CLD-300 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 17-2288
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IN RE: WILLIAM ROHLAND,
Petitioner
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On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(Related to M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 1-17-cv-00333)
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Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
July 6, 2017
Before: SHWARTZ, RENDELL and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 13, 2017)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
William Rohland, proceeding pro se, petitions for a writ of mandamus in
connection with his habeas petition that is pending before the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. For the reasons that follow, we will deny the
petition.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
I.
Rohland is a Pennsylvania state prisoner who is serving life in prison for murder.
In February 2017, he filed a pro se habeas petition in the District Court, appearing to
challenge a protection-from-abuse order issued against him by a state court judge. Over
the next few months, Rohland submitted numerous filings in his habeas case, including
one titled “‘Rule 600’ Prompt Trial” (filed in March 2017), another titled
“‘Extraordinary’ Relief” (filed in April 2017), and a third titled “‘Demand’ Immediate
Emergency Bail and Bail Hearing” (filed in May 2017). Those three filings, and his
habeas case generally, remain pending before the District Court. Rohland has now filed
this mandamus petition, asking us to direct the District Court to rule on those three
filings.
II.
A district court generally has discretion over the management of its docket. See In
re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982). Although a writ of
mandamus may issue when a district court’s “undue delay is tantamount to a failure to
exercise jurisdiction,” Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996), those
circumstances are not present in this case, for the three District Court filings at issue here
have been pending for only a few months. Cf. id. (concluding that mandamus relief was
not warranted in habeas case where the petitioner’s most recent filing had been pending
before the district court for about eight months). Furthermore, Rohland has not otherwise
demonstrated that mandamus relief is warranted here. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab.
2
Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005) (indicating that a writ of mandamus is a drastic
remedy that is available in extraordinary circumstances only); see also Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (explaining that, to obtain the writ, a
petitioner must show that “(1) no other adequate means [exist] to attain the relief he
desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the
writ is appropriate under the circumstances”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Accordingly, we will deny Rohland’s mandamus petition.1 To the
extent that he also asks us to (a) grant him “[i]mmediate [r]elease or [p]rotection,” and
(b) issue a restraining order against all Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
employees, those requests are denied.
1
We trust that the District Court will rule on Rohland’s filings in due course.
3