J-S40029-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
CHRISTOPHER ANTILL, :
:
Appellee : No. 1450 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order April 15, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No.: MC-51-CR-0043141-2014
BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY 14, 2017
In the instant matter, the Commonwealth appeals from the April 15,
2016 Order, entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas,
granting Christopher Antill’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The
Commonwealth argues that the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas
erroneously reversed the Philadelphia Municipal Court’s denial of Antill’s
Motion to Suppress the results of a warrantless blood test obtained following
his DUI arrest. After careful review, we remand for further proceedings
consistent with this memorandum, including the entry of findings of fact and
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S40029-17
conclusions of law by the Municipal Court in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P.
581(I).
On December 25, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a Criminal Complaint
in the Philadelphia Municipal Court charging Antill with five counts of Driving
Under the Influence (“DUI”).1 On September 30, 2015, Antill presented a
Motion to Suppress in the Municipal Court, claiming that: (1) the police
lacked probable cause to detain and arrest him for DUI, and (2) the police
conducted a warrantless blood draw, which constituted an illegal search
under Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013), and
Commonwealth v. Myers, 118 A.3d 1122 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal
granted, 131 A.3d 480 (Pa. 2016).
The Commonwealth presented testimony from Philadelphia Police
Officers Christian Chavez and Heriberto Velez; Appellant presented no
evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Municipal Court denied
Antill’s Motion to Suppress without entering findings of fact or conclusions of
law. The court simply announced: “Motion denied. I stand recused.” N.T.
Motion, 9/30/15, at 44.
On November 18, 2015, Antill proceeded to trial before another
Municipal Court judge, who found Antill guilty of all charges. On January 19,
2016, the Municipal Court imposed an aggregate term of three days to six
____________________________________________
1
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) (two counts); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c); 75 Pa.C.S. §
3802(d)(2); and 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(3), respectively.
-2-
J-S40029-17
months’ imprisonment with immediate parole, with a concurrent term of six
months’ probation.
On February 18, 2016, Antill filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, arguing that the Municipal
Court erroneously decided the Motion to Suppress. The Court of Common
Pleas granted Antill’s Petition on April 15, 2016, concluding that the
warrantless blood test was illegal under Myers, supra. The Court of
Common Pleas vacated Antill’s Judgment of Sentence, and reversed the
Municipal Court’s ruling on the Motion to Suppress.
On May 11, 2016, the Commonwealth filed a timely Notice of Appeal.2
Both the Commonwealth and the Court of Common Pleas complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.3
The Commonwealth presents one issue in this appeal:
Did the lower court, sitting as an appellate court, err in reversing
the denial of suppression of blood test evidence based on
defendant’s lack of affirmative consent, notwithstanding his
verbal consent and the implied consent statute?
____________________________________________
2
See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) (Commonwealth may appeal as of right from Order
that does not end entire case where Commonwealth certifies in Notice of
Appeal that Order will terminate or substantially handicap prosecution).
Here, the Commonwealth included in its Notice of Appeal a certification that
the April 15, 2016 Order, granting Antill’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
“terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution.” Commonwealth’s
Notice of Appeal, 5/11/16. The Commonwealth simultaneously filed a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of Errors.
3
The suppression court did not file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion.
-3-
J-S40029-17
Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.
In pertinent part, Pa.R.Crim.P. 581 provides:
Rule 581. Suppression of Evidence
(A) The defendant’s attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented,
may make a motion to the court to suppress any evidence
alleged to have been obtained in violation of the defendant’s
rights.
* * *
(H) The Commonwealth shall have the burden of going forward
with the evidence and of establishing that the challenged
evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights.
The defendant may testify at such hearing, and if the defendant
does testify, the defendant does not thereby waive the right to
remain silent during trial.
(I) At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge shall enter on the
record a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law as
to whether the evidence was obtained in violation of the
defendant’s rights, or in violation of these rules or any statute,
and shall make an order granting or denying the relief sought.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(A), (H)-(I).
When the Municipal Court (1) denies a Motion to Suppress, (2) finds
the defendant guilty of a crime, and (3) imposes sentence, the defendant
has the right either to request a trial de novo or to file a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 1006(1)(a). If the defendant files a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari and challenges the denial of a Motion to Suppress, “the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County sits as an appellate court and reviews
-4-
J-S40029-17
the record of the suppression hearing in the Municipal Court.”
Commonwealth v. Neal, 151 A.3d 1068, 1070 (Pa. Super. 2016).
“Importantly, when performing this appellate review, the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County applies precisely the same standard
that the Superior Court applies in appeals from Common Pleas Court orders
denying motions to suppress.” Id. This Court recently reiterated this
standard as follows:
[T]he [C]ourt of [C]ommon [P]leas is limited to determining
whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported
by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from
those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed
before the suppression court, the [C]ourt of [C]ommon [P]leas
may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so
much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted
when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record,
the [C]ourt of [C]ommon [P]leas is bound by those findings and
may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous.
Where ... the appeal of the determination of the suppression
court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s
legal conclusions are not binding on the [C]ourt of [C]ommon
[P]leas, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court
properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of
law of the court below are subject to plenary review.
Id. at 1070-71 (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa.
2010)). “The scope of review from a suppression ruling is limited to the
evidentiary record created at the suppression hearing.” Neal, supra at
1071 (citing In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013)).
In Neal, we concluded that the same remedy applies whether a Court
of Common Pleas has denied a suppression motion without entering findings
-5-
J-S40029-17
of fact and conclusions of law or whether the Municipal Court has denied a
suppression motion without entering findings of fact and conclusions of law:
the court performing appellate review must vacate the order denying
suppression and remand with instructions for the suppression court to enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Neal, supra at 1071. This Court
reasoned that there is no meaningful difference between this Court’s
appellate review of a Court of Common Pleas order denying a suppression
motion when compared to the Court of Common Pleas reviewing a Municipal
Court’s denial of a suppression motion in the context of a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari. Id. at 1070-71.
Here, the Municipal Court failed to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I). The failure to do
so poses a substantial impediment to our meaningful and effective appellate
review.4 Accordingly, we must vacate and remand for further proceedings.
____________________________________________
4
We acknowledge that this Court may, in certain circumstances, conclude
that a remand is unnecessary and apply an alternative standard of review.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Astillero, 39 A.3d 353, 357 (Pa. Super.
2012); Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680, 685 (Pa. 2005) (holding
that “[w]hen the suppression court’s specific factual findings are
unannounced, or there is a gap in the findings, the appellate court should
consider only the evidence of the prevailing suppression party [] and the
evidence of the other party [] that, when read in the context of the entire
record, remains uncontradicted.”). In this case, such a conclusion is
unwarranted given the relevant facts in dispute and the issues presented on
appeal.
-6-
J-S40029-17
Consistent with our opinion in Neal, because the Municipal Court failed
to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law into this record, we order the
following:
(1) The Court of Common Pleas’ Order granting Antill’s Petition for Writ
of Certiorari is vacated;
(2) This case is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County with instructions to remand the case to the Municipal
Court and direct that court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law;
and
(3) Following the Municipal Court’s entry of findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County shall
reconsider Antill’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari by reviewing the evidentiary
record in accordance with the standards articulated in Jones and L.J., and
reiterated in Neal.
We relinquish jurisdiction. See Neal, supra at 1071-72 (citing
Landis, 89 A.3d at 704 n. 10 (“given our disposition of this appeal, we
decline to retain jurisdiction for the purposes of the filing of a statement of
the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the
suppression issue”)).
Order granting Antill’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari vacated. Case
remanded for proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
-7-
J-S40029-17
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/14/2017
-8-