In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 16‐2055
JAMES HUNT,
Plaintiff,
v.
MOORE BROTHERS, INC., et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees.
APPEAL OF: JANA YOCUM RINE
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:15‐cv‐00433‐MJR‐SCW — Michael J. Reagan, Chief Judge.
____________________
ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2017 — DECIDED JUNE 29, 2017
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and HAMILTON, Cir‐
cuit Judges.
WOOD, Chief Judge. James Hunt worked as a truck driver
in Nebraska. On July 1, 2010, he signed an Independent Con‐
tractor Operating Agreement with Moore Brothers, a small
company located in Norfolk, Nebraska. Three years later,
Hunt and Moore renewed the Agreement. Before the second
2 No. 16‐2055
term expired, however, relations between the parties soured.
Hunt hired Attorney Jana Yocum Rine to sue Moore on his
behalf. She did so in federal court, raising a wide variety of
claims, but paying little heed to the fact that the Agreements
contained arbitration clauses. Rine resisted arbitration, pri‐
marily on the theory that the clause was unenforceable as a
matter of Nebraska law. Tired of what it regarded as a flood
of frivolous arguments and motions, the district court granted
Moore’s motion for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and or‐
dered Rine to pay Moore about $7,500. The court later dis‐
missed the entire action without prejudice.
I
Rine has appealed from that order. We begin with a word
about our appellate jurisdiction. The district court’s order of
dismissal represented its decision that this dispute belongs in
the arbitral forum selected by the parties, not the court. Such
a dismissal is analogous to one based on forum non conveniens.
Like a dismissal for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction, it is
final and appealable even though it is said to be without
prejudice. Manez v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 533
F.3d 578, 583–84 (7th Cir. 2008); Chang v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 599 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2010). Manez explains why.
There we allowed a lawyer to appeal a sanctions order after
the underlying case had been dismissed “without prejudice”
on forum non conveniens grounds. The critical point was that
the U.S. court was finished with the case; as we said, “the
phrase ‘without prejudice’ means that although the dismissal
is ‘final’ in the sense that plaintiffs are finished before the U.S.
courts, they still are free to refile the case in another,
appropriate forum … .” Manez, 533 F.3d at 583–84. The same
is true here. The merits of this dispute will be resolved by the
No. 16‐2055 3
arbitrators, and any remaining role for the court will concern
only the question whether the award should be recognized
and enforced. Because the judgment is thus final for purposes
of appeal, we have no need to consider whether the sanctions
order also qualifies as an appealable collateral order under
such cases as Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100
(2009), and Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017). With
our jurisdiction secure, we may proceed to the merits.
II
The relevant part of the arbitration clauses in the Agree‐
ments reads as follows:
This Agreement and any properly adopted Adden‐
dum shall constitute the entire Agreement and under‐
standing between us and it shall be interpreted under
the laws of the State of Nebraska. … To the extent any
disputes arise under this Agreement or its interpreta‐
tion, we both agree to submit such disputes to final and
binding arbitration before any arbitrator mutually
agreed upon by both parties.
When Rine decided to take formal action on Hunt’s part, she
ignored that language and filed a multi‐count complaint in
federal court. The complaint was notable only for its breadth:
it accused Moore of holding Hunt in peonage in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1581 (a criminal statute), and of violating the Rack‐
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),
18 U.S.C. § 1962; the federal antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 4,
14; the Illinois Employee Classification Act, 820 ILCS 185/1 et
seq.; and for good measure, the Illinois tort of false represen‐
tation.
4 No. 16‐2055
Relying on the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1
et seq., Moore responded with a motion to compel arbitration
and to stay the litigation; it also sought the appointment of an
arbitrator pursuant to section 5 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 5. Rine
objected on several grounds. First, she asserted that Hunt had
no obligation to comply with the arbitration clause because
Moore had materially breached the Agreements. Second, she
asserted that the Agreements fell outside the scope of the FAA
because Hunt was a transportation worker. See 9 U.S.C. § 1;
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (“Sec‐
tion 1 exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of
transportation workers.”). Third, Rine resisted Moore’s re‐
quest for a court‐appointed arbitrator, noting that the clause
provided for a person “mutually agreed on by the parties.”
The district court made short shrift of Rine’s arguments. It
rejected the assertion that an alleged breach of the underlying
contract relieves a party from an arbitration agreement; by
that reasoning no one would ever arbitrate a contract dispute,
because the arbitration agreement would go up in smoke as
soon as the dispute arose. Rine’s effort to bring Hunt under
the transportation‐worker exception also failed, the court
said, because the complaint conceded that he was an “inde‐
pendent truck owner operator,” not an employee. Rine pre‐
vailed only on her procedural argument against a court‐ap‐
pointed arbitrator: the judge found this step premature, and
directed the parties to try to do this themselves. They took
some steps in that direction, but they never agreed on anyone.
This was the backdrop to Rine’s ill‐fated return to the dis‐
trict court. Less than two months after the judge told the par‐
ties to agree on an arbitrator, Rine filed a motion reporting
that their efforts had failed. This revealed, she said, that the
No. 16‐2055 5
arbitration clause was nothing more than an “agreement to
agree,” unenforceable under Nebraska law. The district court
rejected this reasoning. It noted that Rine should have raised
this argument earlier and that in any event it was wholly
without merit. The FAA preempts conflicting state law, and a
delay in the selection of an arbitrator does not affect the en‐
forceability of an arbitration clause. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance
Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 791–92 (7th Cir. 2013). This was the
point at which the court imposed the sanctions that are the
subject of Rine’s appeal.
III
Rine offers several reasons for setting aside the district
court’s order of sanctions, even as she acknowledges that the
court has wide discretion over such matters. See United States
v. Rogers Cartage Co., 794 F.3d 854, 862 (7th Cir. 2015). She com‐
plains that the court based its order exclusively on a finding
of objective unreasonableness, without finding subjective bad
faith on her part. Her premise—that both are needed—is mis‐
taken: while subjective bad faith is sufficient to support sec‐
tion 1927 sanctions, “such a finding is not necessary; ‘objective
bad faith’ will also support a sanctions award.” Boyer v. BNSF
Ry. Co., 824 F.3d 694, 708 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
Rine insists that the arbitration clause was not enforceable
as a matter of Nebraska law, and so she was justified in resist‐
ing its application. She also attacks the district court’s conclu‐
sion that the FAA preempts whatever Nebraska law has to say
on the subject, and asserts that her motion to lift the stay and
vacate the order compelling arbitration was justified. This is
so, she says, because she pointed to some precedent for the
position that if an arbitration agreement is found to be unen‐
forceable after a stay pursuant to FAA section 3 is entered, the
6 No. 16‐2055
party opposing arbitration is entitled to file a motion to lift the
stay. See 9 U.S.C. § 3.
We are unpersuaded by Rine’s arguments. The funda‐
mental flaw underlying her entire course of conduct is her
disregard of the long line of Supreme Court decisions uphold‐
ing the enforceability of arbitration clauses exactly like the
one in the Hunt–Moore Agreements. As we noted earlier,
Rine’s theory in the district court was that the arbitration
clause was only an agreement to agree in the future and thus
was unenforceable under Nebraska law. For support, she
pointed to Nebraska Nutrients, Inc. v. Shepherd, 626 N.W.2d 472
(Neb. 2001) and T.V. Transmission, Inc. v. City of Lincoln,
374 N.W.2d 49 (Neb. 1985). Yet neither of those cases has any‐
thing to do with arbitration, and so neither is of any use to
Rine, which perhaps is why she has not cited them on appeal.
As the Supreme Court repeatedly has said—most recently
in Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark, 137 S. Ct.
1421 (2017)—“[t]he Federal Arbitration Act … requires courts
to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other
contracts.” Id. at 1424 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
Kindred Nursing, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that its
state constitution forbade a person with a general power of
attorney from entering into an arbitration agreement for his
principal. The Supreme Court found this state law to be in‐
compatible with the FAA because it singled out arbitration
agreements for disfavored treatment, in violation of the
equal‐treatment principle that applies to arbitration agree‐
ments. See also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333,
339 (2011). And there is more: the Court has also held that ar‐
bitration clauses should be generously construed. See Granite
No. 16‐2055 7
Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 298 (2010). Rine’s
position is inconsistent with this guidance.
The fact that an agreement to arbitrate leaves for later ne‐
gotiations the selection of the particular arbitrator does not
render that agreement so vague as to be unenforceable. If that
were the case, then section 5 of the FAA, which provides for
the court to appoint an arbitrator in some circumstances,
would be pointless. Provisions in which the parties must
agree on one or more arbitrators are common. If they cannot
do so, as apparently happened in this case, the court is em‐
powered to step in and “designate and appoint an arbitrator
or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall
act under the said agreement with the same force and effect
as if he or they had been specifically named therein … .”
9 U.S.C. § 5; see also Green, 724 F.3d at 791 (“[A]rbitration
clauses remain enforceable if for ‘any’ reason there is ‘a lapse
in the naming of an arbitrator.’”). Green established that the
absence of an obligatory process for designating an arbitrator
is not the kind of lacuna that prevents the enforcement of the
arbitration agreement.
That is enough to show that Rine’s effort to avoid arbitra‐
tion was doomed. But if we had any doubts about the district
court’s imposition of sanctions, the remainder of Rine’s con‐
duct in the litigation would resolve them. Section 1927 per‐
mits sanctions against a lawyer who “so multiplies the pro‐
ceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously” that the
lawyer should be responsible for the excess costs, expenses,
and attorney’s fees borne by the other side. 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
This is the authority on which the district court relied. As we
said earlier, the court has broad discretion in implementing
this statute. We will reverse only if no reasonable person
8 No. 16‐2055
could have come to the same conclusion, in these circum‐
stances.
This was a simple commercial dispute between Hunt and
Moore, but one would never know that from reading Rine’s
complaint. She blew it up beyond all rational proportion. One
count asserted that there was an unspecified civil right of ac‐
tion to enforce the criminal laws against peonage. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1581. There is no support whatsoever for that theory. As far
as we can tell, only one court has considered it, and that judge
rejected the argument that section 1581 creates a civil right of
action. Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (D. R.I.
1978). Her RICO and antitrust arguments were also beyond
the pale. There is no RICO enterprise in sight, no pattern of
racketeering activity, and no conspiracy between Moore and
any other entity, as far as this record shows. And it is clear
under the antitrust laws that a simple decision by one firm to
stop dealing with another firm at a different point along the
distribution chain does not violate Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998). It is
also frivolous to imply that Moore had the kind of market
power necessary to support a claim under Sherman Act § 2,
15 U.S.C. § 2. As for the Illinois Employee Classification Act,
820 ILCS 185/1 et seq., while it does at least address the “prac‐
tice of misclassifying employees as independent contractors,”
id. § 3, nothing hints at why Illinois law governs this relation‐
ship between a Nebraska truck driver and a small Nebraska
company. The same is true of the claim that relies on Illinois
common law.
So Rine was off to a bad start, even before she filed the
motion that prompted the district court’s sanctions: her com‐
plaint was a disaster, and her efforts to avoid arbitration were
No. 16‐2055 9
meritless. Moreover, the key motion was one under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), but Rine failed to show the ex‐
ceptional circumstances required by that rule. See Bakery
Mach. & Fabrication, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc., 570 F.3d 845,
848 (7th Cir. 2009). As the district court pointed out, Rine was
“not offering newly discovered evidence, or arguing fraud or
misconduct … . Nor [was] counsel arguing that the Court’s
prior findings … [were] incorrect.” She was instead introduc‐
ing a meritless theory that the arbitration clause was unen‐
forceable as a matter of Nebraska law.
This court had already squarely rejected Rine’s theory in
Green, supra. Rine has tried to distinguish Green in her brief
before this court, but she has missed the forest for the trees.
She describes the question in Green as whether the clause re‐
quiring that the arbitrator be named by the parties was so cen‐
tral to the agreement that the arbitration could not proceed if
it failed. But she brushes past the fact that Green rejected this
way of thinking about the problem. See 724 F.3d at 791–92.
Instead, we asked whether “a reference to an unavailable
means of arbitration is equivalent to leaving the issue open.”
Id. at 792. The answer, we said, is “yes.” Id. Indeed, Green went
further than the present case requires, by suggesting that “de‐
tail‐free” arbitration clauses are enforceable. The district
court, though not compelled to do so, was entitled to regard
Rine’s approach as so objectively unreasonable that it called
for some kind of sanction under section 1927.
To determine the amount of sanctions it was prepared to
impose, the court ordered Moore to submit an affidavit de‐
scribing all fees that it had incurred in responding to Rine’s
motion. Moore did so, and based on the materials it submit‐
ted, the court settled on $7,427 (representing 27.6 hours of
10 No. 16‐2055
work) as the money Rine had to pay. This is a reasonable
measure of the cost Rine imposed on her opponent. She ar‐
gues that the sanction was too high, but she offers no support
for that position other than a convoluted argument to the ef‐
fect that Moore should be compensated only for the pages of
its brief that (she thinks) the district court adopted. As the dis‐
trict court put it, “it is unfathomable why she would invent an
algorithm rather than relying on the information supplied in
the Defendants’ affidavit.”
IV
We have no need to consider whether the sanctions im‐
posed by the district court were also justified under the court’s
inherent power. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–
46 (1991). Nor are we saying that the district court would have
erred if it had denied Moore’s sanctions motion. We hold only
that it lay within the district court’s broad discretion, in light
of all the circumstances of this case, to impose a calibrated
sanction on Rine for her conduct of the litigation, culminating
in the objectively baseless motion she filed in opposition to
arbitration. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s order im‐
posing sanctions.