employee or official, or the investigation of charges or
complaints against a public employee, official, licensee, or
regulated individual.”
10:08 a.m.: The Board moved out of executive session, took no
action, and discussed the 2016 budget with county officials and
department heads.
11:05 a.m.: The Board moved back into executive session,
pursuant to R.C. 121.22(G)(6), this time with certain county
officials and directors present, “to discuss details relative to the
security arrangements and emergency response protocols for a
public body or a public office.”
11:46 a.m.: The Board moved out of executive session, took no
action, and recessed.
1:16 p.m.: The Board reconvened and further discussed the
2016 budget with county officials and department heads.
2:14 p.m.: The Board adjourned.
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{¶12} Mr. Ames filed a response in opposition to the Board’s motion for
summary judgment.
{¶13} On September 12, 2016, the trial court issued a judgment entry granting
the Board’s motion for summary judgment and denying Mr. Ames’ motion for summary
judgment. The trial court held the following:
In the instant matter, there are no facts in dispute. There was a
single Board of Commissioners meeting on November 4, 2015. As
this was a Wednesday, it was not a regularly scheduled meeting of
the Board. Proper notice to the news media was provided on
October 23, 2015, and on October 25, 2015. Notice was also made
to various news media outlets on November 3, 2015. The written
minutes of the November 4, 2015 meeting confirm that only the
purposes stated in those notices were discussed by the Board.
Nor are there issues of law. Relator contends there was no real
emergency. However, emergency notice to the news media was
the discretionary decision of the Board of Commissioners as a
legislative body. * * * Relator also claims that the executive session
held in the morning at the November 4, 2015 meeting was
inappropriate. However, Relator has also admitted that the
morning’s executive session was not related to the purposes of the
emergency meeting. A public body may not hold an executive
session in an emergency meeting. Executive session is only proper
at a regular or special meeting. As the executive session was not
related to the emergency purpose of the November 4, 2015
meeting, it was held in accordance with the requirements of [R.C.
121.22].
Relator is not entitled to Summary Judgment. There were not three
or four different meetings on November 4, 2015. There was a
single Board of Commissioner meeting on that day. Appropriate
notice was given to the news media on three occasions. Back to
back meetings held on the same day by the same public body
constitute parts of and a continuation of the same meeting. * * * As
the clear and precise meeting minutes reflect, the Board’s
discussions on November 4, 2015, coincide with those purposes
provided in their notices. And as the morning executive session
had nothing to do with and was unrelated to the emergency
purpose of the meeting, as Relator concisely states in his Amended
Complaint at 22, the Portage County Board of Commissioners did
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not violate [R.C. 121.22] on November 4, 2015. [Citations to the
record omitted.]
{¶14} Mr. Ames appealed from this decision and assigns five errors for our
review challenging the trial court’s decision denying his motion for summary judgment
and granting summary judgment in favor of the Board.
Summary Judgment Standard
{¶15} “While summary judgment is a beneficial procedure aiding in the swift
administration of justice, it must also ‘be used cautiously and with the utmost care so
that a litigant’s right to a trial * * * is not usurped in the presence of conflicting facts and
inferences.’” Fifth Third Mtge. Co. v. Perry, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 12CA13, 2013-Ohio-
3308, ¶35, quoting Viock v. Stowe-Woodward Co., 13 Ohio App.3d 7, 15 (6th
Dist.1983). Summary judgment is only proper when:
(1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated;
(2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and
(3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to
but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in
favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment
is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.
Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977), citing Civ.R. 56(C).
{¶16} “[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial
court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the
trial court [e.g., pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, etc.] which
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the
nonmoving party’s claim.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996), citing Civ.R.
56(C) and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-324 (1986). If the moving party
fails to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Id. at
7
293. If the moving party satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party has the burden to
provide evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact, pursuant to Civ.R.
56(E). Id.
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court
may not weigh the evidence or select among reasonable
inferences. Rather, all doubts and questions must be resolved in
the non-moving party’s favor. Hence, a trial court is required to
overrule a motion for summary judgment where conflicting evidence
exists and alternative reasonable inferences can be drawn.
McCarthy v. Lordstown, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2014-T-0050, 2015-Ohio-955, ¶7, citing
Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., 64 Ohio St.2d 116, 121 (1980); Murphy v.
Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 359 (1992); and Pierson v. Norfork Southern Corp.,
11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2002-A-0061, 2003-Ohio-6682, ¶36.
{¶17} On appeal, we review a trial court’s entry of summary judgment de novo,
i.e., “independently and without deference to the trial court’s determination.” Brown v.
Cty. Commrs. of Scioto Cty., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711 (4th Dist.1993) (citation omitted);
see also Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996).
Ohio’s Open Meetings Act (R.C. 121.22)
{¶18} Purpose. The purpose of Ohio’s Open Meetings Act “is to assure
accountability of elected officials by prohibiting their secret deliberations on public
issues.” State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty. Commrs., 1st Dist. Hamilton
No. C-010605, 2002 WL 727023, *1 (Apr. 26, 2002), citing State ex rel. Cincinnati Post
v. Cincinnati, 76 Ohio St.3d 540, 544 (1996). The Act “shall be liberally construed to
require public officials to take official action and to conduct all deliberations upon official
business only in open meetings, unless the subject matter is specifically excepted by
law.” R.C. 121.22(A).
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{¶19} Meetings. “All meetings of any public body are declared to be public
meetings open to the public at all times.” R.C. 121.22(C). A “public body” includes a
board of commissioners. R.C. 121.22(B)(1)(a). The term “meeting” means “any
prearranged discussion of the public business of the public body by a majority of its
members.” R.C. 121.22(B)(2). There are two types of meetings addressed by the
statute: regular and special. All meetings other than regular meetings are special
meetings. Katterhenrich v. Fed. Hocking Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 121 Ohio
App.3d 579, 587 (4th Dist.1997), citing 1988 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 88-029; see also
Jones v. Brookfield Twp. Trustees, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 92-T-4692, 1995 WL
411842, *6 (June 30, 1995) (“the term ‘special meeting’ was only intended to refer to
those meetings which were not regularly scheduled”).
{¶20} Notice. “Every public body, by rule, shall establish a reasonable method
whereby any person may determine the time and place of all regularly scheduled
meetings and the time, place, and purpose of all special meetings.” R.C. 121.22(F). “A
public body shall not hold a special meeting unless it gives at least twenty-four hours’
advance notice to the news media that have requested notification, except in the event
of an emergency requiring immediate official action. In the event of an emergency, the
member or members calling the meeting shall notify the news media that have
requested notification immediately of the time, place, and purpose of the meeting.” Id.
{¶21} Executive Session. “Except as provided in divisions (G)(8) and (J) of this
section, the members of a public body may hold an executive session only after a
majority of a quorum of the public body determines, by a roll call vote, to hold an
executive session and only at a regular or special meeting for the sole purpose of the
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consideration of any of the following matters [enumerated in (G)(1)-(8)].” R.C.
121.22(G).
{¶22} Minutes. “The minutes of a regular or special meeting of any public body
shall be promptly prepared, filed, and maintained and shall be open to public inspection.
The minutes need only reflect the general subject matter of discussions in executive
sessions authorized under division (G) or (J) of this section.” R.C. 121.22(C).
{¶23} Enforcement. “Any person may bring an action to enforce this section * * *
within two years after the date of the alleged violation or threatened violation.” R.C.
121.22(I)(1). “Upon proof of a violation or threatened violation of this section in an
action brought by any person, the court of common pleas shall issue an injunction to
compel the members of the public body to comply with its provisions.” Id.
Number of Meetings Held on November 4, 2015
{¶24} Under his first assignment of error, Mr. Ames asserts the trial court erred
by concluding that only one meeting was held on November 4, 2015:
The trial court committed reversible error by granting summary
judgment in favor [of] the Portage County Board of Commissioners
and denying summary judgment in favor of Relator Brian M. Ames
as to Counts II and IV, Failure to Keep Full and Accurate Minutes of
a Meeting, by concluding that there was a single Board of
Commissioners meeting on November 4, 2015, failing to reach the
argument that a separate set of meeting minutes was required for
each meeting for which notice was given.
{¶25} The Board cancelled all of its regular meetings scheduled for the months
of November and December 2015 in a public notice issued on October 23, 2015. That
same day, the Board issued a separate public notice of a Special Meeting to be held on
November 4, 2015. The purpose of that Special Meeting was to meet in executive
session to discuss details relative to the security arrangements and emergency
10
response protocols for a public body or a public office. On October 25, 2015, the Board
issued another public notice that it would review fiscal year 2016 budgets with elected
officials and department heads at Special Meetings to be held on November 2, 3, and 4,
2015. On November 4, 2015, this discussion was to take place at 10:00 – 10:30 a.m.
{¶26} On the afternoon of November 3, 2015, the Board’s clerk emailed a public
notice to various local media outlets of a Special Emergency Meeting to be held on
November 4, 2015, at 9:30 a.m. The Record Courier published this notice the morning
of November 4, 2015. It stated, “[t]he purpose of this Special Emergency Meeting is to
meet with the Portage Park District to discuss the Hiram Hike and Bike Trail and to
conduct Budget meetings as previously advertised.”
{¶27} On November 4, 2015, the Board convened the Special Meeting at 9:38
a.m. and discussed the Hiram Hike and Bike Trail. The emergency nature of the need
for this discussion on this date was explained in the affidavit of the Board’s clerk. At
9:52 a.m., the Board moved into executive session to discuss a personnel matter,
pursuant to R.C. 121.22(G)(1). At 10:08 a.m., the Board moved out of executive
session and began the 2016 budget discussion with certain county officials. At 11:05
a.m., the Board moved into executive session to discuss security arrangements and
emergency response protocols, pursuant to R.C. 121.22(G)(6). The Board then moved
out of executive session and recessed at 11:46 a.m. Upon reconvening at 1:16 p.m.,
they remained in public session and continued discussing the 2016 budget with other
county officials.
{¶28} The minutes from November 4, 2015, indicate the meeting was not
adjourned in between each separate discussion. Rather, the Board moved seamlessly
11
between each topic, or moved in and out of executive session, and recessed once for a
lunch break. The Board’s actions reflect an attempt to comply with the time schedule
for the separate purposes of the Special Meeting, of which they had given timely public
notice. The first topic that morning was an emergency matter, which was an additional
purpose for the Special Meeting, but it was not a separate meeting. The Board did not
adjourn at the end of the morning budget discussion. Rather, they moved into executive
session at the time noticed for doing so. The fact that the budget discussion was not
completed at that time, and the fact that it continued after a recess for lunch, does not
equate to the afternoon session being a separate meeting.
{¶29} There is no factual question remaining to be litigated on the issue of how
many meetings were held on November 4, 2015; only one meeting with multiple
purposes was held.
{¶30} Mr. Ames’ first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶31} Under his third and fourth assignments of error, Mr. Ames’ asserts the trial
court erred by not reaching the questions of whether full and accurate minutes were
kept for four separate meetings and whether proper notice was given for four separate
meetings.
[3.] The trial court committed reversible error in granting summary
judgment in favor [of] the Portage County Board of Commissioners
and denying summary judgment in favor of Relator Brian M. Ames
as to Count V, Failure to Give Notice of a Special Meeting, by
concluding that there was a single Board of Commissioners
meeting on November 4, 2015, failing to reach the argument that a
fourth meeting was held for which notice was not given[.]
[4.] The trial court committed reversible error in granting summary
judgment in favor [of] the Portage County Board of Commissioners
and denying summary judgment in favor of Relator Brian M. Ames
as to Count V by concluding that there was a single Board of
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Commissioners meeting on November 4, 2015, failing to reach the
argument that a fourth meeting was held for which full and accurate
meeting minutes were not kept[.]
{¶32} Mr. Ames’ third and fourth assignments of error are rendered moot by our
decision under his first assignment of error.
The Emergency Session
{¶33} Mr. Ames’ fifth assignment of error states:
The trial court committed reversible error in granting summary
judgment in favor [of] the Portage County Board of Commissioners
and denying summary judgment in favor of Relator Brian M. Ames
as to Count I, Holding an Emergency Meeting with No Immediate
Official Action Required, by misstating Relator’s allegation as
“Relator contends there was no real emergency,” when Ames
actually alleges “[o]n Wednesday, November 4, 2015 at 9:30am the
Board held an emergency meeting in the absence of an emergency
requiring immediate official action, thereby violating R.C. 121.22(F)”
and failing to find that no immediate official action was required for
the emergency meeting[.]
{¶34} Mr. Ames first argues the trial court erred by substituting “a fictitious
allegation for the actual allegation made” in his amended complaint.
{¶35} In Count I of his amended complaint, Mr. Ames asserted that “[o]n
Wednesday, November 4, 2015 at 9:30am the Board held an emergency meeting in the
absence of an emergency requiring immediate official action, thereby violating R.C.
121.22(F).” The trial court’s judgment entry rephrased this as a contention that “there
was no real emergency.” The trial court’s characterization of appellant’s allegation was
neither inaccurate nor fictitious. This argument is not well taken.
{¶36} Mr. Ames next asserts that the Board violated R.C. 121.22 because no
immediate official action was taken as a result of the emergency session of the Special
13
Meeting. He argues that because no official action was taken, there was no emergency
to justify the less than 24 hours’ notice given to the public.
{¶37} “A public body shall not hold a special meeting unless it gives at least
twenty-four hours’ advance notice to the news media that have requested notification,
except in the event of an emergency requiring immediate official action.” R.C.
121.22(F) (emphasis added). “The phrase ‘immediate official action’ is not defined in
the statute, and public bodies have considerable discretion to determine what
constitutes an emergency.” State ex rel. Bates v. Smith, 147 Ohio St.3d 322, 2016-
Ohio-5449, ¶14, citing Wolf v. E. Liverpool School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 7th Dist.
Columbiana No. 03 CO 5, 2004-Ohio-2479, ¶46.
{¶38} There is no dispute that the minutes from November 4, 2015, reflect the
emergency discussion regarding the Hiram Hike and Bike Trail was held from 9:38 a.m.
to 9:52 a.m. with Park District Director Chris Craycroft. Adding this topic to the agenda
on an emergency basis was reasonable given the explanation of the difficulty the Board
was going to have in getting a quorum for the remainder of the calendar year. With
regard to this topic, the minutes state, “[t]he Board agreed to ask County Engineer
Marozzi to send correspondence to AMATS withdrawing sponsorship for Phase II of the
Hiram Hike and Bike Trail.”
{¶39} We need not reach the question of whether this constitutes “official
action,” as we do not find any support for the assertion that an emergency session is
invalid under R.C. 121.22(F) where a public body decides not to take official action at
the close of the session. The decision not to take action is sometimes the best one and
certainly not contrary to the purpose and intent of the statute. There is no factual
14
question remaining to be litigated on the issue of whether an emergency existed that
required “immediate official action.”
{¶40} Mr. Ames’ fifth assignment of error is without merit.
The First Executive Session
{¶41} Under his second assignment of error, Mr. Ames asserts the trial court
erred by concluding the first executive session was proper because it was unrelated to
the purpose of the emergency session held during the Special Meeting:
The trial court committed reversible error by granting summary
judgment in favor [of] the Portage County Board of Commissioners
and denying summary judgment in favor of Relator Brian M. Ames
as to Count III, Discussing Matter Not Disclosed In Notice,
concluding that as the morning executive session had nothing to do
with and was unrelated to the purpose of the emergency meeting,
R.C. 121.22 was not violated.
{¶42} Without any legal or analytical context, the trial court held the following: “A
public body may not hold an executive session in an emergency meeting. Executive
session is only proper at a regular or special meeting. As the executive session was not
related to the emergency purpose of the November 4, 2015 meeting, it was held in
accordance with the requirements of [R.C. 121.22.]” This holding is somewhat
problematic. First, the trial court held there was no genuine issue of fact regarding how
many meetings were held on November 4, 2015: there was only one meeting, thus the
emergency session was not a separate meeting. Applying the same standard as the
trial court, we arrived at the same conclusion. Thus, the emergency session was held
at a Special Meeting for which emergency notice was given. Second, there is no law
that states a public body may not hold an executive session in an “emergency meeting”
or an emergency portion of a special meeting. The “emergency meeting” is a type of
15
special meeting. R.C. 121.22(G) states an executive session may only be held at a
regular or special meeting. This does not mean that a public body cannot hold an
executive session during a special meeting for which emergency notice was given; it
means a public body cannot hold an executive session outside of a meeting, either
regular or special. See R.C. 121.22(A) (stating the purpose of the Act is to “require
public officials to take official action and to conduct all deliberations upon official
business only in open meetings”).
{¶43} Whether the first executive session was related to the emergency session,
held during the Special Meeting, is therefore not relevant. The issue is whether the first
executive session improperly exceeded the scope of the notices issued to the public
regarding the purposes for the Special Meeting.
{¶44} [T]he use of the term ‘special meeting’ implies that such a meeting
can only be held when there are specific reasons for holding it.
Given the existence of such a reason, it follows that the notice of a
special meeting must refer to those specific reasons, and that those
specific issues are the only ones which can be addressed at such a
meeting.
Jones, supra, at *6, citing R.C. 121.22(F). The only requirements for an executive
session held during a special meeting are that (1) a majority of a quorum of the public
body must determine to hold the executive session by a roll call vote and (2) only to
consider any of the matters enumerated in (G)(1)-(8). R.C. 121.22(G).
{¶45} Here, notice was given for a special meeting, part of which included an
emergency session to discuss the Hiram Hike and Bike Trail; notice was also given for
the 2016 budget discussions; and notice was given for an afternoon executive session
“to discuss details relative to the security arrangements and emergency response
protocols for a public body or a public office.” All three of these purposes were
16
discussed. The minutes also reflect that the morning executive session was held,
pursuant to R.C. 121.22(G)(1), “to consider the appointment, employment, dismissal,
discipline, promotion, demotion, or compensation of a public employee or official, or the
investigation of charges or complaints against a public employee, official, licensee, or
regulated individual.”
{¶46} Appellant argued in the trial court that this executive session exceeded the
scope of the notices issued regarding the Special Meeting because it was “unrelated” to
the purpose of the emergency session. Appellant provided no evidence in his motion
for summary judgment from which such a conclusion could be drawn, nor did he meet
his burden, in response to the Board’s motion for summary judgment, to raise a genuine
issue of fact on this issue. The minutes reflect the Board met the statutory requirements
when it entered into executive session, and nothing more was required of the Board in
its minutes.
{¶47} Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit.
Conclusion
{¶48} The judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas granting
summary judgment in favor of the Board and against Mr. Ames is affirmed.
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., concurs,
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., concurs in judgment only.
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