NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 25 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAJBIR SINGH, No. 14-71862
Petitioner, Agency No. A200-979-971
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 14, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and FOGEL,*** District
Judge.
Rajbir Singh petitions for review of the decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Jeremy D. Fogel, Senior United States District Judge
for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
removal, and protection under Article III of the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction, and we affirm.
1. Singh contends that the BIA erred in affirming the immigration judge
(“IJ”)’s finding that Singh was not credible. Under the applicable standard, “only
the most extraordinary circumstances will justify overturning an adverse credibility
determination.” Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). Here,
both the IJ and the BIA identified several specific reasons for their respective
determinations as to Singh’s credibility, including material inconsistencies in
Singh’s own testimony, between Singh’s testimony and that of other witnesses, and
between the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence. The IJ also
found much of Singh’s documentary evidence to be questionable and unreliable,
based both on the appearance of the documents and on internal inconsistencies
within the documents themselves. “Immigration judges retain broad discretion to
accept a document as authentic or not based on the particular factual showing
presented.” Vatyan v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1179, 1185 (9th Cir. 2007). Even if the
agency erred in relying on some of these inconsistencies, the error would be
harmless given the numerous other bases for its adverse credibility finding. See
Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e must uphold the IJ’s
adverse credibility determination so long as even one basis is supported by
substantial evidence….”).
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2. Singh also asserts that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s denial of CAT
protection. Here, too, our review is highly deferential. Almaghzar v. Gonzales,
457 F.3d 915, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2006)(applying “the substantial evidence test” to
this “factual determination”). As the BIA noted, Singh identified no evidence,
other than that which the IJ found not credible, to support his claim that he would
face a particularized threat of torture if he were to return to India.
AFFIRMED.
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