People v. Brooks

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA80

Court of Appeals No. 13CA1750
Boulder County District Court Nos. 11CR1849 & 11CR1850
Honorable Maria E. Berkenkotter, Judge
Honorable Roxanne Bailin, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Kyle Brooks,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE BERGER
Dailey and J. Jones, JJ., concur

Announced June 15, 2017

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Christine Brady, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Jud Lohnes, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 A jury convicted defendant, Kyle Brooks, of eight substantive

offenses, including two counts of tampering with a witness or

victim. The district court adjudicated Brooks a habitual criminal

under section 18-1.3-801(2), C.R.S. 2016, and imposed a statutorily

mandated sentence of twenty-four years’ imprisonment.

¶2 Brooks appeals, claiming that (1) there was insufficient

evidence to support one of his convictions of tampering with a

witness or victim; (2) in adjudicating him a habitual criminal, the

district court improperly took judicial notice of material in court

files; (3) his guilty plea in one of the underlying convictions on the

habitual criminal charges was constitutionally invalid, thus voiding

his habitual criminal conviction; and (4) the court erred in

concluding that his sentence was not disproportionate and in failing

to conduct an extended proportionality review of his sentence.

Because we hold as a matter of first impression that the tampering

with a witness or victim statute does not require that the “attempt”

to tamper actually be communicated to the victim or witness, we

reject Brooks’ sufficiency argument. We also reject his other

contentions and affirm the judgment and sentence.

1
 I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History

¶3 Brooks discovered that his girlfriend was pregnant with

another man’s child, argued with her, and then assaulted her. A

bystander called the police. Before the police arrived, Brooks fled.

¶4 The police planned to arrest Brooks when he appeared for an

unrelated court appearance. When officers contacted Brooks at the

courthouse, he resisted arrest and struggled with them. The

officers restrained and arrested him.

¶5 While in jail, Brooks repeatedly telephoned his girlfriend (the

victim) and others in an attempt to persuade them not to testify

against him on the domestic violence charge or to testify falsely.

The jail recorded these conversations and turned them over to the

prosecution. These telephone calls were the basis for Brooks’ first

conviction for tampering with a witness or victim, a class 4 felony.

Brooks does not appeal that conviction.

¶6 After the jail officers learned of these telephone calls, Brooks’

telephone privileges were discontinued, but that did not stop him

from further trying to tamper with the victim. Instead of phone

calls, he wrote letters to the victim to persuade her either not to

testify or to testify falsely on his behalf. Because he knew that if he

2
 attempted to mail the letters to the victim they would be intercepted

by the jail, he hid them in an issue of Westword magazine and

asked his cellmate to deliver them to the victim after the cellmate

was released from jail. His cellmate refused to participate and

instead gave the letters to a jail officer. As a result of this

interception, the victim never received the letters. These letters

formed the basis of the prosecution’s second count of tampering

with a witness or victim.

¶7 The jury acquitted Brooks of assault in the second degree

(either a class 4 or class 6 felony) and two counts of disarming a

peace officer (a class 5 felony), but the jury convicted him of two

counts of assault in the third degree against the victim (a class 1

misdemeanor), two counts of assault in the third degree against a

peace officer (a class 1 misdemeanor), resisting arrest (a class 2

misdemeanor), violation of a protection order (a class 1

misdemeanor), and the two counts of tampering with a witness or

victim (both class 4 felonies) discussed above.

¶8 After the jury returned its verdicts, the district court held a

trial on the habitual criminal count and adjudicated Brooks a

3
 habitual criminal. The court imposed a twenty-four-year sentence

of imprisonment, as mandated by the habitual criminal statute.

¶9 Brooks requested and received an abbreviated proportionality

review of the mandatory sentence. At the conclusion of that

hearing, the district court concluded that Brooks’ sentence was not

disproportionate to his offenses and denied him an extended

proportionality review.

II. There Was Sufficient Evidence to Support Brooks’ Conviction
For Tampering With a Witness or Victim

¶ 10 Brooks argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict

him of the second count of tampering with a witness or victim

based on the letters because the victim never received them.1

Because this argument relies on an unwarranted reading of the

tampering statute, we reject it.

1 Contrary to the Attorney General’s claim, Brooks did not waive
this argument. Brooks conceded there was sufficient evidence to
convict him of the supposed inchoate crime of attempt to tamper
with a witness or victim, but he did not concede there was sufficient
evidence to convict him of the substantive crime of tampering with a
witness or victim. Because Brooks contended the inchoate crime
and the substantive crime were substantially different, his
concession that there was sufficient evidence to convict him of the
uncharged inchoate crime did not waive his sufficiency of the
evidence claim regarding the substantive crime of which he was
convicted.

4
¶ 11 The statute provides as follows:

A person commits tampering with a witness or
victim if he intentionally attempts without
bribery or threats to induce a witness or victim
or a person he believes is to be called to testify
as a witness or victim in any official proceeding
or who may be called to testify as a witness to
or victim of any crime to:

(a) Testify falsely or unlawfully withhold any
testimony; or

(b) Absent himself from any official proceeding
to which he has been legally summoned; or

(c) Avoid legal process summoning him to
testify.

§ 18-8-707(1), C.R.S. 2016 (emphasis added).

¶ 12 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de

novo. Marsh v. People, 2017 CO 10M, ¶ 19; Wolf Ranch, LLC v. City

of Colorado Springs, 220 P.3d 559, 563 (Colo. 2009). We begin by

applying two principles to the words and phrases at issue in the

statute. First, we give the words and phrases their plain and

ordinary meaning according to the rules of grammar and common

usage. People v. Voth, 2013 CO 61, ¶ 21, Sidman v. Sidman, 2016

COA 44, ¶ 13; § 2-4-101, C.R.S. 2016. Second, we consider the

words or phrases both in the context of the statute and in the

context of any comprehensive statutory scheme of which the statute

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 is a part. Doubleday v. People, 2016 CO 3, ¶ 20; Jefferson Cty. Bd.

of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo. 2010). By

applying these principles, we attempt to determine the General

Assembly’s intended meaning of the words or phrases, and

harmonize that meaning with the comprehensive statutory scheme.

Id. If the statutory language is not susceptible of more than one

reasonable meaning, we enforce it as written and do not resort to

other rules of statutory construction. Davison v. Indus. Claim

Appeals Office, 84 P.3d 1023, 1036 (Colo. 2004); People v. Dist.

Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo. 1986).

¶ 13 Brooks argues that while an attempt to tamper need not be

successful, the statute nevertheless requires that the attempt to

tamper must at least reach the victim or witness.2 Because it is

undisputed that the letters did not reach the victim, Brooks claims

that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. He

concedes that he is guilty of a criminal attempt, as defined in

section 18-2-101(1), C.R.S. 2016, to tamper with a witness or

2 Brooks did not waive this argument either. He acquiesced in the
trial court’s elemental instruction on tampering with a witness or
victim but did not waive his argument that, to sustain a conviction,
the tampering had to actually be communicated to the victim.

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 victim, but notes that he was not charged with this crime (a crime

that, as we discuss below, does not exist).

¶ 14 We reject this argument because the concept of attempt is

built into the tampering statute — the crime is completed when a

defendant “intentionally attempts” to tamper with a victim or

witness. § 18-8-707(1). If there were such a crime as attempted

tampering with a witness or victim, it would be defined as “engaging

in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of

the offense” of “intentionally attempt[ing]” to tamper with a witness

or victim. See §§ 18-2-101(1), 18-8-707. We conclude that no such

crime exists because it would be illogical to recognize a crime

premised on an attempt to attempt, and “[a] statutory interpretation

leading to an illogical or absurd result will not be followed.” Frazier

v. People, 90 P.3d 807, 811 (Colo. 2004).

¶ 15 People v. Yascavage, 101 P.3d 1090 (Colo. 2004), does not

require a different result. In Yascavage, the Colorado Supreme

Court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the

defendant’s conviction for solicitation to tamper with a witness or

victim. Id. at 1096. Brooks argues that the court’s recognition of

the crime of solicitation to tamper with a witness or victim

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 necessitates the recognition of the crime of attempting to tamper

with a witness or victim. Brooks cites no authority, and we have

found none, for the proposition that the existence of one inchoate

form of an offense requires the existence of other inchoate forms of

the offense.

¶ 16 We also observe that the Yascavage court held that “[t]he

purpose of the [tampering with a witness or victim statute] was to

punish any attempt to induce another to testify falsely or otherwise

to subvert the administration of justice.” Id. at 1092 (emphasis

added). Thus, Yascavage provides no support for Brooks’

contention that there is a crime of attempt to attempt to tamper

with a witness or victim.

¶ 17 Neither does People v. Scialabba, 55 P.3d 207 (Colo. App.

2002), in which the division held that the defendant, who was

charged with witness tampering, was not entitled to an instruction

on the affirmative defense of abandonment. The defendant sent a

letter to the victim trying to convince her not to appear in court and

also asked his mother to tell the victim not to appear in court. Id.

at 210. Because the defendant had completed the crime when he

sent the letter and asked his mother to dissuade the victim from

8
 testifying, the division held that he was not entitled to an

abandonment instruction. Id. at 210-11. Contrary to Brooks’

contention, the division did not hold that attempted but

unaccomplished communication with the victim or witness could

not support a conviction under the statute.

¶ 18 Nothing in the plain language of the statute requires that the

defendant actually contact a witness or victim either. Rather, an

attempt by the defendant to do so is all the statute requires in this

respect. The trial court instructed the jury that “attempt” in the

tampering with a witness or victim statute means, “intentionally

engaging in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the

commission of the crime of Tampering with a Witness.”3 The jury

3 Brooks makes a perfunctory argument that the trial court erred
when it defined the word “attempt” by utilizing the definition
contained in the criminal attempt statute, section 18-2-101, C.R.S.
2016. Brooks contends that the common dictionary definition of
“attempt” should have been used instead. The common meaning of
the word attempt is “to make an effort to do, accomplish, solve, or
effect.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 140 (2002).
But the use of the statutory definition of criminal attempt was more
favorable to Brooks than the dictionary definition because it
imposed a greater proof burden on the prosecution. Therefore, any
error in this respect could not have harmed Brooks. This
conclusion also makes it unnecessary for us to determine in this
case what meaning should be given to the word “attempt” in the

9
 was entitled to find that Brooks did everything within his power to

attempt to unlawfully influence the victim. He wrote the letters,

concealed them from the jail staff, and asked another inmate to

deliver them to the victim. The fact that Brooks’ scheme failed

provides him no defense.

¶ 19 For these reasons, we conclude that there was sufficient

evidence to support Brooks’ second conviction for tampering with a

witness or victim.

III. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Taking
Judicial Notice of Court Files in the Habitual Criminal
Adjudication, and Sufficient Evidence Supported the Habitual
Criminal Adjudication

¶ 20 Brooks argues that the district court abused its discretion in

taking judicial notice of the complete case files of his prior felony

convictions and that without such improper judicial notice there

was insufficient evidence to support the habitual criminal

adjudication.

tampering statute. “[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is
necessary not to decide more[.]” PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enf’t
Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).

10
¶ 21 A conviction under the habitual criminal statute at issue

requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a

defendant has three prior felony convictions arising out of separate

and distinct criminal episodes. § 18-1.3-801(2)(a)(I)(A).

¶ 22 Brooks contends that only by taking judicial notice of

documents that were not properly subject to judicial notice could

the court have found that his prior convictions for criminal trespass

of a dwelling and theft from a person “relate to different criminal

conduct on separate dates and that the People have separately

brought and tried those offenses.” Because the predicate of his

argument is wrong, we reject it.

¶ 23 Brooks concedes (for good reason) that the district court was

entitled to take judicial notice of the registers of actions contained

in the Integrated Colorado Online Network in the underlying cases.

See, e.g., People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d 51, 56 (Colo. App. 2004) (“A

court may take judicial notice of the contents of court records in a

related proceeding.”). But he argues that the registers of actions

themselves were insufficient to make a prima facie case that two of

his three prior felonies related to different criminal conduct on

separate dates and were separately brought and tried.

11
¶ 24 The registers of actions for these felony convictions establish

the following:

 In Boulder District Court case number 10CR716, Brooks

pleaded guilty to first degree trespass of a dwelling on June

18, 2010, with an offense date of February 5, 2010.

 In Boulder District Court case number 10CR760, Brooks

pleaded guilty to theft from a person June 18, 2010, with an

offense date of April 17, 2010.

The information contained in the registers of actions made a prima

facie showing that these cases addressed different criminal conduct

that occurred on different dates.

¶ 25 But because Brooks entered guilty pleas in both cases on the

same date and in the same court, whether the prosecution

separately brought and tried these cases is a closer question. The

proof required to establish whether two guilty pleas entered on the

same date would have been separately tried is whether — under the

mandatory joinder statute — they arose out of separate and distinct

criminal episodes. People v. Jones, 967 P.2d 166, 169 (Colo. App.

1997). Information such as the dates on which the crimes were

committed and the types of crimes committed may prove that the

12
 crimes were separate and distinct criminal episodes. People v.

Copeland, 976 P.2d 334, 342 (Colo. App. 1998), aff’d, 2 P.3d 1283

(Colo. 2000).

¶ 26 In People v. Jones, 967 P.2d 166, 170 (Colo. App. 1997), it was

plausible that two crimes, which were both burglaries, committed

on consecutive dates, and in the same area, could have arisen from

a single criminal episode. Therefore, without additional evidence

about the underlying convictions, the division concluded that there

was insufficient proof that the defendant’s convictions arose from

separate and distinct criminal episodes. Id.

¶ 27 However, unlike in Jones, the registers of actions relevant to

this case showed that the two prior felony convictions were for

distinct criminal offenses that occurred months apart. Thus, even

though Brooks pleaded guilty on the same day and in the same

court, the registers of actions made a prima facie case that his

criminal trespassing of a dwelling and theft from a person

convictions arose “from charges which, had they not been

adjudicated through the entry of guilty pleas, would have been tried

separately.” Gimmy v. People, 645 P.2d 262, 267 (Colo. 1982).

Both cases were “separately ‘brought’ — i.e., in separate

13
 informations, with separate docket numbers, arising out of separate

criminal incidents.” Id.

¶ 28 While Brooks was free to attempt to disprove these facts, he

chose not to do so. It follows that sufficient evidence supported

Brooks’ habitual criminal conviction.

IV. Brooks’ Guilty Plea to Felony Theft Was Valid

¶ 29 Brooks argues that his plea of guilty to felony theft from a

person — his third underlying felony conviction — was

constitutionally invalid and thus could not support his habitual

criminal conviction.

¶ 30 “A prior conviction obtained in a constitutionally invalid

manner cannot be used against an accused in a subsequent

criminal proceeding to support guilt or to increase punishment.”

Lacy v. People, 775 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo. 1989).

¶ 31 To attack the constitutional validity of his prior conviction, a

defendant must make a prima facie showing that the challenged

conviction was unconstitutionally obtained. Watkins v. People, 655

P.2d 834, 837 (Colo. 1982). “A prima facie showing in the context

of this case means evidence which, when considered in a light most

favorable to the defendant with all reasonable inferences drawn in

14
 his favor, will permit the court to conclude that the defendant’s plea

of guilty was not understandingly made.” Id.

¶ 32 Brooks arguably made such a prima facie case by

demonstrating that the plea court did not advise him of all the

“critical elements” of felony theft, section 18-4-401(5), C.R.S. 2016.

During the providency hearing, the court had the following

exchange with Brooks:

Court: How do you plead with respect to that
added Count 2 which charges on or about
April 17, 2010, in or triable in the County of
Boulder, State of Colorado, you unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly took a thing of
value, namely a purse, from the person of
[female victim], in violation of Section 18-4-
401, sub 1, sub 5, CRS?

. . . Mr. Brooks, how do you plead with respect
to added Count 2?

Brooks: I wish to plead guilty, Your Honor.

¶ 33 The court’s advisement and the charging document (which

mirrored the court’s advisement) did not advise Brooks of the

specific intent element of the crime: a defendant must “[i]ntend[] to

deprive the other person permanently of the use or benefit of the

thing of value.” § 18-4-401(1)(a). Thus, for present purposes we

assume that Brooks’ conviction was constitutionally invalid unless

15
 the prosecution established by a preponderance of the evidence that

Brooks’ plea met constitutional requirements. Watkins, 655 P.2d at

837.

¶ 34 A plea is constitutionally valid when the defendant enters it

voluntarily and knowingly. Lacy, 775 P.2d at 4. Colorado cases

“have recognized that the degree of explanation that a court should

provide depends on the nature and complexity of the crime and that

no particular litany need be followed in accepting a tendered plea of

guilty.” Id. at 6. The record as a whole must demonstrate that the

defendant understood the critical elements of the crime and the

possible penalty or penalties. Id. at 4-5.

¶ 35 Based on the record as a whole, the district court found that

Brooks’ plea to the theft charge was voluntary and that Brooks

understood the elements of the crime to which he pleaded guilty.

The court found that the facts of the underlying crime were that

Brooks distracted a woman so that another man could steal her

purse. Considering these facts, the court held that “the very nature

of the underlying crime would advise Mr. Brooks . . . that this theft

was one that involved an intent to permanently deprive.” We agree.

16
¶ 36 If the law were as Brooks contends — that the defendant must

always be advised expressly of every element of the crime to validate

the conviction under the habitual criminal statute — we would

agree with him. But the law is otherwise.

¶ 37 Brooks relies on two Colorado Supreme Court cases, People v.

Colosacco, 177 Colo. 219, 493 P.2d 650 (1972), and Lacy, 775 P.2d

1, where the trial court’s failure to include a meaningful explanation

of the specific intent element of the crime was fatal to the validity of

the conviction. But Colosacco and Lacy are factually

distinguishable because in those cases, unlike this one, the

underlying nature of the crime required the court to inform the

defendant of the crime’s specific intent element.

¶ 38 In Colosacco, the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of

counterfeit checks after the judge advised him that the nature of

the charge was “possession of the forged or counterfeit [checks] with

knowledge that they were counterfeit.” 177 Colo. at 221, 493 P.2d

at 650. Under the facts presented, the defendant could have

reasonably believed that he was guilty of the crime simply by

possessing checks, irrespective of whether he intended to pass them

with the intent to defraud. Thus, because the judge “failed . . . to

17
 advise the defendant that the intent to utter and pass the notes

with intent to defraud was an essential element of the charge,” the

supreme court concluded that the defendant’s guilty plea was

invalid. Id. at 221-22, 493 P.2d at 650-51.

¶ 39 In Lacy, the Colorado Supreme Court considered a guilty plea

to theft of a car. 775 P.2d at 8. The victim testified that she had

loaned the car to the defendant on past occasions but that she had

not given him permission to use it on the occasion that gave rise to

the theft charge. Id. Therefore, without an explanation of the

specific intent element, the defendant could have reasonably

believed that he was guilty of theft for borrowing the victim’s car,

even if he did not intend to permanently deprive her of it. Because

the providency hearing was “entirely devoid of any accurate or

understandable explanation of the charge,” the defendant’s plea

was invalid. Id. at 9.

¶ 40 The facts and crimes in Colosacco and Lacy are

distinguishable from Brooks’ theft of a purse from a person whom

he did not know. We agree with the district court that it is

inconceivable that forcibly grabbing a stranger’s purse would be for

18
 any purpose other than to permanently deprive the owner of her

property.

¶ 41 Several out-of-state cases further support this analysis.

¶ 42 In State v. Gabert, 564 A.2d 1356, 1358 (Vt. 1989), the

defendant pleaded guilty to lewd and lascivious conduct. He

conceded that he understood the charge, but he argued that his

plea was invalid because of “the court’s failure to explain that the

crime involves acts intentionally done ‘with a view to excite

unchaste feelings and passions.’” Id. (citation omitted). The

Vermont Supreme Court rejected this argument, concluding that

the plea was valid because “under the circumstances here further

inquiry about intent was unnecessary. The alleged acts could

hardly give rise to an equivocal motivation . . . .” Id.

¶ 43 In State v. Brooks, 586 P.2d 1270, 1271 (Ariz. 1978), the

defendant challenged the validity of his guilty plea to child

molestation. He argued there was no evidence that he understood

intent to be an essential element of the crime. Id. Under Arizona

law, “[a]n essential element of the offense of child molestation . . . is

that the acts involved be ‘motivated by an unnatural or abnormal

sexual interest or intent with respect to children.’” Id. at 1272

19
 (citation omitted). But “[a]t no time during [the court’s] questioning

of defendant prior to [the court’s] acceptance of his guilty plea did

[the court] inquire into his motivation for the offense.” Id. The

Arizona Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument because

the “defendant’s acts by their very nature manifest that he was

motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intent

with respect to children.” Id. at 1273.

¶ 44 By contrast, in Patton v. State, 810 N.E.2d 690, 691 (Ind.

2004), the defendant pleaded “guilty to attempted murder without

knowing that specific intent to kill was an element of that offense.”

The Indiana Supreme Court found the defendant’s plea was invalid

because the evidence did not demonstrate specific intent beyond a

reasonable doubt. Id. at 698-99. But the court also held that

“failure of notice that specific intent is an element of attempted

murder will constitute harmless error . . . where during the course

of the guilty plea or sentencing proceedings, the defendant

unambiguously admits to, or there is other evidence of, facts that

demonstrate specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 696-

97.

20
¶ 45 For all of these reasons, we conclude that the felony theft

conviction was constitutionally valid and that the district court

properly found it to be a predicate felony conviction for Brooks’

habitual criminal adjudication.

¶ 46 Brooks also argues that, in addition to the specific intent

element of theft, the court should have explained the elements of

complicity to him, as was required in People v. Martin, 791 P.2d

1159, 1161-62 (Colo. App. 1989).

¶ 47 In Martin, a division of this court held that a defendant’s guilty

plea was constitutionally defective because the court did not explain

the elements of complicity to him. Id. Defense counsel explained to

the court that the defendant had accepted the fruits of a burglary

and only pleaded guilty to burglary based on a theory of complicity.

Id. at 1161.

¶ 48 However, Martin is different from the present case for three

reasons. First, Brooks was more directly involved in the theft than

the defendant in Martin was in the burglary. Second, Brooks

pleaded guilty as a principal and not, like the defendant in Martin,

as a complicitor. Finally, complicity liability in a burglary by after-

the-fact involvement is more complex than Brooks’ immediate

21
 involvement in the crime of theft. Thus, unlike in Martin, the court

did not render Brooks’ plea unconstitutional by failing to explain

the elements of complicity.

¶ 49 For these reasons, we conclude that Brooks made his plea

voluntarily and knowingly and that the district court did not err in

finding that it was a valid prior felony conviction under the habitual

criminal statute.4

V. Brooks’ Habitual Criminal Sentence Was Not Grossly
Disproportionate to His Crimes

¶ 50 A habitual criminal sentence violates the Eighth Amendment if

it is grossly disproportionate to the defendant’s crimes. See People

v. Deroulet, 48 P.3d 520, 523-24 (Colo. 2002). Brooks argues that

the district court erred in concluding that his sentence was not

grossly disproportionate to his crimes and in not granting him an

extended proportionality review. We reject his argument.

4 Although we conclude that Brooks’ plea was voluntary and
knowing, we do not agree with the Attorney General that this is so
solely because Brooks conferred with his counsel. “[A] showing that
defense counsel gave some explanation to his client of the charge to
which the guilty plea is tendered does not by itself sufficiently
demonstrate that the defendant knew the critical elements of the
crime when the plea was entered.” Lacy v. People, 775 P.2d 1, 6
(Colo. 1989).

22
¶ 51 If a defendant challenges the proportionality of a habitual

criminal sentence, the defendant “is entitled to an abbreviated

proportionality review of his or her sentence under the habitual

criminal statute.” People v. Cooper, 205 P.3d 475, 479 (Colo. App.

2008), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Scott v. People,

2017 CO 16. When conducting an abbreviated proportionality

review, a reviewing court scrutinizes the triggering and predicate

offenses in question to determine “‘whether in combination they are

so lacking in gravity or seriousness’ so as to suggest that the

sentence is grossly disproportionate.” Deroulet, 48 P.3d at 524-25

(citation omitted).

¶ 52 Colorado courts have held that certain crimes are per se grave

or serious. People v. Gaskins, 825 P.2d 30, 37 (Colo. 1992). These

crimes are grave or serious “by their very nature.” Id. For other

crimes, “the determination of whether the crime is grave or serious

depends on the facts and circumstances underlying the offense.”

People v. Hargrove, 2013 COA 165, ¶ 12. Specifically, courts look to

“whether the crime involves violence, and the absolute magnitude of

the crime” and compare that to the culpability and motive of the

defendant. Gaskins, 825 P.2d at 36-37.

23
¶ 53 “If, and only if, that abbreviated proportionality review gives

rise to an inference of gross disproportionality does a . . . court need

to engage in an extended proportionality review,” in which it

compares the sentence at issue to sentences for the same offense in

the same jurisdiction and other jurisdictions. Close v. People, 48

P.3d 528, 536 (Colo. 2002). If the abbreviated proportionality

review yields no inference of gross disproportionality, the district

court must impose the sentence mandated by the habitual criminal

statute. Hargrove, ¶ 14.

¶ 54 Whether an abbreviated proportionality review yields an

inference of gross disproportionality is a question of law that we

review de novo. People v. McNally, 143 P.3d 1062, 1064 (Colo. App.

2005).

A. Triggering Offenses

¶ 55 Tampering with a witness or victim is not a per se “grave or

serious” offense. However, we agree with the district court that the

facts underlying these crimes were grave or serious.

¶ 56 The district court explained that Brooks’ attempts to tamper

with the victim constituted “an extensive and extreme scheme to

tamper with the witness; in fact, I have never seen anything like it.”

24
¶ 57 The prosecution identified at least 250 phone conversations in

which Brooks attempted to tamper with a witness or victim.

Further, as noted above, even after his conduct came to light, his

phone privileges were suspended, and he was charged with the first

count of tampering, Brooks continued his attempts to tamper with

the victim.5 For these reasons, we conclude that his conduct

demonstrated a blatant disregard for the law and thus constituted a

grave or serious offense.

B. Predicate Offenses

¶ 58 We agree with Brooks that his predicate offenses of criminal

trespass of a motor vehicle, criminal trespass of a dwelling, and

theft from a person were not per se grave or serious. None of these

offenses fall within the list of offenses designated as per se grave or

serious by Colorado courts. See Deroulet, 48 P.3d at 524. But, as

we have explained above, that does not end the inquiry. We must

5 To the extent that Brooks argues that his alcohol and drug
problems mitigated the seriousness of his conduct regarding
tampering with a witness or victim, we reject the argument because
we assume that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol
while he was in jail pending trial.

25
 also consider the particular facts of these offenses to determine if

they were grave or serious. Hargrove, ¶ 12.

¶ 59 The underlying facts of the criminal trespass of a motor vehicle

conviction were that Brooks broke into a victim’s car and stole some

property. As for the criminal trespass of a dwelling conviction, the

underlying facts were that Brooks took property from a house

during a party to which he had been invited. The underlying facts

of Brooks’ theft from a person conviction were that he distracted a

woman by asking for a cigarette, so that another man could steal

her purse.

¶ 60 Even if we assume without deciding that the predicate offenses

were not grave or serious, that too does not end the matter.

Instead, we must consider the triggering and predicate offenses as a

whole. Deroulet, 48 P.3d at 524-25.

C. Comparison of Gravity of Crimes to Severity of Punishment

¶ 61 We now compare the gravity of Brooks’ offenses as a whole to

the severity of his twenty-four-year habitual criminal sentence,

giving great deference to the General Assembly’s determinations of

criminal penalties. Id. at 527.

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¶ 62 While Brooks’ predicate offenses were not per se grave or

serious, Brooks’ triggering offenses were grave or serious. As the

district court explained, Brooks’ tampering was a “persuasive and

unrelenting campaign to manipulate the cooperation of the victim.”

The tampering offenses are notable not only for the number of times

Brooks tried to influence the victim (the prosecution cited 250

phone calls in its first tampering charge) and the blatantly

manipulative nature of the communications, but also for the fact

that Brooks could not be dissuaded from tampering with the victim.

Brooks continued tampering with the victim after the prosecution

charged him with the first count of tampering and his phone

privileges were discontinued. As the district court noted, the nature

of these offenses demonstrates that Brooks was “uncontrollable in

the community and commits crimes and doesn’t appear to be able

to stop committing crimes.”

¶ 63 Further, “it is appropriate for the court conducting the

proportionality review to consider” aggravating or mitigating

information about the defendant. People v. Austin, 799 P.2d 408,

413 (Colo. App. 1990). We recognize that Brooks was acquitted of

several felony charges but also note that he was convicted of the

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 lesser included misdemeanor offenses of two counts of assault in

the third degree against his pregnant girlfriend, two counts of third

degree assault against a peace officer, and resisting arrest. All of

these crimes involved violence. Following Austin, we consider

Brooks’ conduct underlying these misdemeanor convictions in

determining whether the sentence imposed was grossly

disproportionate. Considering all of the convictions and the

underlying circumstances as a whole, we agree with the district

court that Brooks’ twenty-four-year mandatory sentence was not

grossly disproportionate.6

VI. Conclusion

¶ 64 The judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.

JUDGE DAILEY and JUDGE J. JONES concur.

6 In addition to the offenses discussed above, the district court
considered Brooks’ separate felony conviction for contributing to the
delinquency of a minor, which was entered after his conviction
under the habitual criminal statute. The contributing to the
delinquency of a minor conviction was based on events that
predated the triggering offenses, but the judgment of conviction was
not entered until Brooks was sentenced under the habitual criminal
statute. Therefore, this conviction could not have served as a
predicate offense (and indeed, it was not pleaded as such). People
v. Loyas, 259 P.3d 505, 512 (Colo. App. 2010). Whether erroneous
or not, the district court’s consideration of this conviction does not
alter our analysis or conclusion.

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