16‐2779‐cv
Palmer‐Williams. v. United States
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
the City of New York, on the 21st day of June, two thousand seventeen.
PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER,
GUIDO CALABRESI,
DENNY CHIN,
Circuit Judges.
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ZELMA PALMER‐WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v. 16‐2779‐cv
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant‐Appellee.
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FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT: Merryl F. Weiner, Meagher & Meagher, P.C.,
White Plains, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLEE: Arastu K. Chaudhury, Christopher Connolly,
Assistant United States Attorneys, for Joon H.
Kim, Acting United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, New York,
New York.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Seibel, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff‐appellant Zelma Palmer‐Williams appeals a June 27, 2016
judgment of the district court, granting the Governmentʹs motion to dismiss her
complaint. The judgment was entered pursuant to an oral decision issued from the
bench on June 24, 2016 and a written order of dismissal was entered the same date. We
assume the partiesʹ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues
on appeal.
The facts are summarized in this Courtʹs January 30, 2017 summary order
in a related prior action. See Palmer‐Williams v. United States, No. 16‐812, 2017 WL
397908 (2d Cir. Jan. 30, 2017) (ʺPalmer‐Williams Iʺ). Palmer‐Williams filed an
administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act with the Department of Health
and Human Services (ʺHHSʺ) on April 8, 2014, alleging that she received improper
medical care from a federal healthcare facility. In a letter dated May 15, 2014, HHS
denied Palmer‐Williamsʹ administrative claim for failure to state a ʺsum certainʺ for
damages and advised her that under applicable statutes and regulations she had six
months to request that HHS reconsider her claim or, if she chose not to request such
reconsideration, to file an action in district court. On November 20, 2014, more than six
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months after the denial of her administrative claim, Palmer‐Williams filed a complaint
in district court. On November 24, 2014, she also requested that HHS reconsider her
administrative claim.1
On December 2, 2014, HHS sent Palmer‐Williams a letter acknowledging
her request for reconsideration and soliciting ʺsubstantiating evidenceʺ for her claim. In
response, Palmer‐Williams submitted various medical records and documents to HHS
on January 30, 2015. On March 4, 2015, HHS sent a final rejection letter to Palmer‐
Williams, deeming her request for reconsideration untimely, and informing her that she
had six months to challenge HHSʹ determination in district court.
Palmer‐Williams filed the complaint in this case on May 8, 2015, asserting
claims identical to those of Palmer‐Williams I, but recasting her November 24, 2014
request for reconsideration as her initial administrative claim. On August 24, 2015, the
district court stayed the instant case pending a decision on dispositive motions filed in
Palmer‐Williams I. Those motions were granted in favor of the Government on February
18, 2016, on grounds that Palmer‐Williamsʹ complaint and request for reconsideration
were untimely.
1 Although Palmer‐Williams presented the request for reconsideration to HHS by
a letter dated November 10, 2014, the district court found that HHS did not receive the letter
until November 24, 2014, and HHSʹs receipt is the relevant event for statute of limitations
purposes. See Mora v. United States, 955 F.2d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 1992) (ʺA tort claim must be
presented to the appropriate federal agency . . . [and] [p]ursuant to Department of Justice
regulations, a claim [is] deemed to have been presented when a Federal agency receives
[written notification] from a claimant.ʺ (emphasis added and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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On April 21, 2016, the Government moved to dismiss the complaint in the
instant case on grounds that the claims were precluded by the final judgment in Palmer‐
Williams I. On June 24, 2016, the district court concluded that Palmer‐Williamsʹ claims
were precluded and granted the Governmentʹs motion to dismiss. Palmer‐Williams
timely appealed.
On appeal, Palmer‐Williams argues that the district court erred in
granting the Governmentʹs motion to dismiss in the instant case on grounds of claim
preclusion because (1) the judgment in Palmer‐Williams I was not final while it was
pending appeal, (2) the judgment in Palmer Williams I was not an adjudication on the
merits because the district court did not adequately address certain correspondence
between Palmer‐Williams and HHS, and (3) the policy rationales underlying the
doctrine of claim preclusion are not served by dismissing her claims in this case.
We review de novo a district courtʹs dismissal of a complaint for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lanier v. Bats Exch., Inc.,
838 F.3d 139, 150 (2d Cir. 2016). We assume that the factual allegations of the complaint
are true, and taken together they must state a plausible claim for relief to survive a
motion to dismiss. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569‐70 (2007). A motion to
dismiss may be granted on grounds of claim preclusion when ʺit is clear from the face
of the complaint, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice, that the
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plaintiffʹs claims are barred as a matter of law.ʺ Conopco, Inc. v. Roll Intʹl, 231 F.3d 82, 86
(2d Cir. 2000).
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion ʺa final judgment forecloses
ʹsuccessive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim
raises the same issues as the earlier suit.ʹʺ Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008)
(quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)). The party raising a claim
preclusion defense must show that, ʺ(1) the previous action involved [a final]
adjudication on the merits; (2) the previous action involved the plaintiffs or those in
privity with them; (3) the claims asserted in the subsequent action were, or could have
been, raised in the prior action.ʺ Monahan v. N.Y.C. Depʹt of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 285 (2d
Cir. 2000). ʺ[T]he first judgment will preclude a second suit only when it involves the
same ʹtransactionʹ or connected series of transactions as the earlier suit.ʺ Legnani v.
Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 400 F.3d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Maharaj v.
Bankamerica Corp., 128 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir.1997)).
Palmer‐Williams avers that the judgment in Palmer‐Williams I was not
entitled to preclusive effect while an appeal was pending and therefore her complaint in
this case should not have been dismissed. The argument fails for the law is well‐settled
that the preclusive effect of a judgment is immediate, notwithstanding a pending
appeal. Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (2015) (ʺ[A] judgmentʹs preclusive
effect is generally immediate, notwithstanding any appeal.ʺ); accord Patrella v. Siegel, 843
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F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1988) (judgment pending appeal entitled to preclusive effect); 18A
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4433 (2002) (ʺThe bare act
of taking an appeal is no more effective to defeat preclusion than a failure to appeal.ʺ).
Besides, we affirmed the judgment of the district court in Palmer‐Williams I, eliminating
any doubt as to finality. See Palmer‐Williams, 2017 WL 397908. The argument that the
judgment in Palmer‐Williams I was not an adjudication on the merits fares no better. As
noted above, the district court dismissed the claims in Palmer‐Williams I as untimely,
and the ʺlongstanding rule in this Circuit . . . is that a dismissal for failure to comply
with the statute of limitations will operate as an adjudication on the merits.ʺ PRC
Harris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 896 (2d Cir. 1983). Moreover, as to equitable
tolling, it was incumbent upon Palmer‐Williams to raise all of her arguments on that
issue with the district court in her first case. The arguments she presents here could
have, and should have, been raised in the first case, and they were not. Lastly, Palmer‐
Williamsʹ ʺpolicyʺ arguments against applying the doctrine of claim preclusion offer us
no reason to disturb the judgment in this case.
We have reviewed Palmer‐Williamsʹ remaining arguments and conclude
they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine OʹHagan Wolfe, Clerk
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