IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1695
Filed June 21, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTHONY ALBERT TRONCA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Todd A. Geer,
Judge.
Defendant appeals his conviction for murder in the first degree.
AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Heard by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.
Anthony Tronca appeals his conviction for murder in the first degree. We
find the district court did not err in denying Tronca’s motion to suppress. Also,
Tronca has not shown the police department lacked reasonable standardized
procedures for the impoundment of the car and the impoundment was for the
purpose of investigating criminal activity, so the impoundment is not
unconstitutional. Additionally, Tronca has not shown he received ineffective
assistance due to defense counsel’s failure to raise a claim under the Iowa
Constitution there had been an improper pretextual stop. We preserve for
possible postconviction proceedings Tronca’s claim of ineffective assistance due
to the failure to challenge the seizure of his business building. We affirm
Tronca’s conviction for first-degree murder.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
On September 9, 2014, Waterloo police officers received a missing person
report for Ronald Randall. The officers were aware Randall was friends with
Curtis Radamacher and Radamacher was often present at AJT Auto, an auto
body shop owned by Tronca. There was also information methamphetamine
was being distributed from the business and Tronca owned firearms.
Additionally, officers received information Randall was last seen at AJT Auto and
there had been a shooting at the business.
Officers went to AJT Auto in an attempt to locate Radamacher. In addition
to wanting to talk to Radamacher about the missing person case, there was a
warrant for Radamacher’s arrest for probation violations. Tronca came to the
door and told the officers he did not know Radamacher. The officers said they
3
were not concerned about what was going on at the business, “so anything
beyond a dead body, we’re not concerned about.” Tronca responded, “[T]hat’s
why I’m not going to let you in here.” The officers left without contacting
Radamacher.
On September 11, 2014, Elvis Medrano, who was cooperating with the
police, told Officer Jeffrey Zubak that Radamacher would be present at a specific
address. Officers set up surveillance at the home. They observed Radamacher
and Tronca come out of the house. Tronca put a dark-colored bag into the trunk
of an Oldsmobile Alero, and then he drove away in the vehicle with Radamacher
as a passenger.
The officers decided to stop the vehicle, knowing there was an arrest
warrant for Radamacher. A marked police car behind the Alero activated its
lights, but the Alero did not stop right away. Officer Joseph Saunders saw
movement in the vehicle and thought the occupants were “possibly trying to hide
something.” When the vehicle was stopped, Radamacher had a backpack
between his feet, which he threw into the backseat. Radamacher was not
compliant with officers’ requests and was arrested for probation violations and
interference with official acts. He was transported to the police station.1
The officers determined the Alero was registered to Tronca’s wife, Jennifer
Tronca. The officers discovered Tronca’s driver’s license had been suspended,
and he was arrested for driving while license suspended. Tronca was also
transported to the police station. He did not ask for anyone else to pick up the
1
At the police station, Radamacher stated he did not feel well because he had
swallowed methamphetamine. He was given medical assistance.
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Alero. Officer Jeffrey Tyler determined the vehicle should be towed to the
impound lot. He stated this was based partially on the traffic stop, but also
because officers wanted to look further into the missing person case. Officer
Tyler stated there was no one to drive the vehicle from the scene because both
the driver and passenger had been arrested.
A police dog sniffed around the vehicle at the impound lot and alerted to
narcotics. Officers obtained a search warrant for the vehicle. They found
methamphetamine, a .380 Lorcin handgun, and ammunition for a .45 firearm.2
Radamacher later told officers he, Tronca, and Randall had been smoking
methamphetamine on September 2, 2014, in a room at AJT Auto used to paint
vehicles, when Tronca asked Randall if Randall had sex with Tronca’s girlfriend,
Jessica Ogden. Tronca did not wait for a response before Tronca shot Randall
three to five times. Valerie Vandervort was present in the building and heard the
shots. Radamacher told her Tronca shot Randall. Tronca told Ogden what he
had done. Radamacher and Ogden helped Tronca remove the body, cover it
with plastic, and dump it in a remote location. Tronca had the paint room at AJT
Auto repainted. He told an employee of AJT Auto, Jeremiah Griggs, he shot
Randall. Radamacher showed officers the place where the body was hidden.
Tronca was charged with first-degree murder, in violation of Iowa Code
section 707.2 (2014). He filed a motion to suppress, claiming the vehicle should
not have been impounded because there was no issue of officer safety or
evidence preservation related to the charge he was driving while his license was
2
Randall was shot in the head with a .380 Lorcin and shot in the torso with a .45
Ruger. A .45 Ruger handgun was found in Tronca’s office.
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suspended. At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor stated he believed the
issue was “the delay actually doing the search and getting the search warrant as
far as the impoundment or seizure of the vehicle shouldn’t have happened,” and
defense counsel agreed.
The district court denied the motion to suppress. The court found:
Both occupants of the vehicle had been placed under arrest and
were transported to the Waterloo Police Department for processing.
There was no licensed driver remaining at the scene to remove the
vehicle from the roadway. In addition, Officers had the backdrop of
the foregoing facts to establish not only reasonable suspicion but
probable cause that the vehicle contained contraband. The facts
and circumstances outlined above would lead a reasonably prudent
person to believe that the vehicle contained contraband. It was
reasonable and, in fact, prudent for officers to secure the vehicle
while a search warrant was obtained. . . . The seizure of the
vehicle was constitutionally permissible.
A jury found Tronca guilty of murder in the first degree. He was sentenced
to life in prison. Tronca now appeals his conviction.
II. Search and Seizure
A. Tronca claims the district court should have granted his motion to
suppress. He states the impoundment of the Alero was not reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the
Iowa Constitution. He claims the Waterloo Police Department did not have
reasonable standardized procedures for the impoundment of vehicles and the car
was solely impounded for the purpose of investigating criminal activity.
In general, “a search of private property without valid consent is
unreasonable unless it has been authorized by a warrant issued upon probable
cause.” State v. Huisman, 544 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Iowa 1996). A vehicle
inventory search is recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement. Id.
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The legality of a vehicle inventory search is dependent upon (1) the validity of the
impoundment, and (2) the scope of the inventory. Id. Because the officers
obtained a search warrant after impounding the Alero, this case concerns only
the first element—the validity of the impoundment.
“An impoundment is proper if it is reasonable.” Id. In determining the
reasonableness of impoundment, “we look for the existence of reasonable
standardized procedures and a purpose other than the investigation of criminal
activity.” Id. at 437. We do not “second-guess[ ] a police officer’s exercise of
professional judgment regarding impoundment of an automobile when the
judgment was exercised in accordance with otherwise reasonable police
department regulations.” Id. (citation omitted). It is not necessary for there to be
a written standardized policy. Id. The policy should “contain reasonable
standardized criteria limiting an officer’s discretion to impound a vehicle.” Id. at
438. The standardized policies should not give officers unlimited discretion to
conduct searches. Id.
As noted, “an impoundment is unconstitutional if it is done to investigate
suspected criminal activity.” Id. at 439. “[A]n investigatory purpose invalidates
an inventory search only if the search is conducted for the sole purpose of
investigation.” Id. “To decide whether the officers were motivated solely by an
investigatory purpose, we examine whether, when viewed objectively, an
administrative reason for the impoundment existed.” Id. “If the officers could
have had a caretaking reason to impound the car, then we assume they did not
act solely to investigate criminal activity. We do not analyze the subjective
motivations of the officers.” Id. at 439-40.
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At the suppress hearing, Officer Saunders testified:
Q. And are vehicles at certain times towed when there’s not
a valid driver to take a vehicle from the scene if no one requests
otherwise? A. Yes.
Q. And would that be a standard procedure with the
Waterloo Police Department? A. Yes.
Q. And it’s not always done, but without a valid driver to take
that, is towing the vehicle an option that you have with the Waterloo
Police Department? A. It could be, yes.
We determine the evidence shows the Alero was impounded pursuant to
reasonable standardized procedures of the Waterloo Police Department.
Although the policy of the police department was not completely articulated
during the suppression hearing, the testimony of Officer Saunders shows there
were reasonable standardized procedures for towing vehicles. See id. at 437
(noting “we look for the existence of reasonable standardized procedures”).
Under these standardized procedures, a vehicle could be towed if there was no
valid driver at the scene and no one had requested the car be picked up.
The evidence shows Tronca did not request to have anyone else come to
take the car and there was no valid driver to remove the vehicle from the scene.
Both the driver, Tronca, and the passenger, Radamacher, had been taken to the
police station. Officer Saunders’s testimony shows the officers acted within the
scope of the reasonable standardized procedures of the police department when
they made the decision to tow the vehicle. We will not second-guess the officers’
“exercise of professional judgment regarding impoundment of an automobile
when the judgment was exercised in accordance with otherwise reasonable
police department regulations.” See id.
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We also determine the sole purpose of the impoundment was not to
investigate criminal activity. Officer Tyler testified there were no licensed drivers
available to take the vehicle after Tronca and Radamacher were arrested. He
additionally stated the vehicle was towed for “safekeeping” and due to
information received in the missing person case. Because the officers had a
caretaking reason to impound the car, we can assume they did not act solely to
investigate criminal activity. See id. at 439-40.
B. Tronca claims the officers did not have probable cause to seize the
vehicle. He states the seizure was improper because officers did not have
probable cause to believe there was contraband in the vehicle. Tronca states at
the time the vehicle was seized officers did not have sufficient information to
show the vehicle was involved in criminal activity.
On constitutional issues our review is de novo. State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d
371, 377 (Iowa 2007). The seizure of a vehicle, prior to the issuance of a search
warrant, may be valid based upon probable cause coupled with exigent
circumstances.3 State v. Hoskins, 711 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Iowa 2006). There is
probable cause for the search and seizure of a vehicle:
when the facts and circumstances would lead a reasonably prudent
person to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. The facts
and circumstances upon which a finding of probable cause is based
include “the sum total . . . and the synthesis of what the police
[officer has] heard, what [the officer] knows, and what [the officer]
observe[s] as [a] trained officer[ ].”
3
The exigency requirement is satisfied by a vehicle’s inherent mobility. State v.
Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d 789, 795 (Iowa 2008). The exigency requirement is satisfied if
the vehicle is searched at the scene or if the vehicle is impounded and searched later.
Id. at 797.
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Id. (citation omitted). Probable cause “must be based on facts that would justify
a magistrate to issue a warrant, even though the officers had not actually
obtained a warrant.” Id. “A probable cause finding rests on a nexus between the
criminal activity, the place to be searched, and the items to be seized.” Id.
We determine the officers had probable cause to seize the Alero. The
officers had information Tronca was involved in the distribution of
methamphetamine and he owned firearms. The officers had information there
had been a shooting at Tronca’s business and Randall had last been seen there.
The officers were aware Tronca denied knowing Radamacher but at the time of
the stop was in a vehicle with Radamacher. Furthermore, when officers came to
Tronca’s business looking for Radamacher, stating “so anything beyond a dead
body, we’re not concerned about,” Tronca responded, “[T]hat’s why I’m not going
to let you in here.” Additionally, there was Officer Saunders’s observation the
occupants of the Alero appeared to be “possibly trying to hide something” while
the police car was attempting to stop the vehicle.
In addition, the officers were entitled to stop the vehicle because they had
a reasonable belief there was a valid warrant for the arrest of Radamacher, who
was a passenger in the vehicle. See United States v. O’Connor, 658 F.2d 688,
691 (9th Cir. 1981) (“It is obvious that in executing the warrant, the agents could
stop the vehicle in which they reasonably thought O’Connor was a passenger.”).
We agree with the district court’s conclusion the officers had probable
cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband. We conclude the court
properly denied the motion to suppress.
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III. Ineffective Assistance
Tronca claims he received ineffective assistance from defense counsel.
We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Ennenga v.
State, 812 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Iowa 2012). To establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) the attorney failed to perform
an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted to the extent it denied the defendant
a fair trial. State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Iowa 2009). A defendant has
the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence counsel was ineffective.
See State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Iowa 1992).
A. Tronca claims defense counsel should have challenged the stop of
the Alero on the ground it was pretextual. He states the district court could have
found a pretextual stop was unconstitutional under article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution.
Under the United States Constitution, the reasonableness of traffic stops
does not depend on the actual motivations of the officers. Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). The United States Supreme Court has
concluded pretextual stops are constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. See
id. at 814. Our supreme court has stated, “The search and seizure clause of the
Iowa Constitution is substantially identical in language to the Fourth Amendment.
We therefore usually deem the two provisions to be identical in scope, import,
and purpose.” State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 640-41 (Iowa 2002) (citations
omitted). Our supreme court has also stated, “The motivation of the officer
stopping the vehicle is not controlling in determining whether reasonable
suspicion existed. The officer is therefore not bound by his real reasons for the
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stop.” Id. at 641 (citations omitted); see also State v. Harrison, 846 N.W.2d 362,
366 (Iowa 2014).
Tronca acknowledges the law in Iowa does not support his claim a
pretextual stop is unconstitutional under the Iowa Constitution. But cf. In re
Pardee, 872 N.W.2d 384, 397 (Iowa 2015) (Wiggins, J., concurring specially)
(“However, I would go further and find a pretextual stop violates article I, section
8 of the Iowa Constitution.”). Tronca asks for a modification of the current law to
include an examination of an officer’s subjective reasons for a stop in order to
evaluate whether the stop was pretextual. “We are not at liberty to overturn Iowa
Supreme Court precedent.” State v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1990). We determine Tronca has not shown he received ineffective
assistance due to defense counsel’s failure to challenge the stop of the Alero on
the ground it was a pretextual stop.
B. Tronca claims he received ineffective assistance because defense
counsel did not challenge the seizure of AJT Auto prior to the issuance of a
search warrant. He states officers seized the building, not allowing anyone in or
out, for some period of time before they obtained a search warrant and then
executed the warrant. He notes, “The exact length of time between the seizure
and the granting of a search warrant cannot be determined by the current
record.” The State agrees it is impossible to assess the length of the State’s
seizure of AJT Auto based on the current record. We determine this issue
should be preserved for possible postconviction proceedings. See State v.
Oberhart, 789 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Iowa 2010) (preserving an issue for
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postconviction review when the record was inadequate to decide the issue in the
direct appeal).
We affirm Tronca’s conviction for first-degree murder.
AFFIRMED.