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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHING-
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KIRK WILLIAMS, )
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) No. 73766-0-1 32. (nr•n
Appellant, )
) DIVISION ONE 9 c,v)
v. ) .=.4-
4X11
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)
CLAUDIA BALDUCCI, DIRECTOR, KING ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
COUNTY DEPT. OF ADULT & JUVENILE )
DETENTION FACILITY; BENJAMIN )
SANDERS, KING COUNTY MEDICAL )
DIRECTOR, MANAGER, SUPT, SUED IN )
THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL )
CAPACITY, )
)
Respondents. ) FILED: June 19;2017
)
SPEARMAN, J. — Kirk Williams sued employees of the King County
Correctional Facility (the jail) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging they were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. But Williams made no
showing that the defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his
health and safety or that they made any intentional decisions regarding the
conditions of his confinement at the jail. Accordingly, the trial court properly
dismissed his claims on summary judgment. We affirm.
FACTS
Williams sued Dr. Benjamin Sanders and Claudia Balducci, alleging they
violated his constitutional right to adequate medical care while he was a pretrial
No. 73766-0-1/2
detainee in the jail from June 2010 until September 2011. Williams claimed that
as a result of the defendants' negligence, he contracted tuberculosis in the jail
from "illegal immigrants" who "were not properly screened"for communicable
diseases. Clerk's Papers(CP)at 2. Williams tested positive for tuberculosis when
he was later transferred to prison.
Dr. Sanders is the Medical Director of Jail Health Services at the jail, and
Balducci was director of the Department of Adult and Juvenile Detention.
Williams does not allege that he had any interaction with either defendant.
Williams attached supporting declarations to his complaint from two fellow
inmates. David James stated that he was exposed to tuberculosis while housed
in the jail from 1994 to 1995. Jason Boothby stated that he was booked into the
jail on January 27, 2011, and was housed in the cell next to Williams. Boothby
claimed he told a medical nurse he had tuberculosis but was never tested.
Boothby concluded that he "could [have]spread tuberculosis to Mr. Williams." CP
at 18.
On May 29, 2015, Dr. Sanders and Balducci moved for summary
judgment, arguing there was no evidence they knew of or disregarded a serious
risk to Williams' health. They also maintained they were entitled to qualified
immunity.
In his supporting declaration, Dr. Sanders stated that he reviewed
Williams' health records for the period of his incarceration in the jail from June
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No. 73766-0-1/3
12, 2010 to September 13, 2011. He did not personally examine or treat
Williams, although he did participate in Williams' diabetes diagnosis.
According to Dr. Sanders, inmates booked into the jail are given a
tuberculosis skin test if they are foreign-born. But all inmates are offered a
tuberculosis skin test during the health assessment, which occurs within 14 days
of booking, and any inmate can receive a skin test on request.
Williams' receiving screening form noted that there were no indications or
risk factors requiring a tuberculosis skin test, and Williams did not request a test
at the 14-day health assessment. Nor was there any record that Williams ever
submitted a kite requesting a skin test or expressing concerns about the
conditions in the jail or the quality of his medical care.
Dr. Sanders acknowledged that the Department of Corrections(DOC)
tests all incoming inmates for tuberculosis. He noted, however, that the longer
period of incarceration for DOC inmates generally permits the treatment for latent
tuberculosis, which takes six to nine months, to be successfully completed. Dr.
Sanders explained that the majority of pretrial detainees spend a shorter time in
the jail and that it would be inappropriate to start the treatment for latent
tuberculosis if it cannot be completed. Had Williams shown symptoms of active
tuberculosis while in jail, he would have been isolated in a specialized cell for
diagnosis and treatment.
Based upon his review, Dr. Sanders concluded that the jail medical staff
followed all applicable protocols for Williams' medical care while in jail.
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No. 73766-0-1/4
The fact that Mr. Williams, an inmate who had no risk factors for
tuberculosis and never requested a tuberculosis skin test, was not
given a tuberculosis skin test met the appropriate standard of care
and did not result in a disregard or indifference to his medical
needs.
CP at 114.
In her affidavit, Balducci stated that she had never provided any medical
treatment to Williams or participated in any medical or housing decision. Balducci
noted that contrary to Williams' assertion, jail records showed he had never been
housed on the ninth floor of the jail.
The trial court denied summary judgment, and Dr. Sanders and Balducci
moved for reconsideration. After considering all of the materials, including the
additional evidence that Williams submitted, the trial court granted the motion
and entered summary judgment in favor of Dr. Sanders and Balducci. The court
concluded that Williams failed to present any evidence to support an inference
that the defendants knew of a serious risk of harm and were deliberately
indifferent to that risk.
Williams appeals.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court
undertakes the same inquiry as the trial court. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d
434,437,656 P.2d 1030(1982). We consider the evidence and all reasonable
inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
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No. 73766-0-1/5
Christensen v. Grant County Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 152 Wn.2d 299, 305, 96 P.3d 957
(2004). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c); Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d
358, 370, 357 P.3d 1080(2015).
The moving party can satisfy its initial burden under CR 56 by
demonstrating the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.
Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225 n.1, 770 P.2d 182(1989). The
burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts
demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Kendall v. Douglas, Grant, Lincoln &
Okanogan Counties Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 6, 118 Wn.2d 1, 8-9, 820 P.2d 497
(1991). To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the
nonmoving party may not rely on the allegations in the pleadings,
but must set forth specific facts by affidavit or otherwise that show a
genuine issue exists. Additionally, any such affidavit must be based
on personal knowledge admissible at trial and not merely on
conclusory allegations, speculative statements or argumentative
assertions.
Las v. Yellow Front Stores, Inc., 66 Wn. App. 196, 198, 831 P.2d 744(1992)
(citation omitted).
In order to maintain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983, Williams
must show, among other things, that(1)the defendants violated a federal
constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the defendants acted under color of state
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No. 73766-0-1/6
law. See Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wn.2d 1, 11, 829 P.2d 765(1992)
(citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S. Ct. 1908,68 L. Ed.2d 420
(1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.
Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662(1986)). Williams asserts that Dr. Sanders and Balducci
were deliberately indifferent to his risk of serious harm and therefore violated his
rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs violates the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v.
Gamble 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). To establish
an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Estelle 429
U.S. at 106. An inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care does not
violate the Eighth Amendment. Estelle 429 U.S. at 105-06.
Because the Eighth Amendment applies only after conviction, courts have
generally applied a similar deliberate indifference standard under the Fourteenth
Amendment to analogous claims by pretrial detainees. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 535, 998. Ct. 1861,60 L. Ed. 2d 447(1979). A jail official acts with
deliberate indifference only if he or she "knows of and disregards an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S. Ct.
1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994). Under this subjective standard, the official must
not only "be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists," but"must also draw the inference." Id.
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No. 73766-0-1/7
Relying on a United States Supreme Court decision, the Ninth Circuit has
recently adopted a more objective approach to the elements of a pretrial
detainee's Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claim.
(1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the
conditions under which the plaintiff was confined;
(2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering
serious harm;
(3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to
abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the
circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk
involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct
obvious; and
(4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the
plaintiffs injuries.
Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 831, 197 L. Ed. 2d 67(2017)(applying an objective standard
under the Fourteenth Amendment to a failure to protect claim arising from an
inmate beating); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, U.S. ,135 S. Ct. 2466,
2470, 192 L. Ed. 2d 416(2015)(applying objective standard to a pretrial
detainee's claim for excessive force).
Williams fails to establish a triable issue under either standard.
Dr. Sanders never examined or treated Williams while he was
incarcerated in the jail. Williams' medical records revealed no indications or risk
factors suggesting the need to perform a tuberculosis skin test. Nor did he exhibit
any signs of active tuberculosis. Williams never complained about the quality of
his medical care or expressed concerns about the health or condition of other
inmates in the jail.
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No. 73766-0-1/8
Balducci had no contact with Williams while he was at the jail and did not
participate in any medical or housing decisions involving Williams. Nothing in the
record suggests that either Dr. Sanders or Balducci made any intentional
decisions regarding the conditions of Williams' confinement or that they directed
or supervised any subordinates who may have violated Williams' constitutional
rights.
The declarations that Williams submitted provided no support for his
conclusory allegations of deliberate indifference. David James stated that he was
exposed to tuberculosis while housed in the jail. But James was in the jail more
than 15 years before Williams and long before either Dr. Sanders or Balducci
began working at the jail. Jason Boothby speculated he might have been the
source of Williams' tuberculosis while he was housed at the jail in 2011 and
claimed he was never tested. But Boothby provided no details about any risk
factors or symptoms that would have prompted testing. Nor did he identify any
contact with Dr. Sanders or Balducci or suggest they had any involvement with
his medical treatment or housing location.
In response to the defendants' motion for reconsideration, Williams
submitted two declarations from inmates Fausto Filio and Alberto Soliz, who had
been incarcerated in the jail during 2010 and 2011. Both inmates stated they
were never tested for tuberculosis, even though they were foreign born. But
neither inmate claimed he had tuberculosis. Nor did either inmate refer to Dr.
Sanders or Balducci or allege having any interaction with them.
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No. 73766-0-1/9
Viewed in the light most favorable to Williams, the materials before the
trial court failed to support the slightest inference that Dr. Sanders or Balducci
knew of and disregarded a risk to Williams' health and safety or that they made
any intentional decision regarding the conditions under which he was confined.
The court properly entered summary judgment.1
Williams has appended various materials to his opening brief that were not
part of the record before the trial court. We therefore decline to consider them.
See RAP 9.12 (appellate review of an order granting summary judgment is
limited to those materials properly before the trial court); see also RAP 10.3(8)
(appendix to appellate brief may not contain materials not in the record on review
without permission for the appellate court). Contrary to Williams' assertions in his
reply brief, the materials do not satisfy the strict criteria for additional evidence on
review under RAP 9.11.
Affirmed.
Sif,t/
WE CONCUR:
41
144i &SILiv
1 Because the trial court properly entered summary judgment on Williams'
deliberate indifference claim, we need not address whether Dr. Sanders and Balducci
were also entitled to qualified immunity.
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