[Cite as Beers v. Falkowski, 2017-Ohio-4380.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY, OHIO
THOMAS P. BEERS, : PER CURIAM OPINION
:
Relator,
: CASE NO. 2017-L-044
- vs - :
HONORABLE COLLEEN A. :
FALKOWSKI, et al.,
:
Respondents. :
Original Action for Writ of Prohibition.
Judgment: Petitions dismissed.
George K. Simakis, G.K. Simakis & Associates, 4186 Pearl Road, Cleveland, OH
44109 (For Relator).
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Eric A. Condon, Assistant
Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490,
Painesville, OH 44077 (For Respondents).
PER CURIAM.
{¶1} This matter is before this court on the March 20, 2017 application for writ
of prohibition and the May 18, 2017 amended application for writ of prohibition filed by
relator, Thomas P. Beers, against respondents, Judge Colleen A. Falkowski, Magistrate
Lynne Yohe, and Magistrate Margaret Campbell.
{¶2} Relator’s claim for relief is predicated upon the following factual
background involving a domestic relations matter: relator and Shannon Beers were
married on October 27, 2001; two children were born as issue of the marriage, B.B.
(d.o.b. June 16, 2005) and M.B. (d.o.b. October 17, 2007); Shannon filed a complaint
for divorce on August 23, 2013; relator filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce on
September 20, 2013; the cause came on for hearing for final trial on May 6, 7, and 15,
2015; the trial court adopted a final judgment entry of divorce on April 18, 2016; relator
contends the divorce decree was faulty and unclear, yet neither party filed an appeal;
Shannon filed a motion to show cause on August 11, 2016; on February 1, 2017, the
trial court scheduled a trial (hearing) for March 20, 2017 on the motion to show cause;
on the date of the hearing, relator filed his March 20, 2017 application for writ of
prohibition; the hearing went forward; and the magistrate issued a decision on April 6,
2017 finding and concluding that relator is in civil contempt, with included purge
conditions, for nonpayment of $7,435.03.
{¶3} In response to the prohibition petition, respondents filed a motion to
dismiss on April 7, 2017, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), contending that relator has failed
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On April 20, 2017, relator filed
objections to the magistrate’s decision. On May 18, 2017, relator filed a response in
opposition to respondents’ motion to dismiss and an amended application for writ of
prohibition to prevent the trial court from enforcing the magistrate’s April 6, 2017
decision.
{¶4} This court stated in State ex rel. Caszatt v. Gibson, 11th Dist. Lake No.
2012-L-107, 2013-Ohio-213, ¶15:
2
{¶5} “A writ of prohibition can only be issued where the relator establishes that:
(1) a judicial officer or court intends to exercise judicial power over a pending matter; (2)
the proposed use of that power is unauthorized under the law; and (3) the denial of the
writ will result in harm for which there is no other adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law. State ex rel. Florence v. Zitter, 106 Ohio St.3d 87, * * *, 2005-Ohio-
3804, ¶14; State ex rel. Sliwinski v. Unruh, 118 Ohio St.3d 76, * * *, 2008-Ohio-1734,
¶7. A writ of prohibition is a legal order under which a court of superior jurisdiction
enjoins a court of inferior jurisdiction from exceeding the general scope of its inherent
authority. State ex rel. Feathers v. Hayes, 11th Dist. No. 2006-P-0092, 2007-Ohio-
3852, ¶9; State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70 * * * (1998). The writ is
an extraordinary remedy which should not be issued in a routine manner. State ex rel.
The Leatherworks Partnership v. Stuard, 11th Dist. No. 2002-T-0017, 2002-Ohio-6477,
¶15.” (Parallel citations omitted.)
{¶6} In this case, relator alleges that respondents were about to exercise, and
did exercise, jurisdiction in the underlying action by holding the March 20, 2017 hearing.
As a result, relator’s allegation is legally sufficient to satisfy the first element of a
prohibition claim. Caszatt, supra, at ¶15; Leatherworks, supra, at ¶16. Accordingly, the
outcome of our analysis as to the sufficiency of relator’s request for prohibition will turn
upon whether his allegation can satisfy the second and third elements of such a claim.
{¶7} “[T]he initial issue which must be addressed in regard to the second and
third elements is whether the alleged jurisdictional defect is patent and unambiguous. *
* * [I]f there are no set of facts under which a trial court or judge could have jurisdiction
over a particular case, the alleged jurisdictional defect will always be considered patent
and unambiguous. On the other hand, if the court or judge generally has subject matter
3
jurisdiction over the type of case in question and his authority to hear that specific action
will depend on the specific facts before him, the jurisdictional defect is not obvious and
the court/judge should be allowed to decide the jurisdictional issue.” Leatherworks,
supra, at ¶19.
{¶8} We note that respondents, as sitting members of a county common pleas
court, generally have subject matter jurisdiction to hear and rule on a case such as the
instant. The alleged jurisdictional defect in this action, as asserted by relator in his
petitions, is not patent and unambiguous.
{¶9} However, since the March 20, 2017 hearing went forward and a
magistrate’s decision was rendered, if respondents made an improper decision, relator
has an adequate remedy at law because he can file an appeal from a final judgment of
the trial court. See, e.g., Leatherworks, supra, at ¶14. Thus, because an adequate
legal remedy exists, relator fails to establish that he is entitled to a writ of prohibition.
{¶10} Accordingly, it is the order of this court that respondents’ motion to dismiss
is granted. Relator’s prohibition petition and amended petition are hereby dismissed.
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, P.J., TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J., COLLEEN MARY
O’TOOLE, J., concur.
4