IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-1535
Filed July 19, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARJAN STOJANOV,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Palo Alto County, Ann M. Gales,
District Associate Judge.
Marjan Stojanov appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and
subsequent conviction for operating while under the influence. AFFIRMED.
Jared R. Weber, Orange City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.
2
DANILSON, Chief Judge.
Marjan Stojanov appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and
subsequent conviction for operating while under the influence (OWI).
Stojanov was approached by Deputy Eric Ring while Stojanov was parked
in a gas station parking lot. The officer had located Stojanov driving a vehicle
matching the description of a citizen’s report of a suspected intoxicated driver
and followed the vehicle to the gas station. The officer did not observe any traffic
violations. Stojanov failed field sobriety tests, and a later breath test indicated a
blood alcohol content of more than twice the legal limit. Stojanov was charged
with OWI. He filed a motion to suppress, asserting he was seized without
reasonable suspicion or probable cause and the results of the seizure should be
suppressed.
Our review of the denial of a motion to suppress is de novo. State v.
Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001). “Under this review, we ‘make an
independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the
entire record.’” Id. (citation omitted). “The fact findings of the district court are
not binding; however, because the district court had the opportunity to assess the
credibility of the witnesses, we do give deference to those findings.” State v.
Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 131 (Iowa 2006).
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Stojanov and Deputy Ring
presented very different versions of their encounter. Deputy Ring testified he
parked next to the vehicle Stojanov had been driving. He then approached the
vehicle and engaged Stojanov in friendly conversation by saying “hello” and
asking, “Would you mind stepping out of the car for me?” After Stojanov did so,
3
Deputy Ring asked, “Mind if I speak with you?” According to the deputy,
Stojanov’s decision to engage in conversation with him was entirely voluntary up
until the point when Deputy Ring observed signs of intoxication and developed
reasonable suspicion to justify further detention for investigatory purposes.
Stojanov testified, however, Deputy Ring’s unmarked vehicle partially
blocked him in, and when Stojanov got out of his vehicle and started walking
towards the store, the deputy yelled in a commanding voice, “Go back in the
vehicle.” Stojanov described the deputy’s tone of voice as “very scary,
commanding, loud.” According to Stojanov, Deputy Ring gave the command for
Stojanov to get back in the vehicle while Deputy Ring was walking towards the
vehicle with his hand near his gun.
The district court concluded Deputy Ring’s testimony was credible and
Stojanov’s was not, and Stojanov was not seized when the deputy approached
the vehicle but only after the deputy had cause to believe Stojanov was under the
influence.
The trial court’s specific credibility finding was based upon this reasoning:
Deputy Ring is a trained officer with over [thirteen] years of law
enforcement experience. His testimony was reasonable and
internally consistent. His memory of events was clear and
unimpaired. There is no evidence that he had a preexisting bias
against Stojanov—or that he had any previous knowledge of
Stojanov whatever. He testified that he was well aware he did not
have grounds to detain Stojanov during the initial encounter and for
that reason he was careful not to use police coercion to restrain
Stojanov’s movement. These factors cause the Court to believe
that Deputy Ring was cognizant of his constitutionally permissible
boundaries and was careful not to cross them.
Stojanov, on the other hand, had a clear motivation to testify
untruthfully in order to avoid a conviction for operating while
intoxicated. In addition, unlike Deputy Ring, Stojanov was impaired
on the night in question, as evidenced by his failure of field sobriety
4
tests and the open containers of alcohol in his vehicle. It is likely
that Stojanov’s perception of events and memory were impaired by
his alcohol consumption. For all these reasons, the court rejects
Stojanov’s version of events and accepts the deputy’s testimony as
true.
In light of the deference owed to the district court’s specific credibility
determination and its superior position to examine and view the witnesses, we
adopt the findings as our own. We conclude Stojanov’s initial encounter with
Deputy Ring was not a seizure. See State v. Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Iowa
2008) (“Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority,
has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a
‘seizure’ has occurred.” (citation omitted)). We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED.
State of Iowa v. Marjan Stojanov
Combined Opinion