Robert W. Hunt, M.D. V.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 5 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT In re: ROBERT W. HUNT, M.D., a No. 14-60029 Medical Corporation, BAP No. 13-1148 Debtor. ______________________________ MEMORANDUM* PELI POPOVICH HUNT, Agent for Robert W. Hunt M.D. Medical Corporation & Trustee of 2007 Restated Robert & Peli Hunt Living Trust, Appellant, v. DAVID M. GOODRICH, Chapter 7 Trustee; UNITED STATES TRUSTEE, Los Angeles, Appellees. Appeal from the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Kurtz, Pappas, and Taylor, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding Submitted June 26, 2017** * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges. Peli Popovich Hunt appeals pro se from a judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirming the bankruptcy court’s order denying the corporate debtor’s claimed exemptions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo decisions of the BAP and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 2010). To the extent Hunt is challenging the bankruptcy court’s order as the representative of a trust or the corporate debtor, the appeal is dismissed because Hunt, as a non-attorney, “has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than [her]self.” C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1987). To the extent Hunt is challenging the bankruptcy court’s order directly as an individual, the appeal is dismissed because Hunt is not a “person aggrieved” by the bankruptcy court’s order and, therefore, lacks standing to prosecute the appeal. See Duckor Spradling & Metzger v. Baum Trust (In re P.R.T.C., Inc.), 177 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1999). DISMISSED. 2 14-60029