In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: C.B. (Minor Child), T.J. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Jun 23 2017, 9:06 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Brooklyn, Indiana
James D. Boyer
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Termination of the Parent- June 23, 2017
Child Relationship of: C.B. Court of Appeals Case No.
(Minor Child), 35A02-1611-JT-2548
Appeal from the Huntington
T.J. (Mother), Circuit Court
Appellant-Respondent, The Honorable Thomas M. Hakes,
Judge
v. Trial Court Cause No.
35C01-1601-JT-8
Indiana Department of Child
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.

Najam, Judge.

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 Statement of the Case
[1] T.J. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights over

her minor child C.B. (“Child”). Mother raises a single issue for our review,

namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the

termination of her parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
[2] Mother gave birth to Child on March 22, 2013.1 On June 30, 2014, the Indiana

Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Mother and

Child’s home contained an active methamphetamine lab. In addition, the

home had no running water or electricity. DCS took custody of Child at that

time and placed Child in foster care. Mother was arrested.

[3] On July 1, the State charged Mother with dealing in methamphetamine, as a

Class A felony. On July 2, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a Child

in Need of Services (“CHINS”). On August 19, Mother pleaded guilty as

charged. And on October 7, Mother was ordered to complete residential drug

treatment as part of a deferred sentencing order.

[4] On February 13, 2015, the trial court held a factfinding hearing and adjudicated

Child to be a CHINS. On May 8, Mother was discharged from the residential

drug treatment program for “drinking and smoking spice.” Appellant’s App.

1
Child’s father has signed a consent for Child to be adopted, and he does not participate in this appeal.

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 Vol. 2 at 101. Accordingly, on May 19, the criminal court sentenced Mother to

twenty years, with eight years executed and twelve years suspended to

probation. On May 28, the CHINS court ordered that, upon her release from

incarceration, Mother was to: maintain contact with DCS; complete a

parenting assessment; participate in homebased parenting; participate in

individual therapy; participate in anger management; and participate in

substance abuse treatment.

[5] On January 20, 2016, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights

to Child. Following a hearing on August 31, the trial court granted that

petition on October 12. In support of its order, the trial court entered findings

and conclusions. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision
[6] We begin our review of this appeal by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional

right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe

Div. of Family & Children (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996),

trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the

parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a

termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In re K.S.), 750

N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child

relationship is proper where a child’s emotional and physical development is

threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one’s own child should not be

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 terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental

rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or

her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[7] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS

is required to allege and prove:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the
reasons for placement outside the home of the
parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
threat to the well-being of the child.

***

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS’s “burden of proof in termination of parental

rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child

Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-

14-2).

[8] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Ofc. of
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 Family & Children (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.

denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that

are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial

court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s

judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous.

Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208

(Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[9] Here, in terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial court entered specific

findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court’s judgment

contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of

review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind.

2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and,

second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id.

“Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98,

102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s

decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[10] Mother’s challenge on appeal is very narrow. Mother concedes that the

evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s findings underlying its

conclusions that Mother will not remedy the conditions that resulted in Child’s

removal, that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to

the well-being of Child, and that there is a satisfactory plan for C.B.’s care and

treatment. Mother only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to show that

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 termination is in the best interests of Child. Thus, we address only that

contention.

[11] In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a

child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. A.S. v.

Ind. Dep’t. of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

“A parent’s historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and

supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a

finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best

interests.” Castro v. State Ofc. of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2006), trans. denied. “Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an

important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the

testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child’s

best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224 (emphasis added).

[12] In support of her contention on this issue, Mother maintains that, while her

earliest possible release date is December 2020, she might be able to get an early

release in 2018. Mother also asserts that she “already has both stable housing

and employment lined up when she is released.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. Finally,

Mother maintains that Child has lived in the same foster home since her

removal, so “[r]emaining there a little longer while Mother completes her term

of incarceration would not negatively impact C.B.” Id. But Mother’s

contentions amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we

cannot do.

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[13] As the trial court found, both the family case manager and Guardian ad Litem

testified that adoption and termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Child’s

best interests. The totality of the evidence, including Mother’s historical

inability to provide a safe and stable home and her inability to overcome her

debilitating substance abuse, supports the trial court’s conclusion that

termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Child’s best interests. The trial

court did not err when it terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child.

[14] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Altice, J., concur.

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