NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 30 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OBED OMAR ESCOBAR-VASQUEZ, No. 16-70658
Petitioner, Agency No. A206-735-980
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 26, 2017**
Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Obed Omar Escobar-Vasquez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order summarily
affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for
withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial
evidence the agency’s factual findings. Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1062 (9th
Cir. 2013). We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.
We lack jurisdiction to consider Escobar-Vasquez’s contentions that his
claims should have been analyzed under a child-specific definition of persecution,
that victims of child abuse may constitute a particular social group, and his
arguments as to his experiences of childhood abuse, because he failed to raise them
before the agency. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004).
The BIA did not err by affirming, without opinion, the IJ’s decision. See
Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 850-52 (9th Cir. 2003).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination Escobar-Vasquez
failed to establish a nexus between the past harm he experienced in Guatemala and
a protected ground. See Pagayon v. Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“A personal dispute is not, standing alone, tantamount to persecution based on” a
protected ground). Escobar-Velasquez’s contention that he was entitled to a
presumption of future persecution therefore fails. See El Himri v. Ashcroft, 378
F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that a petitioner who did not establish
past persecution was therefore not entitled to a presumption of future persecution).
Escobar-Velasquez does not otherwise challenge the agency’s determination that
he failed to establish a likelihood of future persecution. Thus, his withholding of
2 16-70658
removal claim fails.
Finally, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Escobar-
Vasquez’s CAT claim because he failed to establish it is more likely than not he
would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if
returned to Guatemala. See Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir.
2008).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.
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