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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
KENNETH ALLEN
Appellant No. 2589 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 13, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0007335-2015
BEFORE: MOULTON, J., RANSOM, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED JUNE 19, 2017
Kenneth Allen appeals from the July 13, 2016 judgment of sentence
entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas following his
conviction for retail theft.1 Allen’s appellate counsel has filed an Anders2
brief and a petition to withdraw from representation. We affirm and grant
counsel’s petition to withdraw.
This case stems from a November 29, 2015 retail theft. At trial,
Anthony Sapp testified that at the time of the offense he was working as a
loss prevention officer for Burlington Coat Factory in Upper Darby. N.T.,
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 3929(a)(1).
2
Anders v. California 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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5/19/16, at 22-23. Sapp testified that at approximately 2:00 p.m. on
November 29, 2015, he observed Allen walk into the store and place four
watches, a bottle of fragrance, and a bottle of cologne into a shopping cart.
Id. at 24-27. Sapp then saw Allen ride the elevator to the ground floor. Id.
at 27-28. Sapp used the escalator to follow Allen downstairs and “to give
him customer service.” Id. at 28. Sapp stated that when he arrived at the
ground floor, he located Allen in a fitting room. Id. at 28-29. Sapp asked
Allen if he needed help, to which Allen responded “no.” Id. at 49-50. Sapp
observed Allen exit the fitting room empty-handed and take the escalator
upstairs. Id. at 30-31. Sapp then observed empty watch boxes and
perfume cases inside the fitting room. Id. at 31.
Sapp testified that he watched Allen walk past the registers and
approach the front entrance to the store. Id. at 33. Before Allen passed the
front door, Sapp approached him and asked if he knew anything about the
empty boxes in the fitting room. Id. at 33-34. Allen responded that he did
not want any trouble, and Sapp took him into the loss prevention office. Id.
at 34, 52. When Sapp asked Allen to return any store merchandise he had
on his person, Allen removed three watches from the inside of his pants. Id.
at 34-35. Sapp contacted the Upper Darby Police Department and, within
five minutes, Officer James Fiore arrived. Id. at 36.
Officer Fiore testified that when he arrived at the loss prevention
office, he spoke with Allen and conducted a pat-down of Allen’s person,
which revealed other items in Allen’s pants, as well as another watch on
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Allen’s wrist. Id. at 65-67.
On cross-examination, Sapp explained that he had made a compact
disc (“CD”) of the surveillance video but that another loss prevention officer
accidentally discarded it. Id. at 55, 58. Sapp further explained that he
could not make an additional CD because the server deletes the recording
after 60 days and he did not learn that the CD had been discarded until after
the 60 day period. Id. at 56-57.
On May 19, 2016, a jury convicted Allen of retail theft. On July 13,
2016, the trial court sentenced Allen to 16 to 32 months’ incarceration,
followed by three years’ probation. Allen did not file a post-sentence
motion. On August 11, 2016, Allen filed a timely notice of appeal.
Because counsel has filed a petition to withdraw pursuant to Anders
and its Pennsylvania counterpart, Santiago,3 we must address counsel’s
petition before reviewing the merits of Allen’s underlying claims.
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa.Super. 2007). We
first address whether counsel’s petition to withdraw satisfies the procedural
requirements of Anders. To be permitted to withdraw, counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that,
after making a conscientious examination of the record,
counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous;
2) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant; and 3)
advise the defendant that he or she has the right to retain
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3
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
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private counsel or raise additional arguments that the
defendant deems worthy of the court’s attention.
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en
banc).
Here, appellate counsel has stated that after a conscientious
examination of the record, he “found no issues to raise in this appeal and he
believes this appeal to be wholly frivolous.” App. to Withdraw, 11/3/16, at
1. Appellate counsel furnished a copy of the Anders brief to Allen, as well
as a letter advising him that “[i]f you have any issues that you wish to bring
to the Court’s attention, you must do it now. You may submit your own
brief o[r] hire another attorney to do it for you.” Ltr. to Allen, 11/30/16.
We conclude that counsel’s petition to withdraw has complied with the
procedural dictates of Anders.
We next address whether counsel’s Anders brief meets the
requirements established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago.
The brief must:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the
record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding
that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the
relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or
statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the
appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
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Here, appellate counsel has provided a summary of the procedural
history and the facts with appropriate citations to the record. Anders Br. at
4-6. Counsel’s brief states that he conducted a thorough review of the
record and determined that any appeal would be frivolous, and set forth his
reasons for that conclusion. Id. at 8-9. Accordingly, appellate counsel has
substantially complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago.
Allen has not filed a pro se brief or a counseled brief with new,
privately-retained counsel. We, therefore, review the issue raised in the
Anders brief.
Allen raises the following issue: “Did the Commonwealth fail to prove
[Allen] guilty of the offense of Retail Theft because it failed to produce video
footage showing him committing the offense when Defense [sic] witness
Anthony Sapp testified it had been ‘preserved’ at the preliminary hearing in
this case?” Anders Br. at 3.
Counsel’s issue presented and the brief’s argument section appear to
commingle two separate arguments: (1) the evidence was insufficient to
convict Allen because of the Commonwealth’s failure to produce the video;
and (2) the destruction of the video violated his due process rights.
First, Allen contends that, without the surveillance video, the evidence
was insufficient to support his conviction.
We apply the following standard when reviewing a sufficiency of the
evidence claim:
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[W]hether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the
light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is
sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless
the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain
its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Best, 120 A.3d 329, 341 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Harden, 103 A.3d 107, 111 (Pa.Super. 2014)) (some
alterations in original).
We conclude that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for
the jury to find every element of retail theft beyond a reasonable doubt.
Sapp testified that he observed Allen remove the watches and the fragrance
and cologne bottles from the shelves and take them into the fitting room.
Sapp further testified that when Allen left the fitting room, Sapp saw empty
boxes inside. As Allen walked toward the front door, Sapp stopped him and
took him to the loss prevention office where Allen removed stolen
merchandise from his person. Officer Fiore also testified that when he
arrived, he found more stolen items on Allen. This evidence was sufficient,
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and the absence of a surveillance video does not alter this conclusion. See
Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571, 576-77 (Pa.Super. 2003) (holding
evidence of retail theft sufficient without video); Commonwealth v.
Steward, 762 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa.Super. 2000) (holding video of theft was
not “crucial evidence” when security officer “observe[d] appellant’s action
contemporaneously with the crime”).
Second, Allen claims a violation of his due process rights because the
Commonwealth failed to preserve the surveillance video.4 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has explained that there are two categories of
“constitutionally guaranteed access [to evidence]: evidence that is
exculpatory and material, and evidence that is potentially useful.”
Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 30 A.3d 381, 402 (Pa. 2011).
The first category implicates a Brady/Agurs5 claim, which entitles
“defendants [to] access . . . certain kinds of evidence prior to trial, so they
may ‘be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’”
Chamberlain, 30 A.3d at 402 (quoting Commonwealth v. Snyder, 963
A.2d 396, 401 (Pa. 2009)). “This guarantee of access to evidence requires
the prosecution to turn over, if requested, any evidence which is exculpatory
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4
We note that nothing in the certified record suggests that the
Commonwealth was ever in possession of the video.
5
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97 (1976).
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and material to guilt or punishment, and to turn over exculpatory evidence
which might raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt, even if the
defense fails to request it.” Id. (internal citations omitted). In this
situation, a defendant need not show bad faith. Id.
The second category “involves evidence that is not materially
exculpatory, but is potentially useful, that is destroyed by the state before
the defense has an opportunity to examine it.” Id. “When the state fails to
preserve evidence that is ‘potentially useful,’ there is no federal due process
violation ‘unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the
police.’” Id. (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)).
“Potentially useful evidence is that of which ‘no more can be said than that it
could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have
exonerated the defendant.’” Id. (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57).
We “must first determine whether the missing evidence is materially
exculpatory or potentially useful.” Id. Because Allen does not claim that
the surveillance video had exculpatory value, and based on the evidence
presented, we have no reason to believe it would be materially exculpatory,
we focus on the second category – that is, whether the Commonwealth
withheld potentially useful information and acted in bad faith.
Even assuming that the video might have been useful, Allen has not
established that the Commonwealth destroyed the evidence in bad faith.
First, nothing in the certified record suggests that the Commonwealth was
ever in possession of the video. Second, the relevant testimony at trial
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would not support a finding of bad faith on anyone’s part. During trial, Sapp
testified about the loss of the video:
[COMMONWEALTH]: Do you know how the CD was -- the
DVD was discarded, how it was thrown out? What were
the circumstances?
[SAPP]: We had a prior visit maybe not too long ago by
our regional manager. So we were doing like some
cleaning in the office just to make sure it looked squared
away by the time the visit came. And then I guess one of
the [loss prevention officers] just threw it away.
...
[COMMONWEALTH]: So at the time you suspect it was
discarded there were other people in loss prevention
capacity?
[SAPP]: Yes.
[COMMONWEALTH]: How many others?
[SAPP]: There’s two others.
[COMMONWEALTH]: And did you approach them and ask
them if they were aware of [sic] this DVD was thrown out?
[SAPP]: Yes.
[COMMONWEALTH]: And did they recall the event?
[SAPP]: Yes.
[COMMONWEALTH]: Did you have any prior knowledge of
[Allen], did you know him?
[SAPP]: No.
[COMMONWEALTH]: Do you have any reason to try to
abscond or try to conceal the evidence in this case?
[SAPP]: No.
[COMMONWEALTH]: Did you -- after finding out that the
DVD was discarded did you attempt to go back to the hard
drive to retrieve the information a second time?
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[SAPP]: Yes. I went to the server that it should have
been on and it was already too late to record again.
[COMMONWEALTH]: And by saying too late what had
transpired?
[SAPP]: It was -- like I said it was 60 days that it should
have been recorded but it wasn’t. It’s 60 days that you
have until it gets deleted.
[COMMONWEALTH]: So you’re confident you didn’t have
access to that tape any further?
[SAPP]: Correct.
[COMMONWEALTH]: Or that information, I should say.
[SAPP]: Correct.
N.T., 5/19/16, at 58-59. Sapp’s uncontradicted testimony establishes the
tape was not destroyed in bad faith.6
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6
We further note that the trial court instructed the jury on the missing
evidence:
THE COURT: . . . There’s been a discussion about the
DVD that was not produced in this case. There’s a
question of what weigh [sic] if any you should give to the
failure of Burlington Coat Factory to produce the DVD in
question. If three factors are present and there is no
satisfactory explanation for a party failure to produce an
item the jury is allowed to draw a common sense inference
that the evidence would have been unfavorable to that
party. The three necessary factors are, first, that the item
is available to that party and not for the others. Second, it
appears that the item contains or shows special
information material to the issue. And third, the item
would not be merely cumulative evidence. Let me talk to
counsel at sidebar at this point.
...
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, with respect to the
missing item I want to talk one further -- add something
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Thus, we conclude that Allen has failed to establish that the video was
potentially useful and that the Commonwealth acted in bad faith.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition for leave to withdraw as
counsel granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/19/2017
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
further to that. That is if you find the three factors are
present and there is no satisfactory explanation for
Burlington/Commonwealth failure to produce the item you
may infer, if you chose to do so, that would have been
evidence unfavorable to Burlington/Commonwealth in this
matter.
N.T., 5/19/16, at 96-98.
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