J-S32015-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
DENNIS L. PRENDES :
:
Appellant : No. 2313 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order June 15, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0001246-2012
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JUNE 29, 2017
Appellant, Dennis L. Prendes, appeals from the order entered in the
Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition
brought pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
In its opinion, the PCRA court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant
facts and procedural history of this case.2 Therefore, we have no reason to
restate them.
____________________________________________
1
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
2
Throughout the opinion, the PCRA court cites Megan’s Law as the statute
governing Appellant’s sexual offender registration requirements. Megan’s
Law, however, expired on December 20, 2012. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9791-
9799.9. The Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)
became effective in its place. See 42 Pa.C.S.A §§ 9799.10─9799.41.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
___________________________
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S32015-17
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
WHERE TRIAL COUNSEL’S ERRORS LED TO A JURY THAT
WAS PRONE TO CONVICT WHICH, IN TURN, LED TO THE
PLEA OF GUILTY, AFTER COUNSEL SAW A DEADLOCKED
JURY’S TALLY SHOWING IT FAVORED CONVICTION,
PANICKED AND ESSENTIALLY FORCED APPELLANT TO
TAKE THE PLEA, DID THE [PCRA] COURT ERR IN NOT
PERMITTING THESE CLAIMS TO BE PRESENTED AT A PCRA
HEARING?
WHERE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN ADVISING
[APPELLANT] TO PLEAD GUILTY, DID THE [PCRA] COURT
ERR IN NOT GRANTING A NEW TRIAL?
WHERE COUNSEL COERCED [APPELLANT] TO PLEAD
GUILTY, DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING
A NEW TRIAL?
WHERE AFTER[-]DISCOVERED EVIDENCE MET ALL THE
TESTS FOR THE GRANT OF A NEW TRIAL, DID THE [PCRA]
COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING RELIEF IN THE PCRA
PROCEEDING OR HOLD A HEARING ON THIS ISSUE?
(Appellant’s Brief at 2).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Michael J.
Koury, Jr., we conclude Appellant’s issues on appeal merit no relief. The
PCRA court opinion comprehensively discusses and disposes of the questions
presented. (See PCRA Court Opinion, filed September 8, 2016, at 17-33)
(finding: (1) Appellant’s PCRA petition sought to raise various claims of
counsel’s ineffectiveness during trial; however, these claims do not address
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
SORNA governed Appellant’s January 11, 2013 SVP hearing and dictates
Appellant’s registration requirements. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.13.
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validity of Appellant’s guilty plea or legality of Appellant’s sentence; as such,
these claims are waived, and PCRA court properly prohibited Appellant from
exploring, at PCRA hearing, counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness during trial;
(2) with respect to trial counsel’s handling of jury’s straw vote, trial counsel
shared straw vote with Appellant and informed Appellant that straw vote
made trial counsel less confident in likelihood of acquittal; trial counsel also
discussed outcome of various scenarios with Appellant on numerous
occasions, including during jury deliberations; trial counsel’s actions were
based on twenty years of experience as criminal defense attorney; under
these circumstances, Appellant failed to establish counsel’s advice about
straw vote lacked reasonable basis or prejudiced Appellant; with respect to
trial counsel’s handling of SORNA implications, counsel prepared
memorandum for Appellant prior to trial, which described SORNA
implications of guilty plea including possibility of lifetime registration as sex
offender; Appellant acknowledged possibility of lifetime registration as sex
offender in both his written and oral plea colloquies; further, counsel
supplemented Appellant’s oral plea colloquy to address December 2012
amendments to statute, which extended required registration periods;
significantly, even if counsel had failed to inform Appellant of SORNA
implications, it would not have undermined validity of plea because sex
offender registration requirements are collateral consequence; thus,
Appellant’s claims that counsel was ineffective when he advised Appellant
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about guilty plea fail; (3) while Appellant alleges counsel’s references to
possible thirty-year sentence scared him, Pennsylvania law required trial
counsel to inform Appellant of permissible sentencing ranges; as such, trial
counsel’s references to potential thirty-year sentence did not unlawfully
induce Appellant’s guilty plea; additionally, trial counsel’s recommendation
that Appellant enter plea prior to jury’s verdict was reasonable and did not
coerce Appellant’s guilty plea; to succeed on claim, Appellant had to
establish jury’s verdict offered potential for success substantially greater
than entry of guilty plea; nevertheless, Appellant merely speculates jury
would not have reached verdict or would have acquitted Appellant of most
serious charges; under these circumstances, counsel’s advice to enter plea
prior to jury’s verdict did not unlawfully induce Appellant’s guilty plea;
finally, Appellant’s allegations of coercion directly contradict his plea
colloquies and his testimony at PCRA hearing; record indicates Appellant
freely and voluntarily entered his guilty plea; thus, Appellant’s claims that
trial counsel coerced his guilty plea fail; (4) alleged after-discovered
evidence does not exculpate Appellant as it merely impeaches credibility of
Commonwealth’s polygraph analyst; further, Appellant waived challenge to
credibility of Commonwealth’s polygraph analyst through entry of negotiated
guilty plea; because impeachment evidence does not establish basis for
relief and Appellant waived this claim through entry of guilty plea, court
properly denied relief and limited exploration of claim at PCRA hearing). The
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record supports the court’s analysis and belies Appellant’s allegations of
coercion and counsel’s ineffectiveness, where the plea colloquy makes clear
Appellant entered his guilty plea of his own volition, calmly, fully informed,
and expressly satisfied with the services of his counsel. (See N.T. Guilty
Plea, 9/18/12, at 22-40; R.R. at 33-51.) Appellant is bound by his
statements made under oath in the course of his plea and cannot, during
post-sentencing or collateral proceedings, attack the plea on grounds which
contradict the statements he made in his plea colloquy. See
Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa.Super. 2003) (stating
Pennsylvania law presumes defendant who entered guilty plea was aware of
what he was doing and bears burden of proving otherwise). Accordingly, we
affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s opinion.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/29/2017
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Circulated 06/07/2017 02:10 PM