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Appellate Court Date: 2017.07.19
11:34:52 -05'00'
People v. Veal, 2017 IL App (1st) 150500
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption ISRAEL VEAL, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. First District, Second Division
Docket No. 1-15-0500
Filed May 2, 2017
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 14-CR-49; the
Review Hon. Arthur F. Hill, Jr., Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Imran Ahmad, of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,
Ashlee Cuza, and Kelly Warnick-Brown, Assistant State’s Attorneys,
of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Hyman and Justice Pierce concurred in the judgment
and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a 2014 bench trial, defendant Israel Veal1 was convicted of several counts
arising out of his possession of a handgun, all of which merged into his armed habitual
criminal conviction, for which he was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. Veal’s sole
argument on appeal is that the trial court erroneously denied his pretrial motion to quash
arrest and suppress evidence of the gun. Finding no error, we affirm.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Veal was charged with four counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, two counts of
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and one count of armed habitual criminal after an
officer recovered a gun on Veal’s seat during a traffic stop on December 5, 2013, in Chicago.
Prior to trial, Veal moved to quash his arrest and suppress evidence of the gun.
¶4 At the suppression hearing and at trial, Officer Wojciech Kanski testified to the events of
that night. Officer Kanski was assigned to the area north saturation team, which was
dispatched to violent neighborhoods where there were high incidences of shootings and gang
conflicts. Officer Kanski was on routine patrol with his partner, Officer Pelayo, in the area of
4258 West Washington Boulevard. Officer Pelayo pulled up next to a Honda Civic at a red
light, at which time Officer Kanski observed that the rear two passengers of the car were not
wearing seatbelts. After the light changed, Officer Pelayo executed a traffic stop of the Civic.
The officers pulled to the side of the Civic after it had come to a stop, and Officer Kanski,
who was next to the rear passenger on the driver’s side, exited his vehicle and approached the
Civic. As Officer Kanski was 5 to 10 feet away from the car, he observed the rear passenger
closest to him, identified in court as Veal, making movements toward his waist, as though he
was trying to cover something. Specifically, Officer Kanski testified that Veal moved his
hands towards his waist on the right side of his body and pushed his waist down.
¶5 Upon observing Veal’s movements, Officer Kanski ordered the car’s occupants to raise
their hands for reasons of officer safety. While three of the occupants immediately complied,
Veal did not. Officer Kanski testified that Veal instead moved his hands up and down.
Officer Kanski did not did not see anything in Veal’s hands.
¶6 Officer Kanski initially ordered the driver out of the car, whereupon he patted him down,
handcuffed him, and had him stand outside behind the Civic.2 He then ordered Veal out of
the car and opened the door for him. As Veal exited the car, Officer Kanski saw a handgun
underneath where Veal had been sitting, and he immediately secured Veal and took
possession of the weapon.
¶7 The trial court denied the motion to quash and suppress, finding that the seatbelt
violation, coupled with Veal’s furtive movements and his failure to comply with the officer’s
request to raise his hands, justified ordering Veal out of the car.
1
The defendant’s name is alternately spelled “Israel” and “Isreal” throughout the record and the
briefs. We refer to him as “Israel” as that is the name used in the notice of appeal.
2
Officer Kanski testified that the driver was ticketed for the passengers’ seatbelt violations, but the
record does not indicate if that was also the reason for the driver’s arrest.
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¶8 At trial, Officer Kanski was the sole State witness. His trial testimony echoed his
testimony at the suppression hearing. At the close of the State’s evidence, the court denied
Veal’s motion for a directed finding. Veal rested without putting on evidence, and the court
found Veal guilty on all counts, which were merged into the most serious charge of armed
habitual criminal. Following the denial of his posttrial motion, Veal was sentenced and
timely appealed.
¶9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 The sole issue on appeal is the court’s ruling on Veal’s motion to quash and suppress. A
ruling on a motion to suppress is subject to a mixed standard of review. People v. Pitman,
211 Ill. 2d 502, 512 (2004). The trial court’s factual findings are entitled to deference, given
that the trial court is in a superior position to weigh the credibility of witnesses, and we will
uphold such findings unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.
However, the ultimate legal question of suppression is subject to de novo review. Id.
¶ 11 Pursuant to the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, people have the right
to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; see also
People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 268 (2005). Ordinarily, a search and seizure is reasonable
under the fourth amendment if supported by a warrant showing probable cause. Jones, 215
Ill. 2d at 269 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). But there are several
exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the circumstance where a police officer
briefly stops a person for questioning when the officer reasonably believes that person has
committed, or is about to commit, a crime—colloquially known as a Terry stop. People v.
Duran, 2016 IL App (1st) 152678, ¶ 13 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).
¶ 12 A motor vehicle stop is akin to a Terry stop (Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998)),
and as such, we analyze the reasonableness of such stops under Terry principles (Jones, 215
Ill. 2d at 270). A traffic stop is reasonable when the police have probable cause to believe
that a traffic violation has occurred.3 People v. Reedy, 2015 IL App (3d) 130955, ¶ 20
(quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996)).
¶ 13 Here, Veal does not challenge the legality of the stop based on the fact that both Veal and
his fellow rear-seat passenger were not wearing seatbelts. See 625 ILCS 5/12-603.1(a) (West
2014) (generally requiring rear-seat passengers to wear safety belts). And both parties agree
that following a lawful traffic stop police may, as a matter of course, order the driver and any
passengers out of the vehicle pending completion of the stop. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1997); see also
People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 433 (2001). However, the parties dispute whether
Officer Kanski’s command for Veal to exit the car occurred while the stop was in progress.
Specifically, Veal contends that following the arrest of the driver, the stop had concluded and
he was free to leave. Thus, according to Veal, the order to step out of the car constituted a
new police-citizen encounter requiring separate justification under the fourth amendment.
We disagree.
¶ 14 We have considered the question of when a traffic stop “ends” for purposes of
determining the legality of a later search of the automobile or the defendant. As a general
3
A traffic stop may also be justified under the less exacting Terry standard of reasonable suspicion.
People v. Reedy, 2015 IL App (3d) 130955, ¶ 20 n.1 (collecting cases).
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matter, we have held that the return of paperwork—e.g., a driver’s license, vehicle
registration, or proof of insurance—signifies the conclusion of the stop, as it conveys to the
driver that he is free to leave, and any ensuing search must be supported on grounds
independent of the initial violation prompting the stop. See, e.g., People v. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d
262, 276 (2008); People v. Kats, 2012 IL App (3d) 100683, ¶ 20; People v. Al Burei, 404 Ill.
App. 3d 558, 565 (2010); People v. Miller, 345 Ill. App. 3d 836, 842 (2004).
¶ 15 But Illinois courts have not squarely confronted the issue presented in this case, which is
whether a traffic stop ends when, instead of returning papers to the driver, the officers arrest
or restrain him. The closest case on point is People v. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7, 14-15 (2003),
where, following the arrest of the driver for failing to produce a valid driver’s license, the
police asked defendant, the front-seat passenger, to exit the car and then proceeded to
question him. Although the defendant argued that the questioning violated his fourth
amendment rights, he conceded that the officer could lawfully order him out of the vehicle.
Id. As a result, the supreme court did not analyze the issue here. Id. at 15.
¶ 16 In considering this question, we find instructive the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona
v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). There, three police officers pulled over a vehicle after
a license plate check revealed that the vehicle’s registration was suspended. Id. at 327. While
one officer attended to the driver and asked him to exit the vehicle, another officer
questioned the defendant, the rear-seat passenger, and eventually asked him to exit the car
where she could question him regarding his gang affiliation outside of the presence of the
front-seat passenger. Id. at 327-28. After the defendant exited, the officer patted him down
and recovered a weapon; at issue was the lawfulness of the pat down. Id. at 328-29. The
Court rejected the Arizona Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the pat down was a separate
encounter from the traffic stop and explained that a “traffic stop of a car communicates to a
reasonable passenger that he or she is not free to terminate the encounter with the police and
move about at will.” Id. at 333 (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 257 (2007)).
Accordingly, the stop does not “end” until the police no longer need to control the scene and
inform the driver (or passengers) that they are free to leave. Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333. The
Court concluded that nothing occurred to convey to the defendant that, prior to the pat-down,
the stop had ended or that he was free to depart without police permission. Id. at 333-34.
¶ 17 We do not read Johnson to say that no traffic stop can be considered complete unless and
until the police so inform the occupants of the vehicle. Rather, we must consider the
circumstances of each case and determine whether, under those circumstances, a reasonable
person would understand that they were free to leave and the police no longer needed to
control the scene.
¶ 18 In this case, we do not believe the arrest of the driver would lead a reasonable person in
Veal’s position to believe that he was free to leave. Significantly, the stop was prompted by
the fact that neither Veal nor the other rear-seat passenger was wearing a seatbelt, which is a
petty offense subject to a fine. 625 ILCS 5/12-603.1(d) (West 2014). While Officer Kanski
began the encounter by restraining the driver, that alone did not suggest that Veal would
escape ticketing. In other words, Officer Kanski’s action of handcuffing the driver did not
convey to the passengers that they were then free to leave, particularly where two of those
passengers had also committed traffic violations.
¶ 19 In sum, because we conclude that the stop was ongoing at the time Officer Kanski
ordered Veal out of the car and because an officer may routinely order a passenger out of a
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car during a lawful traffic stop (Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 433), we hold that Veal’s search and
seizure did not run afoul of the fourth amendment. For this reason, we need not address the
State’s argument in the alternative that the officer’s order to exit the car was independently
supported by a reasonable suspicion that Veal had committed a crime based on his furtive
movements.
¶ 20 CONCLUSION
¶ 21 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
¶ 22 Affirmed.
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