Com. v. Collins, R.

J-S40004-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RICHARD ALLEN COLLINS, :
:
Appellant : No. 3249 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 31, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004658-2015

BEFORE: OTT, DUBOW, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 28, 2017

Appellant Richard Allen Collins appeals the judgment of sentence

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County on May 31,

2016, following a jury trial at which time he was sentenced to a consecutive

term of life imprisonment following his convictions of first-degree murder,

conspiracy to commit first degree murder, possession with intent to deliver a

controlled substance (cocaine) and criminal conspiracy to possess a

controlled substance with the intent to deliver.1 We affirm.

The trial court detailed the relevant facts and procedural history herein

as follows:

____________________________________________

*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 903(a)(1); 35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113(a)(30).
J-S40004-17

Mariah Walton testified that she, [A]ppellant and the
murder victim, Artie Bradley sold cocaine, crack cocaine and
heroin from several locations in the Borough of Pottstown,
Pennsylvania in 2014 and 2015.11 Walton narrated to the jury
while the prosecutors showed them a sequence of still
photographs taken from a video recording Walton had made of a
customer buying crack cocaine from [A]ppellant, with the
assistance of Walton and Bradley, inside an apartment at 826
East High Street in Pottstown.12
Walton was [A]ppellant's lover;13 and [A]ppellant and
Bradley were "like brothers."14 Bradley's relationship with the
other two changed for the worse after [A]ppellant and Walton
returned from a trip in early February, 2015, to find that "there
was $10,000 worth of heroin money missing."15 Appellant
confronted Bradley, whose excuses were unpersuasive.16
Appellant told Bradley he would have to pay the money back by
way of future drug sales.17 Although [A]ppellant tried to appear
as if he "let it go" at that, he was still angry at Bradley18 because
(as Walton explained on cross-examination) “[t]here’s no way
you're going to work off $10,000."19
At approximately ten minutes before 10 p.m. on March 20,
2015, Sergeant Brian Rathgeb of the Pottstown Borough Police
Department and a team of other police officers searched the
area of the 400-500 blocks of Chestnut and Walnut Streets in
Pottstown after being dispatched to investigate reports of
gunshots.20 They found no victim of a gunshot wound or other
evidence of shots being fired in that area.21 At approximately
11:30 p.m. Sergeant Rathgeb was dispatched to the nearby
intersection of Beech and Washington Streets in Pottstown to
investigate a call for an ambulance to treat an unresponsive
person.22 That person--Bradley--was already dead when the
ambulance team had arrived.23 Forensic pathologist Gregory
McDonald, D.O., testified that he performed an autopsy of
Bradley's remains and determined that Bradley had sustained
seven gunshot wounds to the chest and abdomen, which caused
fatal injuries to the lung and liver,24 which he agreed were "vital
parts of the body."25 Mariah Walton testified,
I was a knowing participant [in] the murder of Artie
Bradley. I knew that [[A]ppellant] had a gun, and I
knew he went there to get in a confrontation, and I not
only watched him kill Artie Bradley, I drove him away
from the crime scene and covered up for him.26
At the time [A]ppellant and Walton decided to commit the
murder, they had just learned that Bradley was at the home of a

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mutual friend, Troy Holmes, only a few blocks from the
apartment [A]ppellant and Walton rented at 423 East High
Street in Pottstown.27 Appellant was expressing hostility toward
Bradley, calling him derogatory names.28 Appellant put a gun in
his jacket pocket and told Walton he was leaving to confront
Bradley and would telephone her when he was ready for her to
pick him up in her car.29 Approximately two minutes after
[A]ppellant left, Walton drove her car to a vantage point on
Washington Street where she could see when [A]ppellant and
Bradley would leave the home of their mutual friend, and
telephoned [A]ppellant to tell him she was waiting there.30
Walton saw [A]ppellant and Bradley leave the home and cross
the street together, then she saw [A]ppellant shoot Bradley
twice, saw Bradley fall, and saw [A]ppellant shoot Bradley four
more times as he lay on the ground.31 Walton put her car in
gear, appellant got in, and the two fled to Philadelphia.32

_____
11
N.T. 3-1-2016, pp. 92-93.
12
Id. at 94-98.
13
Id. at 89-90.
14
Id. at 100.
15
Id.
16
1d. at 101.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 160.
20
Id. at pp. 49-52.
21
Id. at 52.
22
Id. at 52-53.
23
See stipulation, N.T. 3-2-2016 ("Robin Yerger, a paramedic of
Goodwill Ambulance, was the first responder to the murder
scene. Artie Bradley was already dead upon her arrival.").
24
N.T. 3-1-2016, pp. 69-72, 81.
25
Id. at 79.
26
Id. at 144.
27
Id. at 117-18.
28
Id. at 118, 119.
29
Id. at 119.
30
Id. at 119-123
31
Id. at 123-24.
32
Id. at 124-25.

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Trial Court Opinion, filed 1/10/17, at 2-5. Following a four-day trial that

commenced on March 1, 2016, a jury convicted Appellant of the

aforementioned charges, and the trial court sentenced him on May 31, 2016.

On June 30, 2016, Appellant filed both a post-sentence motion which

the trial court denied and a timely notice of Appeal. The trial court and the

parties have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925, and the matter is now ripe for

consideration on appeal.

In his brief, Appellant presents the following Statement of Questions

Involved.

(1) Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err as a matter of law by affirming the
jury’s finding that the Commonwealth presented sufficient
evidence of [] Appellant’s proximity to the victim beyond mere
presence?

(2)(3)(4) Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err as a matter of law and as an
abuse of discretion by allowing fabricated and inconsistent
testimony of Ms. Mariah Walton in violation of the Joint Defense
Agreement and allowing Mr. Jamar Holmes to testify in violation
of the sequestration Order where the verdict was against the
weight and sufficiency of the evidence and the Commonwealth
failed to present sufficient evidence for the jury to find
[Appellant] guilty of the crimes charged?

(5) Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err as a matter of law and as an
abuse of discretion in introducing as evidence Jury items 8-15 in
the Commonwealth[’]s Memorandum of law filed 10/29/2015
and ruled on by Order 01/26/2016 because they were calculated
and improperly appealed to the sympathy and prejudice of the
jury?

(6) Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err as a matter of law and as an abuse
of discretion in denying [Appellant’s] Omnibus Pretrial motion as
it relates to identification evidence pursuant to the Order dated
01/21/2016?

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Brief for Appellant at 5. We shall discuss each of these issues in turn, and in

first analyzing Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we

employ a well-settled standard of review:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence
admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable
the fact-finder to find every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our
judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that
the facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt
may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence
is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its
burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the
entire record must be evaluated and all evidence
actually received must be considered. Finally, the
finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is
free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943–44 (Pa.Super.
2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 856–57
(Pa.Super. 2010)). “This standard is equally applicable to cases
where the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long
as the combination of the evidence links the accused to the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Commonwealth v.
Sanders, 426 Pa.Super. 362, 627 A.2d 183, 185 (1993)).
“Although a conviction must be based on ‘more than mere
suspicion or conjecture, the Commonwealth need not establish
guilt to a mathematical certainty.’” Commonwealth v. Gainer,
7 A.3d 291, 292 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Badman, 398 Pa.Super. 315, 580 A.2d 1367, 1372 (1990)).

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Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal

denied, 626 Pa. 681, 95 A.3d 275 (Table).

While Appellant couches his initial challenge as one pertaining to the

sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions, a reading of his

appellate brief reveals that he does nothing more than dispute the credibility

of the testimony presented by Ms. Walton in support of his claim. For

instance, Appellant stresses that less than two weeks prior to the

commencement of his jury trial, on February 18, 2016, Ms. Walton entered a

guilty plea for her involvement in Mr. Bradley’s death. Appellant states that

at trial, “Ms. Walton testified and attempted to corroborate a great deal of

evidence proffered by the Commonwealth but did so untruthfully,

inconsistently, and deliberately. Specifically, Appellant contends the

information concerning his involvement and his proximity to the murder was

inaccurate.” Brief for Appellant at 10.

Appellant also points out that Ms. Walton admitted on cross-

examination to having lied to police three times and indicated that she

expected leniency as a result of having entered a guilty plea. Id. at 10-11

citing N.T. 3/1/16, at 147-48; 3/2/16, at 13-14. As such, Appellant has

presented a challenge to the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281–82 (Pa.Super. 2008)

(an argument that the fact-finder should have credited one witness's

testimony over that of another witness goes to the weight of the evidence,

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not the sufficiency of the evidence); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825 A.2d

710, 713–14 (Pa.Super. 2003) (a review of the sufficiency of the evidence

does not include a credibility assessment; such a claim goes to the weight of

the evidence); Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 692 A.2d 224, 227 (Pa.Super.

1997) (the fact-finder makes credibility determinations, and challenges to

those determinations go to the weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency of

the evidence).

The argument portion of Appellant’s brief otherwise fails to mention,

let alone discuss, any of the elements of the various offenses of which

Appellant had been convicted for which the evidence was insufficient to

sustain the conviction. Because Appellant has failed to provide any

discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence with citation to proper legal

authority, we find this issue to be waived. See Commonwealth v.

Johnson, 604 Pa. 176, 191-92, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (2009) (finding claims

waived where an appellant fails to provide any discussion pertaining to it

with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other

meaningful fashion capable of review in his appellate brief).

Appellant next contends the jury’s verdict was against the weight of

the evidence. Specifically, Appellant asserts the Commonwealth’s evidence

“was so meddled and inconsistent, that a new trial must be awarded.” Brief

for Appellant at 12. Appellant further maintains that the “inconsistent timing

of gunshots, the time period in finding the body and Appellant’s whereabouts

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J-S40004-17

before the alleged murder, were insufficient for a jury to return a verdict

against [ ] Appellant without shocking ones [sic] sense of conscience.” Id. at

12. Appellant also generally discusses what he presents as inconsistencies

in the testimony of officers and lay witnesses pertaining to the timeframe in

which the crimes occurred and the trial court’s error in permitting the

testimony of Ms. Walton and Mr. Jamal Holmes. Id. at 12-14. Specifically,

Appellant argues that despite the fact that Ms. Walton’s lack of credibility

“was fully explored” before the jury, it “shockingly” managed to return a

guilty verdict. In addition, Appellant posits the matter should be remanded

for a “curative instruction” in light of Mr. Holmes’ testimony that while he

and Appellant were being transported to the courthouse together, Appellant

had offered Mr. Holmes four thousand dollars to change his testimony. Id.

at 14.

In considering a claim that the verdict was against the weight of the

evidence, an appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the

factfinder, which is free to assess the credibility of witnesses and to believe

all, part, or none of the evidence presented. Commonwealth v. DeJesus,

580 Pa. 303, 860 A.2d 102 (2004). This Court has held that:

“[w]hen the challenge to the weight of the evidence is predicated
on the credibility of trial testimony, our review of the trial court's
decision is extremely limited. Generally, unless the evidence is
so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict based
thereon pure conjecture, these types of claims are not
cognizable on appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Rossetti,
863 A.2d 1185, 1191 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
“Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim

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below, an appellate court's role is not to consider the underlying
question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence.” Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 832
A.2d 403, 408 (2003). “Rather, appellate review is limited to
whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on
the weight claim.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Trippett, 932 A.2d 188, 198 (Pa.Super. 2007). In

addition, this Court will not reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to the

evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. Commonwealth v. Giordano,

121 A.3d 998, 1007 (Pa.Super. 2015).

As a preliminary matter, we note that, generally, a challenge to the

weight of the evidence must be preserved by a motion for a new trial.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607. The Rule provides:

Rule 607. Challenges to the Weight of the Evidence
(A) A claim that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence shall be raised with the trial judge in a motion for a
new trial:
(1) orally, on the record, at any time before sentencing;
(2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or
(3) in a post-sentence motion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)–(3). “As noted in the comment to Rule 607, ‘[t]he

purpose of this rule is to make it clear that a challenge to the weight of the

evidence must be raised with the trial judge or it will be waived.’”

Commonwealth v. Gillard, 850 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal

denied, 581 Pa. 672, 863 A.2d 1143 (2004). An appellant's failure to avail

himself of any of the prescribed methods for presenting a weight of the

evidence issue to the trial court constitutes waiver of that claim, even if the

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trial court responds to the claim in its Rule 1925(a) Opinion.

Commonwealth v. Burkett, 830 A.2d 1034, 1037 n. 3 (Pa.Super. 2003).

Herein, Appellant preserved a challenge to the weight of the evidence

in his post-sentence motion filed on June 30, 2016. Notwithstanding, as he

did in setting forth his initial claim, Appellant conflates challenges to the

sufficiency and weight of the evidence in attempting to develop an argument

in support of his weight claim in his appellate brief. This is evident in

Appellant’s concluding sentence pertaining to that portion of the argument

wherein Appellant states: “[v]iewing evidence in light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, Counsel respectfully requests a cursory review of the jury

verdict and that the case be remanded for a new trial.” Brief for Appellant at

14. As noted above, this standard of review is employed in an analysis of a

sufficiency of the evidence claim. In addition, the majority of Appellant’s

argument is comprised of conclusory statements and bald allegations

unsupported by citations to proper legal authority. As such, Appellant’s

weight claim is arguably waived for lack of proper development. See

Johnson, supra.

To the extent we may view Appellant’s purported argument as

properly challenging the weight of the evidence to sustain his convictions,

upon our review of the record evidence and trial transcripts, we find this

claim merits no relief. The trial court declined to upset the verdict of the

jury, generally noting that:

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When [A]ppellant raised this issue in his post-sentence motion,
the undersigned considered all evidence of record and found no
factual basis for concluding that the jury’s verdict was contrary
to the evidence. The evidence produced by the prosecutors in
this case was not unusual compared to that which is produced in
typical murder and conspiracy trials, in that some was
inconsistent, some circumstantial, and some came from corrupt,
biased and polluted sources. In the typical case, such
circumstances do not render the jury’s verdict against the weight
of the evidence because “the trier of fact, while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence to be
afforded the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or
none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Grisavage, 517 A.2d
1256, 1257 (Pa. 1986).

Trial Court Opinion, filed 1/10/17, at 9.

Specifically, the trial court reasoned it had not erred in allowing Ms.

Walton to testify, as the evidence adduced at a hearing held on February 29,

2016, did not directly or inferentially support a conclusion that either Ms.

Walton or her counsel had exploited the joint defense agreement to

Appellant’s prejudice. Trial Court Opinion, filed 1/10/17 at 10-11. The trial

court also found no record evidence indicated Ms. Walton or her counsel ever

provided detectives with information they had learned from Appellant or his

counsel, and Ms. Walton was questioned regarding only her first-hand

knowledge of the facts relevant to proving the elements of the crimes of

which Appellant had been charged. The trial court further noted Appellant’s

counsel subjected Ms. Walton’s counsel to a rigorous cross-examination

regarding changes in Ms. Walton’s memory of the murder weapon. Id. at

12-14.

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Indeed, at the hearing, Ms. Walton’s counsel explained, inter alia, that

he and Ms. Walton never met with or discussed any trial strategies such as

potential defenses or any affirmative defenses like self-defense with

Appellant, nor did Ms. Walton’s counsel share any information with the

Commonwealth that he had learned from Appellant’s counsel as a result of a

joint defense agreement. N.T., 2/29/16, at 19-20. Counsel related that on

only one occasion he had been with Appellant’s counsel for approximately

two hours at which time they and their respective investigators

photographed the alleged crime scene and discussed the timeline in

question. Counsel also discussed generally potential witnesses, those

individuals’ previous statements, and any possible motivation any might

have for testifying falsely. Id. at 22-26. However, once Ms. Walton advised

her counsel that she wished to cooperate with the prosecution in exchange

for a negotiated guilty plea, neither she nor counsel divulged any defense

strategies, witness issues, or other contents of their discussions to the

Commonwealth; counsel had been present at every meeting between Ms.

Walton and the Commonwealth. Id. at 28-36.

In addition, the trial court explained its decision to permit the

testimony of Jamar Holmes regarding his knowledge of the crimes and

Appellant’s alleged attempt to bribe him as follows:

Jamar Holmes, a cousin of Troy Holmes, testified as a
witness for the prosecution on the third day of the trial, March 3,
2016. In order to avoid confusion between the two witnesses in
this discussion, the undersigned will refer to Jamar Holmes as

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"Jamar." On direct examination, Jamar first testified about
events that transpired only minutes before the murder: he had
been at Troy Holmes' home with Bradley; he had left the
premises while Bradley was still there; as he walked down the
block he saw [A]ppellant, who[m] he knew; and the two made
eye contact as they walked past each other.84 He then testified
as to the events that transpired on the day before, March 2,
2016. He stated that after sheriffs' deputies placed him on a bus
to take him from the county prison to the courthouse,
[A]ppellant sat next to him and offered to pay him $4,000.00 if
he would change his anticipated testimony.85
Jamar further testified, under oath on direct examination,
that [A]ppellant told him that Ms. Walton had driven him to Troy
Holmes's home, where he waited for Bradley to come outside,
and when he came out, [A]ppellant killed him.86 If Jamar's
account of walking past [A]ppellant on the street shortly before
the murder had been true, then the account [A]ppellant had
supposedly told him on the bus would have been inconsistent
with what he saw and knew to be true. Moreover, because Jamar
testified that he and [A]ppellant had made eye contact,
[A]ppellant would have known that Jamar knew, or would have
known, that the account [A]ppellant had supposedly told him on
the bus was false. Appellant's lawyer extensively and ably
exploited this problem with Jamar's testimony when cross-
examining him to give the jury a reason to believe (in addition to
the witness's convictions of multiple crimen falsi and his pending
sentencing hearing on another crime) that he had lied --not only
in his testimony about the night of the murder, but about
[A]ppellant trying to bribe him to change his testimony.87
Appellant, his lawyer, the prosecutors or the undersigned
knew in advance that Jamar would testify that [A]ppellant
offered him a bribe. At the end of the first day of trial, the
undersigned learned that the sheriff's deputies who were in
charge of transportation of [A]ppellant and several of the trial
witnesses from the county prison to the courthouse had placed
[A]ppellant and those witnesses on the same bus.88 In response,
the undersigned expressly told the deputies in the courtroom to
tell the deputies in charge of transportation not to put
[A]ppellant and the witnesses in the same vehicle.89
Nonetheless, to the great displeasure of the undersigned and
counsel, on the next day the deputies in charge of transportation
placed [A]ppellant and Jamar side-by-side on the same bus.90
Jamar told the detectives that while on the bus [A]ppellant had
made an incriminating statement and offered to pay him

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$4,000.00 if he would change his testimony.91 The detectives
took a sworn statement from Jamar regarding [A]ppellant's
statement and gave a copy to [A]ppellant's trial lawyer.92
In view of the unexpected turn of events, the undersigned
postponed the testimony of Jamar from that day until the next,
and gave [A]ppellant's lawyer and private investigator an
opportunity to interview other prison inmates in order to obtain,
if possible, evidence in opposition to Jamar's anticipated
testimony regarding the incriminating statement made by
[A]ppellant.93 With the assistance of the sheriff and prosecutors,
[A]ppellant's investigator ascertained the identities of the other
inmates on the bus, interviewed them at the prison that evening,
transcribed the notes of those interviews, and gave the notes to
[A]ppellant's trial lawyer the next morning." The postponement
of the testimony of Jamar, together with the notes of the
interviews, were what enabled [A]ppellant's trial lawyer to
thoroughly cross-examine the witness and exploit the problems
with his testimony, as previously described. Appellant now
claims that he was prejudiced because he lacked sufficient
opportunity to challenge the veracity of that testimony and to
interview others who may have been present and had personal
knowledge of whether appellant spoke to Jamar, and if so, what
he said. The record contradicts that claim.
At a hearing the next morning (outside the presence of the
jury) [A]ppellant's lawyer argued that his client had been
severely prejudiced by the failure of the sheriff's deputies to
follow the court order to transport [A]ppellant apart from the
witnesses and asked that the undersigned preclude Jamar from
testifying about the statements appellant made on the bus.95
Appellant's lawyer moved for a mistrial,96 arguing that: the
court's transportation order to the sheriff's deputies was
equivalent or analogous to a sequestration order; the deputies
had breached their obligation to follow the order; the breach
caused [A]ppellant to sustain severe prejudice; and the
appropriate remedy would be to preclude the Commonwealth
from presenting evidence of the [A]ppellant's statement or to
declare a mistrial.97 Based upon the information available at the
time, [A]ppellant's lawyer conceded that the prosecutors did not
breach any legal obligation,98 and based upon the same
information the undersigned agreed. The undersigned denied
relief and stated the reasons on the record.99
The events that have unfolded since that time further
support that decision. Having heard Jamar testify at trial and
watched his demeanor, the undersigned finds his claim that

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[A]ppellant offered to pay him to change his anticipated
testimony to be credible. Appellant, through counsel, produced
no evidence that Jamar, the deputies or the prosecutors offered
him any incentive to speak to Jamar, or gave him any
disincentive to remain silent and no such evidence has emerged
since. Regardless of whether the transportation order is a
sequestration order or is analogous to one, and regardless of
whether Jamar initiated conversation with [A]ppellant, it was
[A]ppellant who made the decision to speak to Jamar. His
decision was not caused by coercion or deceit, but was purely
voluntary. Any prejudice he sustained was caused by himself,
and therefore he was not entitled to an order prohibiting the
Commonwealth from producing evidence of his statement or
declaring a mistrial.

_____
84
N.T. March 3, 2016, pp. 63-66.
85
Id. at 67-70.
86
Id. at 68.
87
70-81, 88-90. The jury was free to resolve this problem, as it
apparently did, by concluding that [A]ppellant failed to realize,
or did not care, that he was telling Jamar Holmes something
Jamar must have known not to be true.
88
N.T. March 1, 2016, pp. 182-83.
89
Id. at 183-84.
90
N.T. March 2, 2016, pp. 248-50, 334-42.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 336-39.
94
N.T. March 3, 2016, pp. 2-3.
95
N.T. March 3, 2016, pp. 2-15.
96
Id. at 56-57.
97
Id. at 6-15, 56-58.
98
Id. at 12-13.
99
Id. at 51-59.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 1/10/17, at 20-23.

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Upon our review of the record and in light of the foregoing, we discern

no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rejection of Appellant’s weight

claim.2

Appellant next avers the trial court abused its discretion in allowing

“items 9-13 identified in the Commonwealth’s 10/29/2015, ‘Memorandum in

Support of Motions to Admit Other Bad Acts’ by way of Judicial Order on

01/26/2016 was unduly prejudicial” and concludes that “they were

____________________________________________

2
To the extent Appellant asks this Court to remand the matter for a
“curative instruction,” a review of the record reveals Appellant did not object
to or request a curative instruction following Mr. Jamal’s testimony at the
time of trial. N.T., 3/3/16, at 67-70, 90; N.T., 3/4/16, at 2-75. “Issues not
raised in the [trial] court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). In addition, “it is axiomatic that issues are
preserved when objections are made timely to the error or offense.”
Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 599 Pa. 1, 24, 57, 960 A.2d 59, 73
(2008). “The purpose of contemporaneous objection requirements
respecting trial-related issues is to allow the court to take corrective
measures and, thereby, to conserve limited judicial resources.”
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 614 Pa. 1, 31, 36 A.3d 24, 42 (2011). “[A]
party may not remain silent and afterwards complain of matters which, if
erroneous, the court would have corrected.” Commonwealth v. Strunk,
953 A.2d 577, 579 (Pa.Super. 2008). Therefore, Appellant has waived this
request for failure to make a timely and specific objection on the record. See
Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 605 Pa. 325, 340, 989 A.2d 883, 892
(2010) (where trial counsel objected to the admission of evidence but did
not request a limiting instruction, the issue of trial court error for not giving
such instruction is waived); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 579 Pa. 119, 141,
855 A.2d 726, 739 (2004) (failure to request cautionary instruction upon
introduction of evidence constitutes waiver of claim of trial court error in
failing to issue cautionary instruction);Commonwealth v. Bell, 562 A.2d
849, 853 (Pa.Super.1989) (“Where counsel fails to request a mistrial when
the alleged prejudicial event occurs, the issue is not preserved for appellate
review.”).

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calculated and did appeal improperly to the sympathy and prejudice of the

jury.” Brief for Appellant at 14. Our standard of review of Appellant's claims

regarding the admissibility of evidence is well-settled:

The admission of evidence is solely within the discretion of the
trial court, and a trial court's evidentiary rulings will be reversed
on appeal only upon an abuse of that discretion. An abuse of
discretion will not be found based on a mere error of judgment,
but rather occurs where the court has reached a conclusion that
overrides or misapplies the law, or where the judgment
exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Witmayer, 144 A.3d 939, 949 (Pa.Super. 2016)

(citation omitted).

Despite requesting that this Court make “a cursory review of items 9-

13” and subsequently remand for a new trial, Appellant’s only specific

reference to “items 9-13” is the following sentence:

As it relates to Ms. Esther Saunders and Mr. Herbierto
Delmor[a]l, Appellant contends their individual statements were
offered on an improper basis that causally diverted, the jury’s
attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence
impartially. Because the jury focused on [A]ppellant’s past acts,
they were unable [to] weigh evidence impartially, resulting in
the allowance of unduly prejudicial evidence. (quotation marks
and citation omitted).

Brief for Appellant at 15.3
____________________________________________

3
Ms. Saunders knew Appellant and Mr. Bradley and testified Appellant had
accused Mr. Bradley of stealing money obtained from the sale of drugs and
that he had threatened Mr. Bradley. N.T., 3/2/16, at 197-98. Mr. Bradley
instructed Ms. Saunders as to the type of funeral he wanted should he die
and provided her with various names and phone numbers which he jotted
down in her presence. Id. at 200-02. Mr. Delmoral admitted he had
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Appellant utterly failed to develop how the probative value of these

vaguely referenced statements was outweighed by the potential for unfair

prejudice under the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence or to illustrate how he

reached his bald conclusion that “[b]ecause the jury focused on [A]ppellant’s

past acts, they were unable [to] weigh evidence impartially, resulting in the

allowance of unduly prejudicial evidence.” Brief for Appellant at 15. Thus,

we find this issue waived for lack of development. See Johnson, supra.

_______________________
(Footnote Continued)

purchased heroin and cocaine from Mr. Bradley and that he had stolen drugs
from him as well. Mr. Delmoral stated Appellant pursued and beat him to
retaliate. Id. at 119-24. He also had purchased drugs from Ms. Walton and
saw her counting money. Id. at 127-28.
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b) entitled Crimes, Wrongs or
Other Acts, provides in relevant part that:

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is
not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
the character.
(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or
lack of accident. In a criminal case this evidence is admissible
only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential
for unfair prejudice.

Pa.R.E. 404(b). The trial court determined the foregoing evidence was
admissible at trial to show the course of events that led to the crimes with
which Appellant had been charged. Specifically, the trial court found the
evidence probative of Appellant’s motive to shoot Mr. Bradley and
circumstantial evidence of his specific intent to act in concert with Ms.
Walton and to kill Mr. Bradley. Trial Court Opinion, filed 1/10/17, at 25-27.

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J-S40004-17

Finally, Appellant challenges the in-court identification of him by Mr.

Steven Corey and Ms. Mary Ellen Gibson. In doing so, Appellant avers the

trial court erred in failing to suppress an out-of-court photo array prior to

trial because the identification procedure had been unduly suggestive and,

therefore, illegal. Appellant asserts “the pictures included in the photo array

were inconsistent. Although all eight photographs depicted all black males,

the photographs were inconsistent in that they were photographs of males of

varying age, some had facial hair while others did not, some were bald while

others were not and the skin tones were varying.” Brief for Appellant at 16.

Appellant concludes that “[p]resuming that the photo array identification

procedure was illegal and therefore inadmissible, Appellant’s in-court

identification by Mr. Steven Corey and Ms. Mary Ellen Gibson requires

review.” Id.

Our standard of review of this issue is as follows:

When reviewing the propriety of a suppression order, an
appellate court is required to determine whether the record
supports the suppression court's factual findings and whether
the inferences and legal conclusions drawn by the suppression
court from those findings are appropriate. Where the record
supports the factual findings of the suppression court, we are
bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal
conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. However, where the
appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on
allegations of legal error, the suppression court's conclusions of
law are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to
determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to
the facts.
Whether an out of court identification is to be suppressed
as unreliable, and therefore violative of due process, is
determined from the totality of the circumstances.

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J-S40004-17

Suggestiveness in the identification process is a factor to be
considered in determining the admissibility of such evidence, but
suggestiveness alone does not warrant exclusion. Identification
evidence will not be suppressed unless the facts demonstrate
that the identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive
as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification. Photographs used in line-ups are not unduly
suggestive if the suspect's picture does not stand out more than
the others, and the people depicted all exhibit similar facial
characteristics. Commonwealth v. Fulmore, 25 A.3d 340, 346
(Pa.Super. 2011) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). Moreover, our scope of review from a suppression
ruling is limited to the evidentiary record that was created at the
suppression hearing. In re L.J., 622 Pa. 126, 148, 79 A.3d 1073,
1086 (2013).

Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 978 (Pa.Super 2016), appeal

denied Commonwealth v. Stiles, 2016 WL 7106404 (Pa. Dec. 6, 2016)

(Table).

Although Appellant asserts the photographic array was unduly

suggestive, he failed to ensure that the certified record contained a copy of

the photo array in question, despite the fact that our analysis of this issue

requires a review of it; therefore, he has waived a challenge to the trial

court’s denial of his motion to suppress the same. See Commonwealth v.

Martz, 926 A.2d 514, 525 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 596 Pa. 704,

940 A.2d 363, (2008) (finding issue challenging suppression of photo array

waived where appellant failed to ensure the original record certified for

appeal contained sufficient information to conduct a proper review). See

also Stiles, supra.

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J-S40004-17

Appellant’s remaining challenge to the in-court identification of

Appellant by Mr. Corey and Ms. Gibson is based upon each witness’s alleged

“limited exposure” to Appellant outside of the courtroom and the

“significant” period of time which lapsed between the murder and the

commencement of trial, the fact that neither witnessed the “crime,” and that

Appellant was the only individual seated next to defense counsel at trial.

Brief for Appellant at 16-17.

To the contrary, Mr. Corey testified he worked as a maintenance man

and lived in the same apartment building as Appellant whom he knew as

“B.” N.T., 3/2/16, at 163-64. Mr. Corey also indicated he was in Appellant’s

room when he saw Appellant in possession of a .380 caliber handgun. 4 Id. at

165-67. Additionally, Ms. Gibson identified Appellant in the courtroom. She

explained she knew Appellant as “Bub,” through her acquaintance with Ms.

Walton and had been in the company of Ms. Walton, Appellant and Mr.

Bradley on the night of the murder. N.T., 3/2/15, at 234-41.

Appellant did not object to either witness’s identification of Appellant

at trial. In addition, aside from bald allegations to the contrary, Appellant

has failed to show that these in-court identifications were somehow

suggestive. See Commonwealth v. Wade, 33 A.3d 108, 114 (Pa.Super.

2011) (stating a witness’s in-court identification may be admissible despite

____________________________________________

4
The murder weapon was a .380 caliber handgun.

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J-S40004-17

the inadmissibility of a pre-trial identification where the in-court

identification is not tainted by the previous identification). Thus, Appellant's

final issue fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.5

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/28/2017

____________________________________________

5
In its Rule 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court found no merit to any of
Appellant’s claims. However, “[t]his Court is not bound by the rationale of
the trial court, and we may affirm the trial court on any basis.”
Commonwealth v. Williams, 73 A.3d 609, 617 (Pa.Super. 2013).

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